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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is well known that a bankruptcy trustee may assume a debtor's 
prepetition executory contract.1 Less known is the trustee's (or 
debtor's) ability to cure and reinstate certain executed contracts-loan 
agreements-in reorganization cases. 
How is it profitable for a trustee or debtor to assume and rein-
state a loan agreement when the obligation to pay is all on the 
debtor's side, and the jouissance of receiving payment entirely on the 
creditor's side? There are three sources of profit. First, if the con-
' See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1994). 
• Chapter 11 provides for a debtor in possession-a fox standing guard over the hen-
house. This principle is nowhere stated expressly. We learn, however, that an independent 
trustee or examin~r can be appointed for cause or if such an appointment is in the best inter-
ests of the creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1994). This implies that, until such an event 
occurs, the debtor in possession serves as the trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1994) ("A debt-
or in possession shall have all the rights ... of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter."); 
Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co. v. Holly's, Inc. (In re Holly's, Inc.), 140 B.R. 643, 685 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mich. 1992) (Gregg, J.) ("In a chapter 11 case, the debtor in possession retains manage-
ment of the business unless a party in interest demonstrates that appointment of a trustee is 
necessary."). 
In chapters 12 and 13, the debtor does not serve as the trustee. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1202, 
1302 (1994). The trustee is a "standing" official who receives postpetition payments from the 
debtor and distributes them to the creditors mentioned in .the plan. Meanwhile, the debtor 
has sole power to file a plan. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1221, 1321 (1994). 
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tract rate of interest is lower than the market rate, a debtor profits 
by reinstating the contract. If the security agreement is not reinstat-
ed, the debtor in possession may have to pay cram down interest at 
the market rate.3 Accordingly, reinstatement is obviously preferable 
when the contract rate is favorable and the creditor is oversecured.4 
The second advantage adheres only in chapter 12 (farm reorga-
nizations) and chapter 13 (wage earner reorganizations). In these 
chapters, reinstatement is valuable because the reorgariization plans 
can last only three (or, with court permission, five) years.5 A rein-
stated security agreement, however, may last longer" and obviate the 
need for refinancing. 
Third, in chapter 137 (and, since 1994, in chapter 11),8 long 
term mortgage agreements secured only by the debtor's residence 
may not be modified.9 This same mortgage agreement can be as-
' "Cram down" is slang for the notion that, where the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) 
are met, creditors can be made subject to the plan, despite the fact that the class of creditors 
to which they belong voted against it. It also refers to 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a) (5) and 1325(a)(5), 
which provide that dissenting secured parties are entitled to the value of their collateral as a 
condition of plan confirmation. 
4 See In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 420 (7th Cir. 1984) (Coffey, J.). Even 
when the creditor is undersecured, a debtor might still benefit financially, but this advantage 
would depend on a cost-benefit calculus. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89. In the case 
of assumption and reinstatement, the lower contractual interest rate is the benefit, but the cost 
will be that the debtor must pay the unsecured deficit at 100 cents on the dollar. In cram 
down, a debtor-in-possession would only have to provide the unsecured deficit claim with the 
amount it would have been allocated in a liquidation of the bankruptcy estate. When the debt-
or is insolvent, such an allocation will be less than 100 cents on the dollar. Thus, even when a 
co.Iltractual interest rate is low, an insolvent debtor in possession may not wish to assume and 
reinstateloan agreement~ when a creditor is radically undersecured. 
" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(d), 1322(d) (1994). 
" See In re Pruett, 178 B.R. 7 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) (Caddell,].) (holding that if a secu-
rity agreement is not reinstated, the secured claim must be paid within the life of a chapter 13 
plan); Brown v. Shorewood Fin., Inc. (In re Brown), 175 B.R. 129, 132-33 (Bankr. D. Mass. 
1994) (Feeney,J.) (same); In re Comans, 164 B.R. 539 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1994) (Ellington,J.) 
(same). A short-term note with a balloon payment may have connected with it the expectation 
that the creditor will renew it, but this alone does not authorize a plan to extend the note to a 
twenty year stream of payments. See Citizens Trust & Savs. Bank v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 99 
B.R. 352 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (Enslen,].). Similarly, a perpetual guaranty of advances made to 
another does not justify extension beyond the five year limit, where the actual advances are 
themselves short-term obligations of the third party. See In re Dinsmore, 141 B.R. 499, 504-05 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (Howard,].). 
7 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2) (1994). 
" See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5) (1994). Congress added this provision to discourage wage 
earners from defecting from chapter 13 to chapter 11 in order to cram down a residential 
mortgage. See Bankmptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 206(3), 108 Stat. 4106, 
4123 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(15) (1994)). 
" In 1994, Congress added an exception to this principle. Under new § 1322(c) (2), a 
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sumed and reinstated. 10 Therefore, reinstatement is vital to a chap-
ter 13 wage earner who aspires to save the family homestead. But for 
reinstatement, the mortgagee would be entitled to relief from the 
automatic stay because the home would be superfluous to effectua-
tion of a chapter 13 plan. 11 
If a debtor elects to assume and reinstate a security agreement, 
the debtor must "cure" certain past defaults. 12 What constitutes a 
"cure," however is as controversial in bankruptcy law as it is in medi-
cine. In Rake v. Wade, 13 the Supreme Court, per Justice Clarence 
Thomas implied that cure was governed by two Bankruptcy Code 
provisions pertaining to secured claims-§ 506(b) (which guarantees 
postpetition interest only to oversecured creditors) and cram 
down. 14 As this article shows, cure claims are not coherently viewed 
as secured claims when the collateral is insufficient to cover both the 
reinstated principal and the price of cure. Hence, Rake v. Wade 
caused many conceptual problems with cure and reinstatement of 
security agreements. 
Displeased by Rake v. Wade, Congress intervened in 1994 with 
some disturbing amendments to the reorganization chapters. 15 
These amendments shift the paradigm of cure from the inadequate 
chapter 13 debtor may bifurcate a home mortgage if "the last payment on the original pay-
ment schedule ... is due before the date on which the final payment under the plan is 
due .... " Section 301(2), 108 Stat. at 4131 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) (1994)). Since 
chapter 13 plans la~t no more than three years (or, with court permission, five years), see 11 
U.S.C. § 1322(d) (1994), a great many home mortgages will be immune from bifurcation. 
111 See_l 1 U.S.C. §§ l 123(a) (5), 1322(b) (5) (1994). Controversy exists over whether a debt-
or may pay the reinstatement amounts directly to the secured party or whether the payments 
must be made through the chapter 13 trustee. Compare Wagnerv. Armstrong (In re Wagner), 36 
F.3d 723 (8th Cir. 1994) (Bowman J.) (outside payment permitted in chapter 12); In re Ber-
ru1rd, 201 B.R. 600 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (Feeney,].) (outside payment permitted in chapter 
13); United States v. Donald (In re Donald), 170 B.R. 579 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (Pickering,].) (same) 
with Fulk1Vll v. Savage (In re Fulkrod), 973 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1994 (per curiam) (outside pay-
ment permitted in chapter 12); In re Harris, 200 B.R. 745 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (Kenner,].) 
( outside payments not permitted in chapter 13). The standing trustee,. whose fee is calculated 
as a percentage of money handled, obviously prefers that reinstatements be run through the 
plan. See Michaela M. White, The Effects of Chapter 13 Plan Confinnation and Case Conversion on 
Property, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 785 (1993). 
11 See Di Pierro v. Taddeo (In re Taddeo), 685 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1982) (Lumbard,].). 
12 See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1124(2)(A), 1222(b)(2), 1322(b)(2) (1994). 
" 508 U.S. 464 (1993). 
14 Id. at 470-71. 
"' These amendments affect any bankruptcy proceeding filed on or after October 22, 
1994. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394 § 702(a), 108 Stat. 4106-4150. A 
different effective date applies for the new definition of "cure." See. infra note 268 and accom-
panying text. 
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Rake v. Wade theory to an equally unsatisfactory contractual theo-
ry:6 Under this contractual theory, secured creditors may provide 
the terms of their own cure in their agreements. The physician may 
heal herself, choosing such luxury medicines and comforts as may 
indulge her notion of financial wellness. As always, it is the unse-
cured creditors who will pay the bill of reinstatement. Because cure 
is not compensatory, 17 assumption and cure of loan agreements 
surely will become more expensive and less common, as debtors and 
trustees will find the cure to be worse than the disease. 
The purpose of this article is to pose an alternative theory of 
cure. According to this new theory, cure should be compensatory, 
federal, and, noncont(actual-a matter of tort, if you will. Such a 
theory defines cure as the price of reinstating a security agreement 
which, if unaccelerated, still requires future payments of principal or 
interest going forward. The theory calculates the cure price as repay-
ment of amounts past due under the contract, as augmented by a 
market rate of interest between the time of default and the time the 
cure price is calculated. In addition, if the cure price is to be paid 
over time after confirmation (permitted in chapters 12 and 13), the 
present value of those deferred payments must equal the calculated 
cure price. In short," both preconfirmation interest and 
postconfirmation interest at the market rate will be required. Thus, 
coupled with reinstatement of the agreement, the cure price would 
make the creditor indifferent to the fortuity of bankruptcy. 
The difference between a pure compensatory theory and the 
Rake v. Wade theory is that the compensatory theory would apply to 
over- and undersecured creditors alike. In contrast, the Rake v. Wade 
theory applies § 506(b) and § 1325(a) (5) only to oversecured credi-
tors, 18 leaving no theory of cure for undersecured creditors. A sa-
u; One part of the amendment is noncontractual. In 1994, Congress set a federal dead-
line (the foreclosure sale) for cure and reinstatement, regardless of the content of the con-
tract or state law. See infra notes 161-86 and accompanying text. 
'
7 Economists may object that since cure is defined in the contract, and because a se-
cured creditor will have surrendered benefits to the debtor in exchange for the concessions on 
cure is inherently compensatory. This point must be conceded-at least at the level of eco-
nomic theology. I have in mind a narrower concept of "compensatory." A "compensatory" 
theory of cure would equate the cure price with the monetary defaults or principal and ordi-
nary interest payment5, augmented by the lender's actual opportunity cost (i.e., market rate of 
interest) incurred because the lender failed to receive payment on time. The cure therefore 
"compensates" for, or renders the debtor indifferent to, the fact of bankmptcy. 
'" To be more precise, § 1325(a)(5) governs the secured portion of an undersecured 
claim. See 11 U.S.C. 1325(a)(5) (1994). Arrears become part of the secured claim only if a 
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lient difference between a compensatory theory and the contractual 
theory of the 1994 amendments is that, under the compensatory 
theory, courts could ignore default penalties and postdefault interest 
rates called for in the contract. 
This suggestion might have been instituted without the need of 
legislation until 1994, when Congress provided an explicit definition 
of "cure." In light of the 1994 amendments, it is possible that legisla-
tive intervention will be needed. Ordinarily, it might seem quixotic 
and vain to suggest that Congress should open its ponderous and 
marble jaws to cast up legislation so recently enacted. Yet, along with 
amending the Bankruptcy Code in 1994, Congress also established a 
Commission to review the Bankruptcy Code in general. 19 Presum-
ably, this Commission will not flinch at reviewing and suggesting 
changes in the 1994 legislation. Therefore, a proposed new theory of 
cure may yet undeaf congressional ears. 
Even if the wind and tempests of politics do not blow in the 
direction of legislative reversal, a compensatory theory of cure might 
still be useful to have on the following basis. The 1994 amendments 
allow the contract to govern the cure price. They do not permit the 
institution of punitive measures. Penalties are not cures. Hence, it is 
open for courts to declare that any given contract penalizes the debt-
or and therefore must be disregarded. The difference. between a 
penalty and a cure is that the former is disconnected with compensa-
tion, while the latter merely compensates a creditor for harms done. 
Hence, even under the current regime, courts must have a notion of 
what compensation means. When a contract deviates from that con-
cept, the courts will know that they are faced with punition dressed 
up in the benevolent clothes of cure. In short, the devil hath power 
to assume a pleasing shape. Although the 1994 amendments indicate 
that the contract is the theme of cure's tongue, in fact cure inevita-
bly speaks for itself in a noumenal way. Cure already has a covert 
federal soul. The contract is merely evidence of that soul-the ap-
pearance and not the reality of cure. 
In order to compare the cure with the underlying concept of 
reinstatement, Part II of this article reviews the relevant statutory 
criteria of reinstatement and their differences in the various reorga-
nization chapters. Part II will help emphasize the distinction between 
court consciously allocates them to the secured portion and the reinstated amount to the un-
secured portion. 
"' Section 601-10, 108 Stat. at 4147-50. 
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reinstatement and cure, the latter idea being nothing else but the 
price a debtor must pay to achieve reinstatement. Part III will then 
assess the state of cure prior to and in light of the 1994 amend-
ments. Finally, Part IV will discuss the new theory of cure and rein-
statement being presented. 
II. REINSTATEMENT 
A. Chapter 7 
Chapter 7 liquidation does not allow for the reinstatement of 
loan agre(!ments. Although "executory contracts" may be assumed 
and assigned by trustees to the profit of unsecured creditors,20 loan 
agreements may not. They are "executed" contracts. That is, under 
definitions developed in case law,21 loan agreements are not execu-
tory because they do not usually provide for material duties on each 
side of the contract. Nor do they provide for material nonmonetary 
obligations from either side. Accordingly, loan agreements do not 
fall within the ambit of § 365. 22 
In the absence of reinstatement in chapter 7, the Bankruptcy 
Code automatically accelerates loans, making principal payments due 
in the future presently payable. This proposition is established in 
subsection 502(a) and (b) which provide that: 
(a) A claim ... proof of which is filed under section 501 of this title, 
is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest ... objects. 
20 Section 365(a) allows for the general assumption of executory contract~. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 365(a) (1994). Section 103(a) makes§ 365(a) applicable in chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) 
(1994). 
2
' See generally Jay L. Westbrook, A Functional A~ialysis of Executary Contmcts, 74 MINN. L. 
REV. 227 (1989). 
,,., A great many courts w~uld hold that a chapter 7 trustee has neither a theory under 
which nor an incentive to assume and reinstate a loan agreement. While it is true that a debt-
or and a creditor may, under close court supervision, agree to reinstate a prepetition loan 
agreement under§ 524(c), such reinstatement requires creditor ~onsent. Nevertheless, a mi-
nority of courts think that they could declare a security agreement' to be out of default and 
reinstate it for the benefit of the debtor. Coupled with this declaration of no default is a judi-
cial injunction extending beyond the chapter 7 distribution, preventing any foreclosure of 
collateral until the debtor actually default~ in the future. This controversial theory is beyond 
the scope of this essay, which will consider only the type of cure and reinstatement authorized 
in the reorganization chapters. For a discussion of the unilateral reinstatement of security 
agreement~ in chapter 7, see David Gray Carlson, Redemption and Reinstatement in Chapter 7 
Cases, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 289 (1996). 
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(b) ... if such objection to a claim is made, the court, after notice 
and a hearing, shall determine the amount of such claim in lawful 
currency of the United States as of the date of the filing of the peti-
tion, and shall allow such claim in such amount ... 23 
The language in section 502 (b) allows a claim for any principal 
amount due and owing in the future, which shall be treated as 1due 
and owing "as of the date of the filing of the petition. "24 
Since a claim is allowed "as of' the petition date, postpetition 
interest is implicitly never part of an allowed claim, so far as 
§ 502(b) is concerned.25 For good measure, an exception to 
§ 502(b) disallows any claim for "unmatured interest."26 Putting the 
preamble together with the exception, any creditor is entitled to 
claim prepetition interest and principal, plus an acceleration of any 
principal due and owing in the future. A creditor may not claim 
postpetition interest,27 except that oversecured · creditors may have 
postpetition interest pursuant to§ 506(b), which states: 
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property 
the value of which, after any recovery under [§ 506( c)], is greater 
than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder 
of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, 
or charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim 
arose/8 
If, however, all creditors have been paid in a chapter 7 liquidation, 
§ 726(a) (5) indicates that all of the unsecured creditors are to be 
paid interest on their claims at the legal rate.29 
These rules apply in chapter 7, but, indirectly, in reorganization 
as well. Each reorganization chapter accords creditors the right to 
23 11 U.S.C. § 502(a)-(b) (1994). 
24 Section 502 (b). 
"'' SeeShearson Lehman Mortgage Corp. v. Laguna (In re Laguna), 944 F.2d 542,543 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (Leavy,J.). 
21; 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2) (1994). 
27 In the 1980's, a theory arose that an undersecured creditor deserves postpetition inter-
est a~ part of her right to adequate protection, but this theory was rejected by the Supreme 
Court in the important ca~e of United Savings Assn. of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Fore.st Associates, 
484 U.S. 365 (1988) (Scalia, J.); see generally David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the 
Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577 (1989). 
2
• 11 u.s.c. § 506(b) (1994). 
2
" This residual entitlement to postpetition interest for unsecured creditors will play a 
part in the analysis to follow. See infra notes 93-94, 393-94 and accompanying text. 
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receive as much from a reorganization plan as from a chapter 7 
liquidation.30 Accordingly, chapter 7 distribution rights establish a 
minimum entitlement of a creditor in any reorganization proceed-
ing. 
B. Chapter 11 and "Disimpairment" 
Chapter 11 authorizes the "curing or waiving of any default. "31 
The effect of cure on a security agreement in chapter 11 can be 
significant. To see why, an excursus on chapter 11 voting is required. 
1. Voting 
In chapter 11, the creditors vote on the mode of distribution. 
This makes chapter 11 different from chapter 7. While general credi-
tors in chapter 7 elect the trustee,32 they may not vote on distribu-
tion, which is dogmatically fixed by Bankruptcy Code § 726.33 In 
chapter 11, howev~r, creditors may vote on the distributional system 
promulgated by the plan. 
Voting in chapter 11 is by class. There is good reason for this. 
Prior to the enactment of Bankruptcy Act section 77B34 and the re-
organization chapters that soon followed,35 businesses were reorga-
nized by means of equity receiverships under the pre-Erie federal 
common law. The receiver could not force a creditor to compromise 
her claim. A creditor could hold out against a consensual plan in 
order to obtain a greater recovery.36 Accordingly, while the princi-
"° See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), 1225(a)(4), 1325(a)(4) (1994). Section 
l 129(a) (7) (A) (ii) indicates that a creditor may waive this right by voting in favor of the plan. 
The mies in chapter 12 and 13 apply only to unsecured creditors. Secured creditors are guar-
anteed the value of their collateral. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(a)(5), 1325(a)(5) (1994). To the 
extent they have unsecured deficit claims, they are entitled to the protection of§ 1225(a) (4) 
and§ 1325(a)(4). 
" See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5)(G) (1994). 
"' See 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1994). 
" See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1994); United States v. Noland, 116 S. Ct. 1524 (1996) (Souter,].) 
(equitable subordination doctrine may not be used legislatively to change chapter 7 priorities). 
"' See Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, Pub. L. No. 296, 48 Stat. 911, 913-22. 
"'' Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1978). 
sn See Werner, Harris & Buck v. Equitable Trust Co., 35 F.2d 513, 514 (10th Cir. 1929) 
(McDermitt,J.) ("Each bondholder has the absolute right to determine for himself, in case of 
default, whether he shall take his loss and quit, or continue to gamble .... "); E. Merrick 
Dodd, Reorgflnizfltion Thruugh Bllnkruptry: A Remedy For Whllt?, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1100, 1100-03 
(1935). The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 and the little-used creditor compositions of§ 12 of the 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 also contained class voting. See Chaim J. Fortgang & Thomas Moers 
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pal creditors worked and sacrificed to save the going concern of a 
firm, the lesser creditors soon recognized the profit in protesting too 
much; such creditors were cashed out in full, so that the larger cred-
itors-the ones who really stood to lose if the company were not 
reorganized-could proceed by compromise to reorganize the com-
pany. 
The reorganization legislation therefore introduced cla.ss voting, 
so that marginal creditors could not hold up the entire proceeding 
in order to get paid.37 The Bankruptcy Code continues these rules. 
It requires that two thirds of claims (by amount) in the class vote 
affirmatively, and that a flat majority (by head count) also vote affir-
matively.38 If the class votes in favor of the plan, dissenting creditors 
within the class are forced to go along with the majority, at least for 
voting purposes.39 If the class votes negatively, then the plan may 
still be confirmed, but only if the debtor "crams down" the plan 
under§ 1129(b).40 
It is easy to overestimate the importance of voting in chapter 1 I. 
Generally, even if creditors vote negatively, the plan can be con.:. 
firmed nevertheless, provided that the so-called "cram down" rules of 
§ 1129 (b) are met. This principle is established by the following 
phrase in§ 1129(b) (1): 
if all of the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of this section 
other than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the court, on 
request of the proponent of the plan, shall confirm the plan notwith-
standing the requirements of such paragraph .... 41 
Mayer, Trading Culims mul Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 87 
(1990). 
37 See Herwig v. Neuses (In re Herwig), 119 F.2d 941, 943 (7th Cir. 1941) (Sparks,].) (em-
phasizing that old§ 77B was founded on the principle of stifling dissent). · 
311 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1994). 
'" Thus, in In re 11,111, Inc., 117 B.R. 471 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990) (Kresse!, CJ.), two 
minor creditors, classified together with huge yes-voting creditors, demanded separate classifi-
cation, so that they could preserve their cram down rights . 
... , See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1994); see generally Olympia & York Fla. Equity Corp. v. Bank 
of New York (In re Holywell Corp.), 913 F.2d 873, 879-80 (11th Cir. 1990) (Cox,J.) (describing 
the relationship between Bankmptcy Code§§ 1129(a) and 1129(b)); Teamsters Nat'I Freight 
Indus. Negotiating Comm. v. U.S. Truck Co. (In re U.S. Trnck Co.), 800 F.2d 581, 583 (6th 
Cir. 1986) (Kennedy, J.) ("Confirmation under subsection (b) is commonly referred to as a 
"cram down" because it permits a reorganization plan to go into effect over the objections of 
one or more impaired classes of creditors."). 
41 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1) (1994) (emphasis added). 
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Section 1129(a) (8) in turn requires: 
With respect to each class of claims or interests-
(A) such class has accepted the plan; or 
(B) such class is not impaired under the plan.42 
283 
Thus, if an impaired class votes negatively, the plan may still be con-
firmed by means of cram down.43 A negative vote, then, does noth-
ing more than trigger the cram down protections44-with this im-
portant exception: if no class of impaired creditors votes affirmative-
ly, the plan cannot be confirmed, by virtue of the rule in 
§ 1129 ( a) (I 0). This surprisingly important rule will be discussed 
presently. 4r, 
2. Impairment 
Only impaired creditors may vote in chapter 11. Unimpaired 
creditors are deemed to accept the plan.46 As the legislative history 
puts it, "the holder of a claim or interest who under the plan is re-
sto.red to his original position, when others receive less or get noth-
ing at all, is fortunate indeed and has no cause to complain. "47 
Section 1124 of the Code describes all claims in chapter 11 as 
impaired, with two exceptions: (1) if the plan leaves the creditor's 
rights unaltered, or (2) if the plan cures all past defaults and rein-
" See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8). 
43 On what cram down requires, see Jack Friedman, What Courts Do to Secured Creditors in 
Chapter I I Cram Down, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1495 (1993). 
44 See In re Polytherm Indus., Inc., 33 B.R. 823, 838 (W.D. Wis. 1983) (Crabb, J.) ("The 
impairment determination can be viewed as a statutorily prescribed measurement for deter-
mining when the protections established in [§ 1129(b)] should be accorded a class of credi-
tors."). 
"' See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text. 
«; See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(0 (1994). Conclusively so, since 1984. Prior to 1984, some courts 
thought that creditors who actually voted negatively would be entitled to cram down rights, like 
other negatively-voting creditors, thereby depriving the debtor of the benefits of 
disimpairment. See Charles D. Booth, The Cramdown on Secured Creditors: An Impetus Toward Set-
tkment, 60 AM. BANKR. LJ. 69, 84 (1986). 
47 S. REP. No. 95-989, 120 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5906. This remark 
perhaps underestimates the nearly boundless power of complaint that resides in creditors. 
Creditors might complain that, but for bankruptcy, the debtor would have defaulted and credi-
tors could have reinvested liquidation proceeds at a higher rate of interest. Yet Congress has 
clearly decided that this excess value in the Joan agreement belongs to the general credi-
tors-not to the specific creditor whose agreement is reinstated. 
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states the security agreement.48 In either of those situations, the 
claim is considered not impaired, and the creditor in question is 
deemed to vote affirmatively on the plan. The presumption that 
chapter 11 tends to impair all secured claims accords with what the 
typical layperson would say about the bankruptcy process. For exam-
ple, the automatic stay prohibits foreclosure.49 Moreover, if 
undersecured, the creditor gets no postpetition interest.50 Thus, 
these routine features of chapter 11 would seem to be impairment 
itself.51 
Because of the strong presumption in favor of impairment, vir-
tually any change in rights proves that a plan does not leave creditor 
rights unaltered. Thus, a change in the maturity date52 or a substi-
tution of debtors53 or collateral54 is an impairment, even if the col-
•• Section 1124(2) provides: 
Except as provided in section 1123(a) (4) of this title, a class of claims or inter-
ests is impaired under a plan unless, with respect to each claim or interest of such 
class, the plan-
(2) notwithstanding any contractual provision or applicable law that entitles 
the holder of such claim or interest to demand or receive accelerated payment of 
such claim or interest after the occurrence of a default-
(A) cures any such default that occurred before or after the com-
mencement of the ca'!e under this title, other than a default of a kind speci-
fied in section 365 (b) (2) of this title; 
(B) reinstates the maturity of such claim or interest as such maturity 
existed before such default; 
(C) compensates the holder of such claim or interest for any damages 
incurred as a result of any reasonable reliance by such holder on such con-
tractual provision or such applicable law; and 
(D) does not otherwise alter the legal, equitable, or contractual rights 
to which such claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest. 
11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (1994). The preamble to § 1124 refers to § 1123(a)(4) as an exception. 
Section 1123(a) (4) requires that a plan provide equal intraclass treatment of creditors, unless 
the creditors vote otherwise. Its presence as an exception to disimpairment suggests that dis-
criminatory intraclass treatment makes any claim impaired. 
411 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) (1994). 
,.o See United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 
(1988) (Scalia, J.). 
51 Cf. In m Dixon, 151 B.R. 388, 393 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1993) (Ellington, C. J.) (suggest-
ing bankruptcy is always a modification of a creditor's rights, and that "modification" prohibit-
ed in § 1322(b)(2) is therefore a term of art). 
52 See Ronit, Inc. v. Block Shim Dev. Co.-Irving (In m Block Shim Dev. Co.-Irving), 118 
B.R. 450, 455 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (Fitzwater,].). 
53 See In m Barrington Oaks Gen. Partnership, 15 B.R. 952, 956 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) 
(Mabey,J.). 
54 See In m Gagel & Gagel, 30 B.R. 627, 629-30 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (Anderson,].). 
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lateral is better in quality and more in quantity.55 Lump sum pay-
ment in lieu of installments is likewise an impairment.56 By some 
accounts, even an improvement in position is an impairment.57 On 
the other hand, courts might overlook minor "technical" impair-
ments.58 
Impairment had been defined under old chapter X as a "materi-
al and adverse" effect on a claim.51) Such a standard entailed vexing 
valuation criteria. Obviously, the Bankruptcy Code has lightened the 
standard,60 and it has been suggested that the standard should not 
depend on any quantitative effects on the value of a creditor's claim, 
but merely on qualitative change of any sort.61 Impairment should 
be found easily, and chapter 11 plans should rise and fall on cram 
down criteria.62 
'''' SeeMARTINj. BIENENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 596 (1987). 
,,n See In w Otero Mills, Inc., 31 B.R. 185, 186 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1983) (McFeeley, J.). 
''
7 See In re Temple Zion, 125 B.R. 910, 919 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (Scholl, J.). In L & J 
Anaheim Asso1:~. v. Kawrm1ki /,easing Int'[, Inc. (In w L&] Anahrim Assot:i-.), 995 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 
1993), a secured party proposed it5 own chapter 11 plan, which consigned the unsecured defi-
cit claim to a unique cla5s and awarded the unsecured deficit claim improved rights. See id. at 
941-42. This unique cla5s was the only one voting affirmatively on the plan.Judge Diarmuid F. 
O'Scannlain mled that the cla5s was impaired by virtue of its improved rights. See id. at 943. As a 
result, the plan could be confirmed because, by this dubious means, the secured party had 
met the requirements of§ 1129(a)(l0). Nevertheless, courts disagree as to whether an im-
provement in position is an impairment. In Bustop Shelters of Louisville, Inc. v. Classic Homes, Inc., 
914 F.2d 810 (6th Cir. 1990), a plan a5sumed a security agreement and provided for a secured 
party to obtain a surety in addition to the debtor's continued liability. See id. at 812. The addi-
tional surety-an improvement in position-was held not to be an impairment, even though 
the debtor's equity in the collateral was transferred to the surety. Although these changes "al-
tered" the creditor's prepetition right5, Judge Cornelia Kennedy ruled that the secured party 
was not impaired, and its vote could not count in aid of the plan. See id. at 815-16. Bustop 
might be reconciled with Anaheim Assodates by observing that the contractual relations between 
the secured party and the original debtor were left untouched; the creation of new relations 
between the secured party and the surety did not therefore alter the original debtor-creditor 
relationship. 
For another case denying that improvement in position is an impairment see In re Boston 
Post Road Ltd., 145 B.R. 745, 747 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1992) (Krechevsky, C. J.), affd, 154 B.R. 
617 (D. Conn. 1993), riffd, 21 F.3d 477 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 897 (1995). 
''" See In w Orlando Tennis World Dev. Co., 34 B.R. 558, 562 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) 
(Proctor, J.) (change of management violated covenant but wa5 overlooked on the grounds 
that it was "technical"). 
'" See In reWitt, 60 B.R. 556,561 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa, 1986) (Hill,].). 
'" See id. at 560. 
"' See L & J Anaheim A5socs. v. Kawasaki Lea5ing lnt'I, Inc. (In w Anaheim Assocs.), 995 
F.2d 940, 942 (9th Cir. 1993) (O'Scannlain,J.) (citing In re Barrington Oaks Gen. Partnership, 
15 B.R. 952, 962 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981) (Mabey,].)). 
"! Thus, in Toibb 11. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991),Justice Harry Blackmun held that, under 
the literal words of the Bankruptcy Code, a consumer could file a chapter 11 plan. When the 
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A major purpose of reinstatment in chapter 11 is for the securi-
ty agreements to stand as an alternative to cram down rights under 
§ 1129(b). Only creditors in no-voting classes are entitled to invoke 
cram down protection. Reinstated creditors are presumed to vote 
affirmatively. Reinstated creditors are thus denied the two important 
principles of cram down. According to the first, a secured creditor 
class voting no on the plan, must, in effect, be given the equivalent 
of the collateral. This may be in one of three forms: (A) the present 
value of the collateral, in the form of debt payable over time,63 (B) 
the present value of the cash proceeds,64 or (C) the indubitable 
equivalent of the claim.65 A second principle applies only to unse-
cured creditors, but is relevant to undersecured creditors with unse-
cured deficit claims. Unsecured creditors are entitled to assert the 
absolute priority rule, according to which no junior creditor or inter-
est holder is entitled to any property until the negatively-voting cred-
itor is paid in full. 66 
Neither of these principles applies to unimpaired or disimpaired 
claims. Thus, a secured creditor whose claim is reinstated is not nec-
essarily entitled to the value of collateral or its indubitable equiva-
lent. And no reinstated creditor has standing to assert the absolute 
priority rule when the plan provides for the retention of ownership 
by equity participants. 
Given the purpose of impairnient as an alternative to cram 
down, Judge Ralph Mabey, in the influential case of In re Barrington 
Oaks General Partnership,67 suggested that a creditor is impaired if 
she could benefit from cram down protection. According to Judge 
Mabey, the statutory definition was merely the "formal" approach, 
whereas his more creative suggestion was the "functional" approach. 
This broader definition encouraged him to declare that, any time 
the collateral is sold to a third party contrary to a "due on sale" 
objection was raised that consumers under chapter 11 could keep their postpetition wages 
when chapter 13 debtors could not, Justice Blackmun dismissed the objection by noting that 
creditors are at least as well off in chapter 11 as they are in liquidation. See id. at 164. In other 
words, Justice Blackmun mled that creditor welfare, not technical criteria, should decide the 
appropriateness of a chapter 11 plan. This instinct supports a very broad definition of impair-
ment. 
'" See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (1994). 
,;.i See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
'" See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i). 
66 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
67 15 B.R. 952 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981). 
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clause (i.e., a clause that accelerates the loan whenever the debtor 
sells the collateral to a third· party), the secured party is impaired, 
even if the third party assumes the loan obligation, because a differ-
ent debtor constitutes a different risk. He admitted, however, that 
the slow-footed "formal" approach would have sufficed to reach this 
result.6/l 
Judge Mabey's innovation seems to presume that the creditor in 
mind is voting negatively on the plan. His rule succeeds in giving 
such a negative-minded creditor access and passage to cram down. If 
followed, the rule must shake the debtor from her fell purpose of 
capturing value from the secured creditor. Under the Barrington 
Oaks definition of impairment, a plan could be confirmed only if the 
present value of the reinstated security agreement equalled the value 
of the collateral. Yet no debtor would reinstate a contract unless it 
was cheaper than cram down. Hence, Judge Mabey's rule deprives 
reinstatement of all utility as an alternative to cram down. In recent 
years Barrington Oaks has not been followed-though the Ninth Cir-
cuit has recently cited the case with approval.69 
3. One Class Must Vote Affirmatively 
Class voting controls whether cram down standards must be 
applied to a chapter 11 plan. It does so in two ways. First, by virtue 
of class voting, dissenting creditors who are outvoted by the other 
members of their class do not have standing to insist on the cram 
down standards. 70 Second, if no class votes affirmatively, then 
§ 1129(a) (10) prevents confirmation, even if cram down standards 
could be met. 71 
According to § 1129(a) (10), confirmation can occur "if a class 
of claims is impaired under the plan, [only if] at least one class of 
claims that is impaired under the plan has accepted the plan, deter-
i;• Id. at 966; cf. Bustop Shelters of Louisville, Inc. v. Classic Homes, Inc., 914 F.2d 810, 
814-15 (6th Cir. 1990) (Kennedy,].) (sale of collateral without more not per se impairment). 
'*' See L & J Anaheim Assocs. v. Kawasaki Leasing Int'I, Inc. (In re Anaheim Assocs.), 995 
F.2d 940, 942-43 (9th Cir. 1993) (O'Scannlain,J.). 
70 To be sure, dissenting creditors may occasionally insist that various parts of§ l 129(a) 
prevent confirmation of the plan. For example, even if a class votes "yes," the outvoted mem-
bers of the class may still insist that they receive as much from the plan as they would have 
received from a chapter 7 liquidation of the bankruptcy estate. See 11 U.S.C. § l 127(a) (7) (A) 
(1994). 
71 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (10) (1994). 
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mined without including any acceptance of the plan by any insid-
er. "72 This provision is the source of a secured creditor's "classifica-
tion veto."73 The veto depends on the rule (contained nowhere in 
the Bankruptcy Code) that like claims must be placed in the same 
class.74 According to this important strategy, the undersecured cred-
itor admits that the secured portion of her claim deserves unique 
classification because its priority to the collateral is unique.75 The 
unsecured deficit claim, however, is alleged to be identical to the 
claim of any other unsecured creditor.76 If this rule is enforced, and 
if the undersecured creditor's deficit claim is large enough (one 
third of the unsecured claims in dollar amount or greater) to assure 
a no vote from the class, the undersecured creditor hopes to prevent 
any class from voting yes.77 The classification veto obviously de-
pends on the comparative size of the unsecured deficit claim of the 
secured creditor to the other unsecured claims. In single asset cases, 
where a secured party with a large deficit claim is by far the largest 
creditor in the chapter 11 case, the secured party often may assure 
that no class votes affirmatively. The strategy stakes all on classifica-
tion. If the court allows separate classification of the unsecured defi-
cit claim, the secured creditor cannot dominate. The happy unse-
cured creditors are likely to vote affirmatively, allowing the debtor to 
leap the hurdle of§ l 129(a) (10) into the briar patch of cram down. 
Cure and reinstatement of a security agreement cannot help a 
debtor in possession meet the provisions of§ 1129(a) (10), which 
requires the affirmative vote of an impaired class of noninsider credi-
,., Id. 
73 See David Gray Carlson, The Classification Veto in SinglR A.1;~et Cllses Under Bankruptcy Code 
Section 1129(a)(]0), 44 S.C. L. REV. 565 (1993). 
;, See id. at 573-77. Section l 122(a) prevents different claims from being put in the same 
class, but it does not bar similar claims from being put into different classes. 
"' Secured creditors are almost always separately classified for this reason. See In re Rich-
ard Buick, Inc., 126 B.R. 840 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (Scholl,].). 
w On whether this vital premise is valid, see Carlson, supm note 73. 
77 One problem that nonrecourse lenders presently face is that their deficit claims are not 
given the same priority as other unsecured claims. In chapter 11, nonrecourse creditors are 
given "artificial recourse" under§ 1111 (b) (l)(A), 11 U.S.C. § 1111 (b)(l)(A) (1994) but these 
artificial recourse claims have a lower priority than recourse claims. This is due in large part to 
the workings of§ 1129(a)(7)(A), which requires every creditor in chapter 11 to obtain at least 
as much as they would in chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (1994). In chapter 7, the artifi-
cial recourse claim does not exist, and so artificial recourse claimants are never entitled to 
payment, whereas other unsecured creditors are entitled to some positive amount (where at 
least some unencumbered asset~ exist in chapter 7). See Carlson, sufmt ~ote 73, at 582-87. 
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tors.711 Thus, even if a debtor-in-possession disimpairs large numbers 
of angry creditors, the debtor still lacks the necessary yes vote. For 
this reason, debtors sometimes locate a happy class of creditors and 
nick them only slightly so that they scarcely feel their impairment 
and are still pleased to vote affirmatively. If this can be accom-
plished, the debtor will have met the provisions of§ 1129(a) (10). 
Prior to 1994, the Bankruptcy Code deemed a claim unimpaired 
if the creditor received full cash payment on the effective date of the 
plan.79 Thus, any class of creditors receiving cash on the effective 
date of the plan were deemed to be voting in the affirmative. This 
concession, however, was counterproductive to debtors because such 
a class could no longer help the debtor meet the § 1129(a) (10) 
requirement.Ho Debtors therefore preferred to write plans in which 
the happy unsecured classes received 100 cents on the dollar thirty 
days after the effective date.H1 Since a thirty-day wait was considered 
an impairment, the class was impaired and their affirmative vote 
could be counted as satisfying§ 1129(a) (lO)'s stern challenge. 
To save their classification veto, secured creditors would claim 
that delaying cash payment for thirty days was an impairment of 
such a minor or de minimis nature as to be unnecessary or artifi-
cial. H2 Artificial impairment, they argued, should be disregarded in 
the name of equity-an equity that supposedly demanded their right 
to veto an otherwise qualified chapter 11 plan. Although the matter 
was controversial, prior to 1994 the howl of artificial impairment was 
enough to shatter many a chapter 11 plan.113 
The slanderous insult of "artificial," 114 however, depended great-
'" See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (10) (1994). 
'" See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(3) (repealed 1994). 
"
0 Venturing through the mists of history-to the days before 1984-§ 1129(a)(l0) was 
unclear at to whether an unimpaired class must expressly vote affirmatively for a plan, or 
whether the deemed affirmative vote of an unimpaired class might suffice. Since § 1129(a) (10) 
initially failed to specify whether the affirmatively voting class was required to be impaired, 
courts were bitterly divided on the question. See Ethan D. Fogel, Cmifimuetion and the Unim-
paired Guess of Creditors: Is a "Deemed Acceptance" Deemed an Acceptance?, 58 AM. BANKR. LJ. 151 
(1984). In 1984, Congress made clear that the affirmatively voting class needed to be impaired 
under the plan. See Bankmptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-953 § 512(a)(9), 98 Stat. 333,386 (1984) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (1994)). This 
1984 amendment greatly strengthened the possibility of a classification veto for undersecured 
creditors. 
"' David Gray Carlson, Artificial Impairment and the Sing/,e Asset Real 'Estate Bankruptcy, 23 
CAP. U. L. REV. 339 (1995). 
"' See id. at 361-62. 
"' See id. at 353-68. 
,.., "It is said that upon being shown the newly built St. Paul's cathedral, King Charles II 
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ly on the insinuation that a debtor in possession could have paid cash 
to the affirmative voters on the effective date, but did not. In 1994, 
Congress amended the definition of "impairment" to delete the 
notion that those paid cash on the effective date are unimpaired.85 
Today, such creditors are deemed to be impaired creditors. 
Ironically, Congress did not make this deletion to weaken the 
classification veto. Rather, Congress sought to reverse a notorious 
case-In re New Valley Cmp.116-in which a solvent debtor in posses-
sion avoided paying postpetition interest to unsecured creditors by 
means of disimpairment. According to § 1129(a)(7) (A) (ii), every 
creditor must be paid at least as much as the creditor would have 
received in a chapter 7 liquidation.87 Where a chapter 7 debtor is 
solvent, unsecured creditors are entitled to postpetition interest at 
the legal rate under § 726(a) (5).1111 Section 1129(a) (7), therefore, 
demands that all unsecured creditors simlilary receive interest at the 
legal rate.1111 Yet § 1129(a)(7) (A)(ii) does not apply if the individual 
creditor "has accepted the plan."90 As previously stated, unimpaired 
creditors are deemed to accept the plan automatically.91 Hence, 
Judge Winfield ruled logically ~nough that if creditors were paid 
cash for the allowed claim on the effective date of the plan and thus 
rendered unimpaired, then § 1129(a) (7)(A) (ii) does not apply to 
require payment of postpetition interest.92 
Congress, enraged that a solvent debtor could avoid interest 
payments by this low trick, struck § 1124(3) from the Bankruptcy 
Code.93 In so doing, Congress little realized how much baby went 
out with little bathwater. As of October 22, 1994, an undersecured 
creditor can no longer claim that the affirmative vote of a separate 
class of happy creditors should be disregarded because the debtor 
exclaimed 'How awful! How artificial!' and promptly knighted Christopher Wren." Jeanne L. 
Schroeder, The Vestal and the F<lSce.1·: Property and the Feminine in Law and Psychoanalysis, 16 
CARDOZO L. REV. 805, 849 n.163 (1995). In those days "artificial" was a compliment, meaning 
"made with great art." "Awful" meant capable of inspiring awe. 
"" See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 213(d) (3), 108 Stat. 4106, 
4126. 
"'' 168 B.R. 73 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1994). 
•
1 Id. at 79; see also II U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1994). 
RR l] U.S.C. § 726(a)(5) (1994). 
"" See New Valley, 168 B.R. at 79. 
!Hl 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (7) (A)(i). 
"' See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
'" See New Vtdley, 168 B.R. at 79. 
"' Bankmptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 213(d), 108 Stat. 4106, 4126. 
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could have disimpaired them by giving cash on the effective date.94 
Receipt of cash no longer disimpairs them. Rather, undersecured 
creditors now have to argue that the happy class should be disre-
garded because the debtor could have reinstated and cured the 
creditor's agreement under § 1124(2). Courts are much less likely to 
disenfranchise the affirmative voting class on the basis of a mere 
potential for assumption and reinstatement. Often, there is nothing 
to reinstate, such as where the creditors are suppliers who have al-
ready performed and simply wish to be paid.!)5 If paying creditors 
(as a means of cure) is the same as assuming and reinstating their 
contracts, then Congress will have failed to overrule New Valky. Sol-
vent debtors in possession could still disqualify creditors from 
§ 1129(a)(7) (A) (ii) by paying them, and once again these creditors 
would lose their§ 726(a) (5) right to postpetition interest. Yet this is 
precisely what Congress hoped to prevent by repealing old 
§ 1124(3).96 
C. Chapters 12 and 13 
Chapter 13 is the well known reorganization chapter for wage 
earning debtors. Chapter 12, pertaining to the reorganization of 
farmers, is its lesser known country cousin. Passed during the farm 
crisis in 1984,97 chapter 12 is simply a marked-up version of chapter 
13, with changes appropriate to the context of distressed farmers. 
There are nevertheless some important differences. In chapter 12, 
'" See Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Atlanta-Stewart Partners (In re Atlanta-Stewart Partners, 
193 B.R. 79 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996) (Kahn,].) (holding against an artificial impairment claim 
in light of these amendments). 
''-' See infra notes 388-89 and accompanying text. 
''" We shall revisit this argument later, in the course of determining what events finally 
terminate a debtor's right to cure and reinstate a security agreement. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 310-12. 
"
7 For a good description of chapter 12, see Janet A. Flaccus, A Comparison of Farm Bank-
ruptcies in Chapter 11 and the New Chapter 12, 11 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 49 (1988-89). For an 
article tracing the history of chapter 12 back to the Frazier-Lemke Act in the Depression, see 
James J. White, Taking From Farm Lenders and Farm Debtors: Cha/Jter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code, 13 
J. CORP. LAW 1 (1987); Barry G. Grandon, Note, The Family Farm Bankruptcy Act of 1986 and the 
Elimination of Lost opportunity Costs Under Chapter 12, 14 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 103 (1987). 
Chapter 12 originally had a "sunset" provision that cancelled the chapter on October 1, 
1993. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, § 302(f), 100 Stat. 3088, 3124. But the popularity of chapter 12 was 
strong enough that in 1993, Congress extended the chapter for another five years. See Act of 
Aug. 6, 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-65, 107 Stat. 311. 
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any secured claim may be modified, including a home mortgage.911 
Thus, in chapter 12, a farmer need not reinstate a mortgage agree-
ment in order to save the family home. Cram down of the home 
mortgagee is always possible. In contrast, both chapter 11 and chap-
ter 13 prevent modification of loan agreements in which the 
debtor's residence is the only collateral.99 
l. Voting 
Neither chapter 12 nor 13 has any notion of impairment, main-
ly because there is no class voting in these chapters. To be sure, 
voting-like phenomena may be observed in both chapters. For exam-
ple, secured creditors may waive the right to receive the value of 
collateral. 100 In addition, if even one unsecured creditor ( or the 
standing trustee) disapproves of the reoganization plan, the plan can 
only be confirmed if the debtor's "projected disposable income" is 
dedicated to the payment . of creditors. 101 Thus, in this very rough 
sense, creditors "vote." But there is certainly no class voting. A credi-
tor who somehow found herself in a class of creditors could not be 
outvoted into accepting a plan. Each creditor may stand on her 
rights regardless of what the class does by way of democratic deliber-
ation. 
2. CramDown 
In chapter 11, voting has the main significance of triggering the 
cram down standards with regard to negatively voting classes. Rein-
statement generates an automatic yes vote, thereby disqualifying the 
reinstated creditor from cram down. Reinstatement is therefore an 
alternative to cram down in chapter 11. In chapters 12 and 13, rein-
statement became an alternative to cram down only after 1994. 
In 1993, the Supreme Court, in Rake v. Wade, tO'i insinuated 
'"' See 11 U.S.C. § 1222(b)(2) (1994). 
'"' See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122(b)(5}, 1322(b)(2) (1994). In 1994, Congress added an exception 
to this principle with regard to mortgages whose terms do not extend beyond the length of a 
chapter 13 plan. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) (1994). No similar provision was adopted in chap-
ter 11, perhaps because chapter 11 plans can la~t indefinitely, and any such provision would 
have subverted the privilege accorded to home mortgages. See infra note 138. 
11
•
1 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(5){A), 1325(b)(5)(A) (1994). 
,., See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(l), 1325(b)(l) (1994). 
'°
2 508 U.S. 464 (1993). 
1997] Rakes Progress 293 
that reinstatement is merely a supplement to cram down. Under the 
logic of this ruling, a secured creditor can block a chapter 12 or 13 
plan whenever the present value of the reinstated agreement is less 
than the value of the collateral. 103 For example, suppose a secured 
party claims $100 against collateral worth $120. Cram down there-
fore demands that the secured party receive a distribution of collat-
eral worth $100. Reinstatement, however, might make the claim 
worth only $95, because the contract rate of interest is lower than 
the market rate. Rake v. Wade implied that the reinstatement in this 
example can be blocked, because the secured party is entitled to the 
full $100. 
To be sure, Justice Clarence Thomas addressed a different issue 
when he exalted § 1325(a) (5) cram down over § 1322(b) (5) 
cure. 104 He used § 1325(a) (5) to reason that if cure was to be ac-
complished over time, the present value of the cure must equal the 
full cure price. 105 In other words, he took § 1325(a) (5) to require 
that cure payments must be supplemented by "cram down" interest. 
Yet, if the overriding nature of § 1325(a) (5) governs cure for this 
purpose, it surely restricts reinstatement (as opposed to cure of past 
defaults) as well. 
The 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code have reversed 
Rake v. Wade's position on § 1325(a) (5) 's applicability to cure. Ac-
cording to§ 1322(e): 
notwithstanding subsection (b) (2) of this section and sections 506(b) 
and 1325(a) (5) of this title, if it is proposed in a plan to cure a de-
fault, the amount necessary to cure the default shall be determined in 
accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable 
nonbankruptcy law.106 
Clearly this provision exempts cure of past defaults from the cram 
down rules in § 1325(a). Less clear, however, is whether this provi-
sion exempts reinstatement of the agreement going forward. Nevertheless, 
the above analysis of Rake v. Wade (a cure case) depended on the 
principle that what is sauce for the goose of cure is sauce for the 
gander of reinstatement. If we apply this principle to the 1994 
1113 See id. at 469. 
104 See id. at 471, 473. 
wr. See id. at 475. 
um 11 U.S.C. § 1322(e) (1994) (emphasis added). 
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amendments, then Congress has established reinstatement as. an 
independent alternative to cram down. Thus, a reinstated agreement 
may freely contradict the rules of § 1325(a) (5). A reinstatement 
worth $95 can be instituted even though the collateral is worth more 
than $95. 
As in chapter 11, reinstatement in chapters 12 and 13 now 
serves an alternative to cram down. In addition to this function, 
reinstatement ha,s another significant utility in chapter 12 and 13. 
Whereas chapter 11 imposes no restriction on how long a reorgani-
zation plan might last, a plan in either chapter 12 or 13 must be 
concluded within three years ( or perhaps five years, if the court 
condescends to grant that small extension).107 A reinstated agree-
ment, however, can last much longer than the plan. Where refinanc-
ing is not available on a short term basis, the reinstatement proce-
dure could be very useful indeed to a debtor in chapter 12 or 
13, IOH 
One line of cases, however, allows cram down and extension of 
payments beyond the five-year maximum of§ 1322(d). According to 
Judge James Queenan in In re McGregor, 109 § 1322(b) (5) does not 
merely refer to reinstatement of long term security agreements. It 
also permits long term payouts on cram down, so long as the inter-
est rate and amortization of principal are according to the contract. 
Under this line of reasoning, if an undersecured creditor's claim can 
be bifurcated consistent with§ 1322(b) (2), cram down is not neces-
sarily subject to the five year maximum. Judge Queenan admits that 
bifurcation of home mortgages is not permitted in chapter 
13irn_nor may any other right of a home morgagee be modi-
fied. 111 But where bifurcation or other cram down tortures are per-
mitted, § 1322(b) (5) provides a mode for extending the plan be-
yond five years. 112 This view may be criticized, however, for chang-
107 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(c), 1322(c). 
"'" See justice v. Valley Nat'! Bank, 849 F.2d 1078, 1082 (8th Cir. 1988) (Gibson,].) (hold-




" 172 B.R. 718 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994). 
1111 This is the famous holding of Nobleman v. American Savs. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993) 
(Thomas,].), discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 120-28. 
111 See In re Hatcher, 202 B.R. 626 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1996) (Cornish, J.) (because mort-
gage agreement called for insurance, debtor had to provide it, in the name of "adequate pro-
tection"); In re Legowski, 167 B.R. 711 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (Boroff, j.) (debtor could not 
reinstate and also eliminate contractual right to accelerate payment after five years). 
112 See McGregor, 172 B.R. at 721 ("Subsection (5) does not requite the plan proponent to 
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ing an "and" to an "or." According to§ 1322(b)(5), the plan may: 
provide for the curing of any default within a reasonable time and 
maintenance of payments while the case is pending on any unsecured 
claim or secured claim on which the last payment is due after the 
date on which the final payment under the plan is due. 
Judge Queenan views cure and maintenance of payments to be dis-
junctive, so that, so long as contract payments are maintained, cram 
down can last in excess of five years. No doubt the "and" should be 
taken seriously; extension of payments beyond the five year maxi-
mum of the plan should accompany the cure of all past defaults-a 
principle which would limit cram .down to the five year maximum 
allowed for chapter 13 plans. 
3. Bifurcation 
One advantage of cram down is the bifurcation of undersecured 
claims into two claims-one perfectly secured and one perfectly 
unsecured.' 13 Bifurcation allows the unsecured part of the claim to 
be paid only a pro rata dividend, like the other unsecured creditors. 
Reinstatement, however, is inconsistent with bifurcation of an 
undersecured claim. Rather, reinstatement implies that the entire 
unsecured deficit claim must be paid according to the terms of the 
contract. For this reason, reinstatement of a radically undersecured 
claim is not a good strategy for many debtors. In many reorganiza-
tions, unnecessary payment on the unsecured deficit claim will out-
weigh the advantage won by capturing the low contract interest 
rate. 114 
That reinstatement precludes bifurcation was clear enough un-
der chapter 11. Recall that unimpaired creditors are deemed to vote 
affirmatively. Only no-voting creditors are entitled to cram down. 
avoid modification of the 'rights' of the secured claim holder. Its command is complied with 
so long as payment~ are maintained on the 'secured claim.'"); flccurd, Inn Kheng, 202 B.R. 538 
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1996); In re Murphy, 175 B.R. 134, 137 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (Feeney, J.); 
Brown v. Shorewood Fin., Inc. (In re Brown), 175 B.R. 129 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (Fenney,J.). 
"~ See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994). This is sometimes called "lien stripdown." Lomas Mort-
gage, Inc. v. Louis, 82 F.3d 1 n .. l (1st Cir. 1996) (Lynch,J.). After some controversy, it is now 
clear that a final bifurcation can occur if the collateral is sold or if a reorganization plan is 
confirmed. See David Gray Carlson, Bifurcfltion of Undersecured Cutims in Bankruptcy, 70 AM. 
BANKR. LJ. l (1996). 
114 See MARTIN BIENENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 597 ( 1987). 
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Section 1124(2) states that a secured claim is deemed unimpaired if 
the maturity of the original loan is reinstated •~as such maturity exist-
ed before such default." 115 Such a reinstatement applies to the 
prebifurcated claim, and so reinstatement in chapter 11 is not con-
sistent with bifurcation. In addition, the chapter 11 plan must not 
"otherwise alter the legal, equitable, or contractual rights to which 
such claim or interest entitles the holder of such claim or inter-
est."116 This language similarly precludes bifurcation. 
In chapter 13, bifurcation of home mortgages and reinstate-
ment were not initially seen as mutually exclusive. Section 
1322(b) (2) prevents "modification" of a "claim secured only by a 
security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal resi-
dence." 117 Four appellate courts had read the language of 
§ 1322(b) (2) very closely and noticed that the secured claim could not 
be "modified." 118 By negative pregnant, the unsecured portion of 
the claim therefore might be modified. The entire allowed claim 
might then be bifurcated, with no offense to§ 1322(b) (2). In effect, 
these courts read section 1322(b) (2) to mean that, after bifurcation, 
the debtor was required to reinstate principal and interest payments 
according to the old schedule, but the mortgage debt would be writ-
ten down drastically. For example, a twenty year mortgage might 
become a thirteen year mortgage. Such a possibility provided dis-
tressed debtors no immediate relief, but many years hence, with the 
financial crisis passed and the kids safely graduated from college, 
"'' Ii U.S.C. § 1124(2) (B) (1994). 
11n 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (D) (1994). 
117 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2) (1994). Some debtors have argued that a court must confirm a 
plan when all the requirements of§ 1325(a) are met. Since the antimodification mle is found 
in § 1322(b) (2), this argument reasons that plans which modify but do not cure home mort-
gages can be confirmed. In other words, since the antimodification mle is not found in 
§ 1325(a), it is simply not relevant. This argument has been rejected, on the grounds that the 
antimodification rule is an implicit condition of confirming a chapter 13 plan. See First Nat'I 
Fidelity Corp. v. Perry, 945 F.2d 61, 66 (3d Cir. 1991) (Stapleton,].). Now that chapter 11 has 
the same antimodification mle, a like implication will have to be drawn. In contrast, cure and 
reinstatement are directly implicated in the confirmation standard of§ 1129(a) because rein-
statement establishes the creditor a~ an automatic affirmative voter. As such, reinstatement 
becomes an alternative to cram down, because only negative voters can trigger that right. See 
II U.S.C. §§ 1129(a) (8), 1129(b) (I). 
"" See Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (Cardamore,J.); Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d 1410 (10th 
Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 
1990) (Sloviter,J.); Houghland v. Lomas & Nettleton Corp. (In re Houghland), 886 F.2d 1182 
(9th Cir. 1989) (Fernandez,].). 
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debtors in their waning years would obtain the welcome but quite 
gratuitous benefit of no further mortgage debt service.119 
In Nobelman v. American Savings Bank,120 the Supreme Court 
ruled that bifurcation of an undersecured claim into its secured and 
unsecured parts, followed by a cram down of both claims, "modifies" 
the secured creditor's rights (even though it does not, strictly speak-
ing, modify the secured claim) .121 Hence, bifurcation was ruled out. 
By implication, reinstatement suggests that the entire unbifurcated 
claim of an undersecured creditor must be honored. 
Because bifurcation of the home mortgage became impossible 
after Nobelman, courts began to take a new look at just what it means 
for a creditor to hold "a claim secured only by a security interest in 
real property that is the debtor's principal residence." 122 Thus, if 
the mortgage lien encumbers things other than the residence, 
Nobelman was said to be inapplicable. 123 For instance, if the mort-
gage agreement covers personal property, the entire mortgage may 
be modified. 124 Some courts even ruled that extension of the mort-
1
"
1 See In re Honett, 116 B.R. 495, 497-98 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1990) (Sharp, J.) (payments 
maintained, but maturity date foreshortened). 
120 508 U.S. 324 (1993) (Thomas,].). 
121 See id. at 331-32; see also 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994). 
122 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5) (1994). 
123 See Lomas Mortgage, Inc. v. Louis, 82 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996) (Lynch,J.) (mortgage on 
multifamily dwelling where debtor-landlord lived could be modified); In re DaCosta, 204 B.R. 1 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (Feeney, J.) (same, where family members lived in other apartment 
rent-free). But see Brunson v. Wendover Funding, Inc. (In re Brunson), 201 B.R. 351 (Bankr. 
W.D.N.Y. 1996) (Kaplan, J.) (antimodification rule applicable to multi-family dwelling where 
predominat intent was to provide debtor a residence); In re Spano, 161 B.R. 880, 885-87 
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1993) (Shiff,J.) (where debtor rented out part of his home after the mort-
gage was executed, secured creditor was still entitled to protection of§ 1322(b)(2)). The test 
for whether extra collateral exists to spoil § 1322(b) (2) protection should be performed on 
the day of the chapter 13 petition, to prevent creditors from shedding collateral in order to 
qualify for it. See In re Dinsmore, 141 B.R. 499, 505-06 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (Howard, J.); 
In re Green, 7 B.R. 8 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (Sidman, J.) (holding postpetition attempt to 
cancel security interest in personal property to be in bad faith and not permitted). 
124 See Hammond v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. (In re Hammond), 27 F.3d 52 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (Hutchinson,].); Sapos v. Provident Inst. of Savs., 967 F.2d 918, 925 (3d Cir. 1992) 
(finding security interest on wall-to-wall carpeting fatal to § 1322(b)(2) protection); Wilson v. 
Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123, 124 (3d Cir. 1990) (Sloviter, J.) (unperfected 
security interest on "appliances, machinery, furniture and equipment" held fatal); Mellon Bank 
v. Crystan (In re Crystan), 197 B.R. 803 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1996) (Fitzgerald, J.) (escrow funds 
made mortgage modifiable). Judge Ruggiero Aldisert, in Sapos, reversed and remanded be-
cause the debtor had not cured past defaults of the mortgage, but, having ruled that the mort-
gagee had no rights under § 1322(b)(2), cure was no longer strictly necessary. Cram down 
would have sufficed, except that the debtor wished to extend payment beyond the five-year 
maximum for chapter 13 plans. See Sapos, 967 F.2d at 928. 
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gage to fixtures 12" or insurance proceeds126 is fatal. Sometimes, 
mere lanquage in the agreement claiming nonqulaifying collateral 
cancels § 1322(b) (2) protection, even though the actual extra prop-
erty does not exist. 127 Other courts more sensibly said that the en-
cumbrance of fixtures did not take a mortgage out of the 
antimodification rule; what is a building after all but a great pile of 
fixtures? 128 In support of this view, it has been suggested that the 
mortgage in Nobelman itself covered minerals, oil and gas, and prof-
its, showing that such additional collateral cannot strip a residential 
mortgagee of the immunity from bifurcation. 129 
Surprisingly, cases involving mobile homes have. rarely delved 
into the issue of whether the mobile homes are personal property or 
fixtures. The antimodification rule of§ 322(b) (2) requires that the 
mortgage be "in real property." 130 At least some courts have held 
that mobile homes are not real property, 131 but a great many 
A contrary case, refusing to find bastardly in a mixed mortgage, is PNC Mortgage Co. v. 
Dicks, 199 B.R. 674 (N.D. Ind. 1996), where the mortgage agreement extended to "equipment 
now or hereafter attached to or used in connection with said premises." Judge Allen Sharp still 
extended the antimodification mle to this mortage, claiming that "the evidence ... leads inex-
orably to the conclusion that the items of collateral described in the PNC mortgage are noth-
ing more than enhancements capable of becoming component parts of the debtor's principal 
residence." Id. at 682. Thus, a security interest on the vacuum cleaner did not disqualify this 
mortgagee from claiming antimodification protection. 
125 See In re Escue, 184 B.R. 287 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1995) (Paine,].); see also In re Jones, 
201 B.R. 371 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1996) (Stripp, J.) (fixtures, condemnation awards, and insurance 
proceeds). 
12
" See Transouth Fin. Corp. v. Hill, 106 B.R. 145 (W.D. Tenn. 1989) (Todd, J.); In re 
Selman, 120 B.R. 576, 578 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1990) (Mcfeeley, J.); In re Klein, 106 B.R. 396 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (Scholl, J.) (insurance proceeds plus other personalty). Contra, Allied 
Credit Corp. v. Davis (In re Davis), 989 F.2d 208, 211 (6th Cir. 1993) (Peck, J.); Resolution 
Trust Corp. v. Washington (In re Washington), 967 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1992) (Garza,].). 
127 In re Libby, 200 B.R. 562, 567-68 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1996) (Tuohey,].); In re Pinto, 191 
B.R. 610, 613 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1996) (Stripp,J.). 
12
• See In re French, 174 B.R. 1, 4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (Boroff, J.); Miami Valley Bank v. 
Lutz (In re Lutz), 164 B.R. 239, 242 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1994) (Bentz,].); In re Pmitte, 157 B.R. 
662, 664 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993) (Schermer,].); In re Jackson, 136 B.R. 797, 800 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 1992)) (Katz, J.); see also Lievsay v. Western Fin. Savs. Bank (In re Lievsay), 199 B.R. 705 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (Volinn,J.) (use of home office did not repeal antimodification protec-
tion for home mortgage). 
12
" See Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Hirsch (In re Hirsch), 166 B.R. 248 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(Dalzell,].). 
"
0 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2) (1994). See United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Witt (In 11' Witt), 199 
B.R. 890 (W.D. Va. 1996) (Turk, J.) (ruling mobile homes a fixture, because Virginia taxes 
mobile homes as if real estate). 
131 See Homeowners Funding Co. v. Skinner, 129 B.R. 60, 64 n.2 (E.D. N.C. 1991) (Fox, 
].); In re Comans, 164 B.R. 539,542 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1994) (Ellington,].). 
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courts simply pass over the issue. 132 If mobile homes are personal 
property, then reinstatement and cram down are equally possible for 
chapter 13 debtors. 133 
Courts have also ruled that when .a home mortgage is entirely 
under water, it is not a secured claim at all, and therefore not enti-
tled to the protections of § 1322(b) (2). 134 This claim however, is 
deeply problematic, in that it associates the existence of property 
rights with a positive value in the marketplace. Not all property 
rights hold esteem in the marketplace, yet they are "property" none-
theless. In United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 135 Justice Harry 
Blackmun ruled that a valueless debtor equity was part of the bank-
ruptcy estate. If a debtor owns a valueless property interest, so might 
a secured creditor. These cases therefore must be viewed as concep-
tually unsound-a testimony to how far lower courts would bend 
logic in order to get around the hated Nobelman opinion. 
In 1994, Congress partly overruled Nobelman with respect to 
shorter-term mortgages. According to new§ 1322(c) (2): 
in a case in which the last payment on the original payment schedule 
for a claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is 
the debtor's principal residence is due before the date on which the 
final payment under the plan is due, the plan may provide for the 
payment of the claim as modified pursuant to § 1325(a) (5) of this 
title. 136 
Under this provision, if the scheduled mortgage payments137 runs 
"" See Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Hoggle (In re Hoggle), 12 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir. 
1994) (Anderson,].); Landmark Fin. Services v. Hall, 918 F.2d 1150 (4th Cir. 1990) (Hall, J.); 
Southtrust Mobile Servs., Inc. v. Englebert, 137 B.R. 975, 982-83 (N.D. Ala. 1992) (Acker,].) 
(applying§ 1322(b)(2) to mobile home, even though security interest apparently covered just 
the home: not the land). 
'"' A creditor obtaining a security interest on a fixture before it is installed has not been 
able to claim that the security agreement governing the fixture is entitled to the 
antimodification rule, even if the fixture lender also has a mortgage on the preexisting real 
estate. See In re Reeves, 65 B.R. 898 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (Todd, J.); In re Cotton, 199 B.R. 967 
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1996) (Mahoney,].). These opinions applied to mobile homes would tend to 
deprive the mobile home lender of the antimodification rule of§ 1322(b)(2), since attach-
ment of the security interest will typically precede affixation to real estate. 
"" See Carlson, supm note 113, at 24-25. 
"''' 462 U.S. 198 (1983) (Blackmun,J.). 
i:m· 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (2) (1994). 
m Notice this amendment is carefully written to preclude the argument that, once a debt 
is accelerated, a debtor may freely modify the home mortgage. Rather, the invitation to modi-
fication insists that the "original payment schedule" be consulted to determine whether the 
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out before a chapter 13 plan is finished, the mortgage may be modi-
fied.138 In such a case, a debtor might keep her home without rein-
stating the mortgage agreement. It is not clear how valuable a con-
cession this is to debtors, since chapter 13 plans must conclude with-
in three to five years. 13!1 A debtor in the lag end of a long-term 
home mortgage is likely to have paid down so much of the principal 
that the mortgagee will likely be oversecured and therefore no lon-
ger in danger of bifurcation. Nevertheless, short term mortgages 
have become popular. These mortgages are fully subject to bifurca-
tion 140 and other cram down tortures. 141 
When bifurcation of a home mortgage is impossible, 
§ 1322(b)(5), "notwithstanding paragraph (2) of this subsection," 
authorizes a chapter 13 plan to "provide for the curing of any de-
fault within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while 
the case is pending on any unsecured claim or secured claim on 
which the last payment is due after the date on which the final pay-
ment under the plan is due." 142 This provision, containing a direct 
override of the antimodification rule of § 1322(b) (2), covers the 
cure and reinstatement of long-term home mortgages. It permits the 
mortgage is short term or long term. 
""' This is true regardless of whether the scheduled payments mature prior to the chapter 
13 petition or before the plan ends. See In re Sarkese, 189 B.R. 531, 535 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
1995) (Proctor, J.); In re Lobus, 189 B.R. 216, 218 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995) (Crystol, ].); In re 
Jones, 188 B.R. 281 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1995) (Higdon,J.); In re Chang, 185 B.R. 50 (Bankr. N.D. 
III. 1995) (Schmetterer,J.). 
As of 1994, chapter 11 forbids the modification of home mortgages. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1123(b}(5) (1994). Congress added no exception for mortgages maturing soon after the 
chapter 11 petition, perhaps because chapter 11 plans need not end within five years, as chap-
ter 13 requires. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (1994). Thus, in In re Clay, 204 B.R. 786 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ala. 1996), where a chapter 11 debtor owed a balloon payment on a short-term mortgage, 
Judge Benjamin Cohen ruled that only in chapter 13 could such a mortgage be modified. 
"" See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (1994). 
140 See In re Young, 199 B.R. 643, 647 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996) (Parsons,].). But see Unit-
ed Cos. Lending Corp. v. Witt (In re Witt), 199 B.R. 890 (W.D. Va. 1996) (Turk,].) (Congress 
did not intend to permit bifurcation of short-term home mortgage by enacting§ 1322(c)(2)). 
141 New § 1322(c)(2) could be viewed a~ the adoption of a minority position, which said 
that § 1322(b)(2} 's restriction on modification of home mortgages should not apply to short-
term mortgages, but only to the long-term traditional real estate mortgage. See In re Williams, 
109 B.R. 36, 41 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989) (Eisenberg, J.); In re Shaffer, 84 B.R. 63, 65 (Bankr. 
W.D. Va. 1988) (Pearson,].), rev'd on othergrountls, 116 B.R. 60 (W.D. Va. 1988). 
142 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b}(5) (1994). The rule in chapter 12 is identical. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1222(b}(5) (1994). The implication should not be drawn from § 1322(b)(5) that, since 
"maintenance of payments" must be continued during the plan, it need not be continued after 
the plan. The spirit of reinstatement is that the contractual right to payment or interest may 
not be altered from the terms of the contract. No one has yet suggested otherwise. 
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reinstated agreement to extend itself beyond the life of the plan. 143 
Notice that § 1322(b) (5) refers only to mortgage agreements as to 
which "the last payment is due after the date on which the final 
payment under the plan is due." 144 After 1994, any agreement in 
which the preacceleration scheduled payments run out before the 
chapter 13 plan is simply not entitled to the benefit of the 
antimodification rule of§ 1322(b)(2). 
4. Acceleration 
Prior to 1994, a lively controversy existed as to whether short-
term mortgages could be cured at all. It was sometimes noted that, 
whereas § 1322(b)(5) (long-term mortgages) provided a direct over-
ride of § 1322(b)(2) 's antimodification rule, 145 § 1322(b) (3) (per-
mitting cure in general) permitted none. 146 One extreme implica-
tion was that, once the maturity date of a long term mortgage agree-
ment was accelerated, the entire mortgage agreement precipitated 
out of the jurisdiction of§ 1322(b) (5) into the short-term jurisdic-
tion of § 1322(b) (3), which was incapable of overriding the 
antimodification rule. In short, once a mortgage debt was accelerat-
ed, it was too late to cure and reinstate it.147 Such a holding would 
have all but terminated cure and reinstatement of home mortgages 
in chapter 13 cases, because acceleration is very common and often 
automatic upon default. 
This disastrous argument was rejected on the ground that, re-
gardless of what the statute says, Congress intended something 
else. 14R It was suggested that the language from § 1322(b) (5) ("the 
last payment is due after the date on which the final payment under 
14
' This is also an advantage in chapter 12. See 11 U.S.C. § 1222(b)(5) (1994). 
144 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1994). 
14
" That is to say, § 1322(b)(5) allows cures notwithstanding§ 1322(b) (2). 
14i; See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3) (1988). 
147 See Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Savs. Ass'n, 718 F.2d 694, 696 (5th Cir.) (Jolly, J.), 
rev'd, 730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984) (en bane); Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. Soderlund (In re 
Soderlund), 18 B.R. 12, 16 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (Kinneary,J.); Susan L. Russell-Chema, Saving the 
Family Homestead: Home Mortgages Under Chapter 13, 43 OHIO ST. LJ. 905 (1982); Eric Taube, 
Comment, Aci:ekmted Mortgages: An Unsolved Probkm of Interpretation in Chapter 13, 19 Haus. L. 
REV. 951, 968 (1982). 
"" See In re Roach; 824 F.2d 1370, 1374-75 (3d Cir. 1987) (Stapleton,].). As Judge Edward 
Lumbard put it, "we do not believe that Congress labored for five years over this controversial 
question only to remit consumer debtors-intended to be primary beneficiaries of the new 
Code-to the harsher mercies of state law." Di Pierro v. Taddeo (In re Taddeo), 685 F.2d 24, 
25 (2d Cir. 1982) (Lumbard,].). 
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the plan is due") referred to last payment assuming no accelera-
tion. 1411 In support of this notion, it was claimed that "cure must 
comprehend the power to 'de-accelerate."nr,o Furthermore, it was 
often suggested that a cure was not a "modification" of the security 
agreement at all. 151 On this last view, even cure and reinstatement 
under § 1322(b) (3) were completely consistent with the 
antimodification rule for the simple reason that cures were not mod-
ifications. 152 Meanwhile, policy arguments were asserted to. prove 
that accelerated mortgage claims are subject to cure, in spite of 
§ 1322(b) (5) 's unavailability. De-acceleration thus prevents a race to 
the court house, and encourages debtors to negotiate with the mort-
gagee, in lieu of filing for bankruptcy. 153 
In any event, now that the antimodification rule of§ 1322(b) (2) 
never applies to short-term mortgages whose scheduled payment last 
less time than the chapter 13 plan, 154 these disputes are outmoded. 
Indeed, if debtors turned the tables on secured creditors and used 
acceleration to prove that mortga·ges fell under 
§ 1322(b) (3)-instead of§ 1322(b) (5)-then the accelerated mort-
gage is fully subject to modification and cram down by any means. 
Fortunately for the secured creditors, this argument has been pre-
cluded by§ 1322(c) (2). That section, added in 1994, conditions the 
power to modify upon the "last payment on the origi,nal payment sched-
uut falling before the end of the chapter 13 plan.155 Hence, debt-
ors may not claim that accelerated mortgages are always modifi-
able.156 
In Nepil, 157 however, Judge Novalyn Winfield ruled that a fore-
closure judgment merges with the mortgage agreement and renders 
a long-term mortgage into a short-term one-regardless of the lan-
guage of§ 1322(c) (2). Such a decision is quite unnecessary-federal 
14
" See Grubbl·, 730 F.2d at 241 n.7; Crestline Bldg. & Loan A'!S'n v. Allen (In re Allen), 42 
B.R. 360, 362 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (Krenzler,J.). 
''"' In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 27. 
"'' See infm notes 374-77 and accompanying text. 
152 See, e.g., Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 247 (using § 1322(b) (3) to cure junior mortgage of less 
than three years); In re Ford, 84 B.R. 40, 42-43 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (Scholl,J.). 
"'' See In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 27; Barry L. Zaretsky, Some Limits on Mortgagees' Rights in 
Chapter 13, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 433, 443 (1984); Douglas A. Winthrop, Note, The Chapter 13 
Cure Provisions: A Doctrine in Need of a Cure, 74 MINN. L. REV. 921, 930 (1990). 
"'
4 See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) (1994). 
"'
5 Id. (emphasis added). 
151
; See In re Sims, 185 B.R. 853, 857 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) (Sledge,J.). 
1717 206 B.R. 72 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1997). 
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court have pierced through the merger doctrine and have pro-
claimed the long-term mortgage still in existence. 158 Furthermore, 
the decision puts secured creditors in a dilemma. If they proceed 
too diligently in foreclosing their mortgages, the debtor can, with a 
properly timed bankruptcy opinion, win the right to modify the 
mortgage. 
Nevertheless, Judge Winfield had a very intriguing argument 
from legislative history-a lesson to staff members who write the 
reports that are so influential in litigation. According to the legisla-
tive history: 
The changes made by this section, in conjunction with those made in 
section 305 of this bill, would also overrule the result in First National 
Fidelity Corp. v. Perry, with respect to mortgages on which the last pay-
ment on the original payment schedule is due before the date on 
which the final payment under the plan is due. In that case, the Third 
Circuit held that subsequent to foreclosure judgment, a chapter 13 
debtor cannot provide for a mortgage debt by paying the full amount 
of the allowed secured claim in accordance with Bankruptcy Code 
section 1325(a)(5), because doing so would constitute an impermissi-
ble modification of the mortgage holder's right to immediate pay-
ment under section 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. 159 
In First National Fidelity Corp. v. Perry, ir,o Judge Walter Stapleton 
ruled that a chapter 13 plan could not be confirmed which purport-
ed to cram down a foreclosure judgment, on the grounds that the 
secured creditor was entitled to the benefit of the antimodification 
rule. We do not know from the Perry opinion whether the mortgage 
agreement (merged out of existence by the judgment) extended 
beyond the plan. If so (as was likely), then to overrule Perry is to 
permit any judgment of foreclosure to be crammed down, even 
though the original mortgage was long-term. 
Judge Winfield thought th_e legislative history to be· too vague to 
rely on. She preferred to cite the policy of chapter 13 to relieve 
debtors, and so she ruled that the debtor could cram down a long-
term mortgage, if a judgment of fore closure had been entered. 
""' This was done to extend the deadline for cure past the foreclosure judgment. See gener-
ally infra Part III. 
"'" 140 Cong. Rec. H10752, H10769 (citation omitted). 
u;o 945 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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D. The End of the Right to Cure and Reinstate 
The right to reinstatement must eventually come to an end. For 
example, after a foreclosing secured party sells collateral to a buyer, 
cure and reinstatement necessarily divests the buyer in favor of the 
debtor, which we may assume is manifestly unfair. Such a rule would 
chill prices bid at foreclosure sales, to the detriment of debtors. 161 
We have seen how, prior to 1994, acceleration of the debt had 
been soundly rejected as the deadline for reinstatement. 162 Howev-
er, a division existed as to what the deadline really was. The most 
common view was that the foreclosure sale marked the termination 
date of the right to cure and reinstate. 163 Some courts thought the 
end of the redemption period was the end of reinstatement, because 
the collateral was still "property of the estate" until the end of that 
time. 164 A few courts took the view that any judgment of default or 
foreclosure, even prior to the sale, was the deadline. The theory 
behind this last position was that the foreclosure judgment merges 
with and eliminates the mortgage agreement. Since the contract was 
dead, it could no longer be reinstated. 165 
in, See Federal Land Bank v. Glenn (In re Glenn), 760 F.2d 1428, 1436 (6th Cir. 1985) 
(Engel, J.). 
"" See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text. 
"" See Commercial Fed. Mortgage Corp. v. Smith (In re Smith), 85 F.3d 1555, 1560 (11th 
Cir. 1996) (Birch, J.) (interpreting Bankruptcy Code as it existed prior to 1994); Federal Land 
Bank, 760 F.2d at 1436 (chapter 13); In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 412 (7th Cir. 
1984) (Coffey, J.). Sale was proclaimed the deadline even when the buyer was also the mort-
gagee. See Justice v. Valley Nat'! Bank, 849 F.2d 1078, 1084-85 (8th Cir. 1988) (Gibson, J.). A 
dissent by Judge Gerald Heaney was entered on this score. He did not emphasize the bid in 
quality, id. at 1089-90, but presumably he would not allow property to be taken back from a 
third party buyer who had paid cash. See also Goldberg v. Tynan (In re Tynan), 773 F.2d 177, 
178 (7th Cir. 1985) (Wright, j.) (holding that third party buyer's payment extinguished se-
cured creditor's claim and terminated any possibility of cure). 
rn-1 SeeJim Walter Homes, Inc. v. Spears (In re Thompson), 894 F.2d 1227, 1229-30 (10th 
Cir. 1990); Oregon v. Hurt (In re Hurt), 158 B.R. 154, 159-60 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1993) (Ashland, 
J.); In re Read, 131 B.R. 188 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1991) (Gordon, J.). Judge Stanley F. Birch ar-
gues against the end of the redemption period as a deadline because: 
"(A]fter a foreclosure sale occurs, there is no 'unsecured claim on which the last 
payment is due after the day on which the final payment under the plan, is due.' 
There is also no 'default' to cure or waive. Therefore, there is no ability to cure and 
maintain mortgage payments under II U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3) or (5)." 
Smith, 85 F.3d at 1559 (quoting In re McKinney, 174 B.R. 330, 335 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1994) 
(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5)). But this argument proves too much. It sustains acceleration 
of the debt as the deadline, as all the above attributes are true in case of acceleration. 
rnr. See Midlantic Nat'! Bank v. DeSeno (In re DeSeno), 17 F.3d '642, 644 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(Roth, j.) (holding also that the foreclosure judgment lien" might be crammed down); 
Demers v. Federal Land Bank, 89 B.R. 48, 50-51 (D.S.D. 1987) (Porter, J.), affd, 853 F.2d 605 
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When the foreclosure judgment was held to be the deadline 
prior to 1994, merger of the security agreement into the judgment 
was implicitly held to be fatal to reinstatement. However, a contrary 
view existed under which cure and reinstatement were seen as pre-
emptive federal rules that could cancel what state law dictated. 166 
That is, security agreements could be separated from the foreclosure 
judgment. Indeed; if reinstatement was to be viewed as a federal 
rule, merger was no bar to cure and reinstatement. Only if reinstate-
ment was viewed as a nonbankruptcy concept was merger fatal. 
Meanwhile, the federal rule was free to develop prudential or equita-
ble limits (such as the sale or the end of the postsale redemption 
period) as the final deadline for cure and reinstatement. 
Although the 1994 amendments to the reorganization chapters 
favor deference to local law, they reversed the field with regard to 
the deadline. Section 1322(c)(l) now provides: 
Notwithstanding subsection (b) (2) and applicable nonbankruptcy 
law-
(1) a default with respect to, or that gave rise to, a lien on 
the debtor's principal residence may be cured under paragraph 
(3) or (5) of subsection (b) until such residence is sold at a 
foreclosure sale that is conducted in accordance with applicable 
(8th Cir. 1988); In re Celeste Court Apts., Inc., 47 B.R. 470, 476 (D. Del. 1985) (Schwartz,].); 
see gmerallyJoseph M. Gaynor, Impairment, 3 BANKR. DEV.J. 579, 589-90 (1986)'. 
Incidentally, if the logic underlying the use of foreclosure judgments as the deadline for 
cure and reinstatement is that the contract is merged into the judgment, then the "judgment" 
is not a contract, and§ 1322(b) (2) no longer applies. See First Nat'! Fidelity Corp. v. Perry, 945 
F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1991) (Stapleton, J.) ("Upon entry of a foreclosure judgment, New Jersey 
establishes a new relationship between the mortgagor and mortgagee which includes a right 
on the part of lender to immediate payment of the debt from proceeds of a sale of the prop-
erty. "); In re Gamer, 13 B.R. 799, 801 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Schwartzberg, J.). Section 
1322(b) (2) prevents modification of the rights of holders of claims "secured only by a security 
interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence." 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1994). 
If there really is no contract, then the judgment lien is not a "security interest," because the 
Bankruptcy Code defines security interst as a "lien created by an agreement." 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (51) (1994). Accordingly, foreclosure liens could be bifurcated and crammed down, in 
spite of Nobelman. They need not be cured at all. In First Nat'l Fidelity Carp., Judge Walter 
Stapleton evaded this point by noting that the foreclosure lien was indeed a security interest, 
because it was "created" by a mortgage agreement. First Nat'l Fidelity Corp., 945 F.2d at 64-65. 
""' See Jim Waller Homes, Inc., 894 F.2d at 1230 ("Somewhere on the continuum of the 
mortgagor's interests under state foreclosure law we must draw a line beyond which there can 
be no cure of default."); Boromei v. Sun Bank, 92 B.R. 516 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (Hodges,].). 
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non bankruptcy law .... 167 
The amendment has the indirect effect of making clear that rein-
statement includes the concept of de-acceleration (because accelera-
tion precedes the foreclosure sale). In addition, it clarifies that rein-
statements under § 1322(b) (3) are capable of overriding the 
antimodification rule of§ 1322(b)(2). Of course, § 1322(c) (2) sim-
ply repeals the antimodification rule outright for short term mort-
gages.1611 Between these two new provisions, it is clear that short-
term mortgages and accelerated mortgages may be cured and rein-
stated. 
This amendment sets the foreclosure sale as the deadline in the 
case of a home mortgage, but it leaves many questions unanswered. 
For instance, some courts ruled that reinstatement could occur even 
after the foreclosure sale, where a postsale right of redemption exist-
ed. i69 Section 1322(c) (1) states that the plan may reinstate a securi-
ty agreement up to the time of the foreclosure sale, but it does not 
exactly rule out reinstatement after that time. Hence, it is possible 
that the statute sets no effective deadline at all, except to overrule 
the cases holding that the presale judgment was the deadline. Legisla-
tive history supports this view. 170 Nevertheless, this view has already 
been rejected. 171 In In re Ross,172 Judge Judith Wizmur ruled that 
the deadline implicit in § 1322(c) (1) does not depend on whether 
the debtor owns a property interest in the home, such as a right to 
redeem after the sale. Rather, "[t]he relevant text of§ 1322(b) [and 
now§ 1322(c) (1)] speaks of obligations of the debtor as to which 
cure -of a default is authorized .... "173 Thus, according to Judge 
167 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1) (1994). 
""' See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) (1994). 
"" See Smith, 85 F.3d at 1561; In re Ragsdale, 155 B.R. 578 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993) (Mitch-
ell,].). 
170 According to this legislative history: 
This section of the bill safeguards a debtor's rights in a chapter 13 case by allowing 
the debtor to cure home mortgage default, at least through completion of a foreclo-
sure sale under applicable nonbankniptcy law. However, if the State provides the 
debtor more extensive "cure" rights (through, for example, some later redemption 
period), the debtor would continue to enjoy such rights in bankruptcy. 
140 CONG. REc .. Hl0752, HI0769 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994). 
171 Sometimes with regret. See In re Sims, 185 B.R. 853, 863 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) 
(Sledge,].); In re Rambo, 199 B.R. 747, 751 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1996) (Lindsey,].). 
172 191 B.R. 615 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1996). 
173 Ross, 191 B.R. at 617 (quoting In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 1372 n.1 (3d Cir. 1987) 
(Stapleton, J.)). 
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Wizmur, the amendment establishes the sale as the absolute latest 
deadline possible. 174 
The 1994 amendments mention the sale as a deadline, but 
when are foreclosure sales final? In Ross, Judge Wizmur wrote: 
We believe the statute is ambiguous in this regard. On the one 
hand, the preposition "at" in the phrase "sold at a foreclosure sale" 
might signify the intention of Congress to situate the termination 
point at a defined and certain event, i.e. the foreclosure auction. On 
the other hand, the phrase "that is conducted in accordance with 
applicable nonbankruptcy law" modifies "foreclosure sale," and re-
quires resort to state law to determine the procedural regularity of the 
actual sale. The term "sold" might refer to the process employed in 
each state to complete a foreclosure sale.175 
Judge Wizmur ruled that New Jersey law governed the finality of the 
sale and hence the deadline for cure and reinstatement. In her judg-
ment, New Jersey law pointed to the delivery of a deed by the sheriff 
to the buyer at the foreclosure sale. 176 In contrast, other judges in-
terpreting New Jersey law have pushed the deadline forward to the 
time the auction is concluded, even if the sheriff has not yet issued a 
deed; this was the point at which the buyer obtained equitable title 
to the land in question. 177 
Even other points could have been chosen. For example, New 
Jersey law requires deeds to be recorded; otherwise; the grantor has 
power to convey better title to a bona fide purchaser for value. 178 
Why is not recordation the final moment of "alienation" of the col-
lateral?17!1 Often foreclosure sales must be confirmed by a court; 
174 See id. at 617. 
i,r, Id. at 618. 
1711 See id. at 621. 
177 In re Simmons, 202 B.R. 198 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1996) (Winfield, J.); In re Little, 201 B.R. 
98 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1996) (Gambardella, J.); In re Ziyambe, 200 B.R. 790 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1996) 
(Gambardella, J.). 
17
" See NJ. STAT. ANN. § 46:22-1 (1996). 
17
" See In re Reid, 200 B.R. 265,267 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1996) (Mark,J.); In reJaar, 186 B.R. 
148 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (Glenn,J.) (describing deadline as when clerk files certificate of 
sale). In In re]ohnson, 171 B.R. 613 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1994),Judge Keith Lundin rejected 
recordation and put forth execution of the deed as the relevant deadline. He did so as a mat-
ter of federal law, however, under the authority of Federal Land Bank v. Glenn (In re Glenn), 760 
F.2d 1428 (6th Cir.) (Engel, J.), which expressly rejected state law as setting the deadline. In 
contra~t, Judge Wizmur ruled that the 1994 amendments require state law to define when a 
sale occurs, which reopens the possibility that recordation is the relevant deadline after all. See 
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the § 1322(c) (1) deadline has therefore been set at this late 
point. 180 In North Carolina, "upset bids" are allowed by any person 
ten days after the auction; the end of this period has been identified 
as the deadline. 181 
The effect of the new federal cutoff may be to overrule cases 
holding that the deadline was the end of the redemption period, 
which, in the case of real property, might occur well after the fore-
closure sale. But this holding does not mean that redemption is 
useless. Rather, it implies that redemption must be accomplished 
through a lump sum payment, as per state law, as supplemented by 
the minor extension granted in Bankruptcy Code § 1O8(a).182 
"Cure" on the other hand, could have been accomplished over 
time.1R3 
In addition, the new deadline only covers home mortgages pro-
Ross, 191 B.R. at 618. 
'"" See McEwen v. Federal Nat'! Mortgage Ass'n, 194 B.R. 594 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (Grady, J.); 
In re Rambo, 199 B.R. 747, 750-51 (Bankr, W.D. Okla. 1996) (Lindsey,].); In re Blair, 196 B.R. 
477 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1996) (Scott,].). 
Mc,Ewenwas "ovemlied" by Judge Eugene Wedoffin In re Christian, 199 B.R. 382 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1996), who decreed that the right to cure ended earlier than the order of confirma-
tion. Rather, it ended with the foreclosure auction. As for Mc.Ewen, Wedoff thought the deci-
sion was entitled to "substanial deference, but as the opinion of a single judge in a multi:iudge 
district, it cannot establish precedent for the district binding on the bankruptcy courts." Id. at 
387 (citation omitted). 
181 See In re Barham, 193 B.R. 229, 232 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1996) (Small,J~). 
'"' According to§ 108(b): 
Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, if applicable 
nonbankruptcy law, an order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agree-
ment fixes a period within which the debtor or an individual protected under sec-
tion 1201 or 1301 of this title may ... cure a default, or perform any other similar 
act, and such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, 
the trustee may only file, cure, or perform, as the case may be, before the later of-
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period 
occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or 
(2) 60 days after the order for relief. 
11 U.S.C. § 108(b) (1994). Although this provision does not mention redemption after a fore-
closure sale, the section has been held relevant to redemption. See Glenn, 760 F.2d at 1436-37; 
Johnson v. First Nat'! Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 278 (8th Cir. 1983) (Roberts, J.); Shawn A. 
Holcombe, Comment, The Power to Cure Default Under Chapter 12, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 261, 270 
(1990); Patrick J. Potter, How Much Time Do Vendees Have to Cure Their Land Contract Defaults 
After Filing for Bankruptcy? Or Does Section 362(a) Really Stay Time?, 11 THOMAS M. COOLEY L. 
REV. 45 (1994). Note that§ 108(b) governs a trustee who wishes to redeem. In chapter 12 or 
13, the debtor (not a trustee) will wish to redeem. Court~ assume, however, that this rule ap-
plies to debtors as well as to trustees. See First Nat'! Fidelity Corp. v. Perry, 945 F.2d 61, 65 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (Stapleton, J.). 
'"' See In re Sims, 185 B.R. 853, 863 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) (Sledge, J.); In re Ragsdale, 
155 B.R. 578, 587 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993) (Mitchell,J.). 
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tected from modification under § 1322(b) (2). What rule shall apply 
for other types of security agreements in chapter 13?184 What rule 
shall apply in chapter 11 or 12? In chapter 11, the question becomes 
relevant because new § 1123(b) (5) prohibits modification of the 
home mortgage, yet no reinstatement deadline is set. Hence, the 
same controversy that plagued chapter 13 will now infest chapter 11, 
unless the courts simply borrow the new chapter 13 rule for chapter 
11 cases. This, of course, is subject to the dubious criticism that Con-
gress must have known what it was doing when it set a deadline in 
one chapter but not the other.185 
Sometimes, real estate mortgages come to an end without a sale. 
In Illinois and Michigan, installment contracts can provide that a 
debtor's equitable interest in a home mortgage is forfeited to the 
seller. Forfeiture had been held to be the deadline . prior to 
1994.186 What shall the rule be as to such cases, which do not in-
·volve sales at all?187 In In re Hart, 188 a junior mortgagee exercised 
1
•• In re Pluta, 200 B.R. 740 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1996) (Boroff,].) (Massachusetts law on cure 
of default could not limit right of debtor to cure reinstate security agreement governing car in 
chapter 13). 
'"'' See, e.g.,Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 87 (1991) (Marshall,].) (arguing 
that expressly providing for bad faith dismissals in one case proves that Congress must have 
intended no dismissal in other cases). For a refusal to borrow from chapter 13 to solve a dif-
ferent chapter 11 mortgage problem, see In re Clay, 204 B.R, 786 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996) (Co-
hen, J.) (refusing to permit modification of short-term mortgage just because chapter 13 now 
permits it). 
"i; See In re Layton, 138 B.R. 219 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (Squires, J.); see generally Potter, 
supra note 182. 
'"
7 See In re Carr, 52 B.R. 250, 259 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (Spector, J.) (holding that 
end of redemption period after forfeiture is deadline). A commentator, Patrick]. Potter, com-
plains that this opinion in effect holds that the automatic stay prevents time from run-
ning-that. the automatic stay always extends the redemption period. See Potter, supra note 
182, at 65-69. It is also possible to read this case as simply holding that the right to cure ac-
crues with the bankruptcy petition, So long as it accrues during the redemption period, it may 
be exercised after the redemption period actually expires. From this perspective, the automatic 
stay is irrelevant and does not extend time. Rather, cure becomes a vested right if it accrues 
during the redemption period. 
Potter also points out that, at least in the Sixth Circuit, conditional sales of real estate 
are executory contracts, not security interests. Terrell v. Albaugh (In re Terrell), 892 F.2d 469, 
473 (6th Cir. 1989) (Kennedy, J.); see Potter, supra note 182, at 68-69. On this basis, he pro-
claims Carr to be overruled. See Potter, supra note 182, at 69. Therefore,§ 1322(b)(5), which 
applies to "executed security agreements," does not apply to the cure of a conditional sale of 
real estate. Nevertheless, chapter 13 plans may cure and assume executory contracts. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1322(b)(7) (1994). Executory contracts may be cured and assumed "at any time before the 
confirmation of a plan." 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2) (1994). While cure of a security agreement 
must occur in the plan, the deadline for curing an executory contract is not much different. 
In either case, the right to cure should outlast the redemption period, so long as it accrued 
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its right to pay off a senior mortgage. It then added that amount to 
its own fully matured claim. 1119 Judge Paul Glenn ruled that the se-
nior mortgage could not be reinstated because it was dead. Any rein-
statement of the junior mortgage had to be according to the terms 
of the junior mortgage:90 Since no sale occurred, can it be clear 
this case is rightly decided, in light of the new deadline in 
§ 1322(c) (1)? The answers to these questions are unknown. 
E. Unfair Discrimination 
All of the reorganization chapters prohibit unfair discrimination 
between classes of creditors. Chapter 11 provides this rule as part of 
cram down. Thus, § 1129(b) (1) requires that "the plan does not 
discriminate unfairly ... with respect to each class of claims ... that 
is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan." 191 This lan-
guage means that the negatively voting classes can block confirma-
tion if they can show unfair discrimination against them, compared 
to some other class. 
Chapters 11 makes classification of creditors largely mandato-
ry.192 Not so chapters 12 and 13. Yet chapters 12 and 13 do state 
that, ifa plan classifies claims, the plan "may not discriminate unfair-
ly against any class so designated," with the exception that co-signed 
consumer debt may be treated differently from other classes of 
claims:93 Nevertheless, in a case where no classes at all were set 
forth in a chapter 13 plan, Judge Stephen Mitchell, in In re 
DeLauder, 194 ruled that a reinstated security agreement was inher-
ently a different class from that of other creditors, where the debtor 
proposed to pay the. secured party outside the plan. 195 
This holding required Judge Mitchell to explore whether rein-
during that period. But s1111 In Tl/ Delex Management, 155 B.R. 161, 166-67 {Bankr. W.D. Mich. 
1993) {Gregg, J.) {prohibiting assumption of conditional sale of real estate after redemption 
period lapsed). 
iKH 184 B.R. 849 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) (G)enn,J.). 
JK9 See id. at 851. 
mo See irl. at 858. 
"" 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) {]) (1994). 
"" See 11 U.S.C. § 1123{a) {I) (1994) {providing for classification of claims, but also pro-
viding that administrative creditors, "gap" creditors in involuntary cases, and tax creditors need 
not be classified). 
"" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222{b) {]), 1322(b) {]) (1994). 
11)4 189 B.R. 639 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995). 
"" See id. at 647. 
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stating an. undersecured creditor was unfair, because the unsecured 
deficit of the creditor would be payed in full, whereas other unse-
cured creditors would not receive such favorable treatment. Judge 
Mitchell applied a cumbersome five-part test to discover whether 
reinstatement was unfair. According to this test, reinstatement must 
(1) have a rational basis, (2) be necessary to the debtor's rehabilita-
tion, (3) be in good faith, ( 4) provide meaningful payments to other 
creditors, and (5) impose no great loss on the regular creditors. 196 
Applying these factors, Judge Mitchell confirmed a plan that reinstat-
ed a security agreement pertaining to the debtor's automobile. 197 
Thus, unfair discrimination may conceivably prevent reinstatement 
of a security agreement, if the secured party is undersecured and the 
above fairne,ss test is offended. 
Other courts have suggested that, as a matter of law, the debtor 
may always reinstate a contract, regardless of discriminatory ef-
fect. 1911 Of course, unsecured creditors are still entitled to assert the 
"best interest of the creditors" test;199 which guarantees them at 
least as much as they would have received in a liquidation proceed-
ing. 
F. Discharge 
Reinstatement is inconsistent with discharge, but in different 
ways from chapter to chapter. In chapter 11, a debtor is discharged 
as soon as the plan is confirmed, unless the plan provides other-
wise. 200 Of course, if a security agreement is reinstated, it is part of 
the plan itself .. Hence, the security agreement is obviously not dis-
charged. Rather, the postconfirmation debtor must live up to the 
rnn .. ';ee id. at 643. 
1117 See id. at 647. 
"'" See In 1li Sullivan, 195 B.R. 649, 657-58 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996) (Clark, J.); In re Cox, 
186 B.R. 744, 746 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1995) (Killian,J.); In re Benner, 156 B.R. 631, 634 (Bankr. 
D. Minn. 1993) (Dreher, J.). These are student loan cases in which the debtor reinstated a 
long-term student loan while paying other creditors a regular unsecured creditor ·dividend. 
100 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7)(A), 1225(a) (4), 1325{a){4) (1994). 
21111 See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d){l)(A) (1994). A chapter 11 plan, by its terms, may defer dis-
charge. If so, it apparently extends the automatic stay. See Hillis Motors, Inc. v. Hawaii Auto. 
Dealers' Ass'n, 997 F.2d 581, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt, J.); In re Arlington Village 
Partners, Ltd., 66 B.R. 308 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) (Waldron, J.) (plan reserved jurisdiction 
in bankmptcy court, and secured creditors assumed they had to move to lift the stay before 
seeking remedies); Alan M. Ahart & Lisa Elaine Meadows, Deferring Discharge in Chapter 11, 70 
AM. BANKR. LJ. 127, 146-47 (1996). 
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reinstated security agreement. 
In chapters 12 and 13, a discharge can only be granted after the 
entire plan is completed,201 though a court has some discretion to 
grant a discharge even if the debtor defaults on the plan.202 A rein-
stated claim, however, is never discharged, because chapters 12 and 
13 exempt from discharge any claim provided for under 
§ 1222(b) (5) or § 1322(b) (5), respectively.203 These are the sec-
tions that refer to reinstated loan agreements. 
Because reinstated mortgages cannot be discharged, some 
detors a few years back preferred to file for chapter 7 liquidation, 
obtain a discharge, establish the mortgage as nonrecourse, and then 
file a chapter 13 case. These were the so-called "chapter 20" cases-a 
practice approved by the Supreme Court itself.204 Prior to 
Nobelman, a chapter 20 debtor with a general discharge in chapter 7 
could bifurcate the undersecured nonrecourse claim in a subsequent 
chapter 13. The "secured claim" of the mortgagee could not be 
modified, but the unsecured deficit was quite vulnerable. The mort-
gagee had to be paid the value of the collateral, on the schedule 
provided in the original loan agreement. But, since the unsecured 
deficit had been discharged, the debtor could allocate zero divi-
dends on this part of the mortgagee's claim.205 After Nobelman, 
cure and reinstatement must provide for the payment of the entire 
mortgage debt, including the unsecured deficit, even if it is nonre-
course. 206 Hence, the utility of chapter 20 is much diminished for 
debtors. 
Suppose a plan illegally modifies a home mortgage, but the 
secured party mounts no protest at the confirmation hearing. The 
201 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1228{a), 1328(a) (1994). 
202 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1228(b), 1328(b) (1994). 
2113 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1228(a)(l), 1228(c)(l), 1328(a)(l), 1328(c)(l) (1994). 
'"' SeeJohnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 80 (1991) (Marshall,J.). The informal 
name "chapter 20" results from the witty practice of summing the chapter 7 case with the later 
chapter 13 case. See Joann Henderson, The Gaglia-Lowry Brief: A Quantum Leap from Strip Down to 
Chapter 7 Cram Down, 8 BANKR. DEV.J. 131, 173-80 (1991). 
205 See Jim Walters Homes, Inc. v. Saylors (In re Saylors), 869 F.2d 1434, 1436 (11th Cir. 
1989) (Vance, J.); Lex A. Coleman, Individual Consumer "Chapter 20" Cases After Johnson: An 
Introduction to Nonbusiness Serial Filings Under Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, 9 
BANKR. DEV.J. 357, 371-74 (1992). 
200 In Citicorp Mortgage, Inc v. Lumpkin (In re Lumpkin), 144 B.R. 240 (Bankr. D. Conn. 
1993), the mortgagee claimed that nonrecourse mortgages could not be cured because the 
debtor does not "owe" the arrearages. Judge Robert Krechevsky read Johnson to mean that the 
arrearages could be cured as if the debtor really owed those amounts. See id. at 241-42. 
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security agreement shouul, have been cured and reinstated under 
§ 1322(b) (5), in which case the claim would not be discharged. A 
good argument exists that "equity regards as done what ought to be 
done. "207 Thus, since the mortgage agreement should not have 
been modified, it will be treated as if it were reinstated, in which 
case, once the plan is over, the secured claim will not be discharged. 
This argument, however, was rejected in In re Chappell,208 where 
Judge Kenneth Ripple asserted res judicata to prevent the secured 
creditor from enforcing any rights against the debtor, once the plan 
had finished and the discharge was awarded. 209 
G. Breach of the Reinstated Agreement 
If the reinstated contract is breached, the automatic -stay may 
prevent a secured creditor from foreclosing on the collateral which 
secures the reinstated obligation. Thus, § 362(a) (5) prevents "any 
act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any 
lien to the extent such lien secures a claim that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title." 210 Also relevant is 
§ 362(a) (6), which prohibits "any act to collect, assets, or recover a 
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of 
the case under this title." 211 Taken in isolation, these provisions are 
quite extreme. They forever bar collection of even undischarged 
debts. These provisions are much tempered, however, by § 362(c), 
which governs the duration of the automatic stay. According to 
§ 362(c): 
Except as provided in subsections {d), (e), and (f) of this sec-
tion-
(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under 
subsection (a) of this section continues until such property is no 
longer property of the estate; and 
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this 
section continues until the earliest of-
207 Chase Manhattan Mortgage & Realty Trust v. Bergman (In re Bergman), 585 F.2d 1171, 
1177 (2d Cir. 1978) (Mansfield,].). 
2
•• 984 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1993). 
:mn Id. at 782. 
2111 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) (1994) (emphasis added). 
211 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (1994). 
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(A) the time the case is closed; 
(B) the time the case is dismissed; 
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(C) if the case is a case under ... chapter 9, 11, 12, or 13 
of this title, the time a discharge is granted or denied.212 
In all of the reorganization chapters, the plan divests the estate of its 
property in favor of debtors in their private capacity.213 Hence, 
§ 362(c) (1) is always met by the time a security agreement is rein-
stated. The end of the stay will therefore be decided by§ 362(c) (2), 
which terminates the stay when the debtor is generally discharged. 
Of course, the reinstated agreement is immune from discharge. The 
discharge refers to the other various claims, not the reinstated secu-
rity agreement.214 
In chapter 11, discharge (of unreinstated claims) is granted 
when the plan is confirmed. 215 Thus, in chapter 11, if a reinstated 
security agreement goes into default, the stay is no longer a consid-
eration, unless the plan provides otherwise.216 
In chapters 12 and 13, the stay is prolonged, because chapters 
12 and 13 defer discharge until that time.217 Thus, only when the 
chapter 12 or 13 plan is completed does the automatic stay lapse. 
Prior to that time, a secured creditor must move for relief from the 
automatic stay in order to foreclose upon the collateral. 
Sections 362(a) (5) and (a) (6) refer to the collection of 
prepetition claims. A reinstated security agreement, however, is rein-
stated postpetition in the plan. Therefore, §§ 362(a) and (a) (6) apply 
only if the reinstated agreement is considered a prepetition obliga-
tion. If it is a postpetition obligation, then §§ 362(a) (5) and (6) 
cannot apply. For that matter, no part of§ 362(a) applies, once the 
property leaves the bankruptcy estate. Hence, the applicability of the 
automatic stay to reinstated agreements during a chapter 12 or 13 
plan depends on whether the agreement is viewed as prepetition or 
212 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (1994). 
213 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 114l(b), 1227(b), 1327(b) (1994). 
214 See supra notes 200-09 and accompanying text. 
21
" See 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (d)(l)(A) (1994). 
2111 See supra note 196. 
217 See Hagel v. Drummond (In re Hagel), 184 B.R. 793 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1995) (Meyers,].); 
Allen v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc. (In re Hartley), 75 B.R. 394, 397 (S.D. Ala. 1987) (Hand, J.); 
In re Davis, 64 B.R. 358,359 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Schwartzberg,].). 
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postpetition. 
In In re Nicholson,218 Judge Charles Matheson declared the rein-
stated agreement to be a postpetition obligation. As a result, 
§§ 362(a)(5) and (6) did not protect the debtor.219 Once the plan 
was confirmed, the automatic stay utterly lapsed. For this reason, 
Judge Matheson declared that a postpetition foreclosure could pro-
ceed without the secured party moving to lift the automatic stay 
under § 362(d).220 Other courts, however, find reinstated agree-
ments to be prepetition in nature.221 In these cases, the automatic 
stay prevents unilateral action upon default of the reaffirmed agree-
ment. 
If the stay applies, then, upon breach, the secured party must 
move to lift the stay. Default on the terms of the reinstated agree-
ment then becomes grounds for this relief.222 In contrast; res judi-
cata prevents the secured creditor from obtaining relief from the 
stay when the debtor is not in default under the plan.223 Once the 
stay is lifted, the reinstated agreement may be enforced according to 
the parcels and particulars of state law. 
Nevertheless, a chapter 12 or 13 debtor might prevent the lift-
ing of the stay upon the promise to reinstate the agreement yet 
again.224 Both chapter 12 and 13 provide for liberal modification of 
the plan.225 In contrast, chapter 11 plans may not be revoked, ex-
cept for fraud, and even then revocation must occur within 180 days 
21R 70 B.R. 398 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987). 
219 See id. at 400. 
220 See id. at 400-0 I. 
221 See Far West Fed. Bank v. Vanasen (In re Vanasen), 81 B.R. 59, 60-61 (D. Or. 1987) 
(Panner,J.); Mellon Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Broman (In re Broman), 82 B.R. 581,582 (Bankr. D. 
Colo. 1988) (Brumbaugh,].); In re Ford, 84 B.R. 40, 45 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (Scholl,J.). 
222 See Ellis v. Parr (In re Ellis), 60 B.R. 432, 435 (BA.P. 9th Cir. 1985) (Abrahams,].); In 
re Randall, 98 B.R. 916, 918-19 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (Squires, j.); In re Durben, 70 B.R. 14, 
15-16 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) (Sellers,J.) (denying motion because breach was not material); 
In re Davis, 64 B.R. 358,359 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Schwartzberg,].). 
22
• See Rhode Island Cent. Credit Union v. Zimble (In re Zimble), 47 B.R. 639 (Bankr. 
D.R.I. 1985) (Votolato,J.). 
22
• See In re Raymond, 99 B.R. 819, 822-23 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (Cole,J.). It has been 
suggested that, when a secured party moves to lift the stay because of defaults in the reinstated 
agreement, adequate protection is never an issue because of res judicata. See In re Smith, 104 
B.R. 695, 700 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (Scholl, J.); In re Davis, 64 B.R. 358, 359-60 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Schwartzberg, J.). This would be true when there are no defaults, but, given 
the defaults and given the intent to cure and reinstate the agreement yet again, the court 
should insist on adequate protection between the time of the motion to lift the stay and the 
time of the second reinstatement. 
225 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1229(a), 1329(a) (1994). 
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of confirmation.226 Hence, only chapter 12 and chapter 13 debtors 
will have the opportunity to modify their plans. In Green Tree Accep-
tance, Inc. v. Hoggf,e (In re Hoggf,e),221 Judge Lanier Anderson ruled 
that modification of the plan and reinstatement of the contract a 
second time did not violate the rule in § 1322(b) (2) against modify-
ing home mortgages. Rather, just as cure under § 1322(b) (5) over-
rode the antimodification rule of § 1322(b) (2) the first time, it 
could do so again and again. 228 Indeed, Judge Anderson explained 
that any "contrary interpretation of the statutory scheme would re-
sult in a rigid default rule under which a payment tendered one day 
late would result in an immediate, incurable default. "229 Judge An-
derson warned that debtors who purposefully reinstated security 
agreements in anticipation of multiple defaults were subject to court 
discipline.230 But, assuming no bad faith, the continuance of chap-
ter 13 implies multiple opportunities to cure a default that occurs 
after the first reinstatement.231 Some courts insist that the debtor 
show cause or changed circumstances;232 otherwise res judicata pre-
vents the modification that is permitted in § 1329.233 But, given 
such a showing,234 second or third reinstatements are permissible. 
Some courts, however, disagree and hold that postconfirmation 
modification of the plan is unavailable to cure and reinstate a previ-
ously reinstated agreement.235 For example, courts have held that 
221; See 11 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994). 
227 12 F.3d 1008 (11th Cir. I 994). 
22
• See id. at 1010. Judge Anderson emphasized that § 1322(b)(5), in allowing cures, 
broadly refers to postpetition as well as to prepetition defaults. 
220 Id. at lOll. 
"'" See id. at I0ll-12. 
231 Accord, Metmor Fin., Inc. v. Bailey (In re Bailey), 111 B.R. 151, 154 (W.D. Tenn. 1988) 
(McRae,].); Far West Fed. Bank v. Vanasen (In re Vanasen), 81 B.R. 59 (D. Ore. 1987) 
(Panner,J.); In re Bellinger, 179 B.R. 220, 223-25 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1995) (Hagan,].); In re 
Mannings, 47 B.R. 318, 321-22 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) (Eisen,].). One argument against Hoggf,e 
is that§ 1322(b)(5) refers to "maintenance of payments while the case is pending." 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1322(b)(5) (1994), see In re Smith, 179 B.R. 437, 448 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995). One creditor 
argued that§ l322(b) (5) becomes unavailable if payments were not made after bankruptcy-if 
postpetition defaults occurred. See Smith, 179 B.R. at 448. This was rejected in In re Comans, 164 
B.R. 539, 542-43 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1994) (Ellington,J.). 
232 See In reGadlen, 110 B.R. 341, 344-45 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1990) (Brown,].). 
2
" See In re Bereolos, 126 B.R. 313,326 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1990) (Lindquist,].). 
23-1 Judge Paul Lindsey has suggested that no hearing need be held on a debtor's proposal 
to cure postpetition defaults on its commitment to cure prepetition defaults, unless the se-
cured party objects. In re Steele, 182 B.R. 284, 292 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1995) (Lindsey,].). 
23
' In In re Nicholson, 70 B.R. 398 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987) (Matheson, J.), Judge Matheson 
ruled that the automatic stay never applies to a reinstated agreement. In so ruling, he suggest-
1997] Rakes Progress 317 
§ 1322(b) (5) requires "maintenance of payments while the case is 
pending. "236 Yet if major plan defaults have occurred, this provi-
sion of § 1322(b) (5) cannot be met. Because modification under 
§ 1327(b) (1) requires that § 1322(b) (5) be met, defaults on the 
reinstated agreement would therefore preclude a second reinstate-
ment through modification.237 This argument, however, overlooks 
the fact that§ 1322(b) (5) allows cure of past defaults as well as rein-
statement of payments going forward. A debtor wishing to reinstate 
the security agreement a second time indeed promises to maintain 
payments going forward. The past defaults are cures. "Maintenance 
of payments" is always future-oriented-starting from the time the 
agreement is reinstated. 
Sometimes it is argued that curing postpetition defaults is not 
mentioned in § 1329(a) as one of the reasons for modification. Sec-
tion 1329(a) provides: 
At any time after confirmation of the plan but before the com-
pletion of payments under such plan, the plan may be modified, up-
on request of the debtor, the trustee, or the holder of an allowed 
unsecured claim, to-
(1) increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims 
of a particular class provided for by the plan; 
(2) extend or reduce the time for such payments; or 
(3) alter the amount of the distribution to a creditor whose 
claim is provided for by the plan to the extent necessary to take 
account of any payment of such claim other than under the 
plan.23s 
Creditors thus protest that adding a cure claim to the plan is not 
authorized by the above provl'sion. This argument has been reject-
ed.239 Each of the subparagraphs quoted above may be fairly inter-
preted as describing cure. 
In any case, a chapter 13 debtor could always refile a second 
chapter 13 petition. In this second proceeding, the mortgage, earlier 
ed that plan modifications to reinstate mortgage agreements a second time were always inap-
propriate. See id. at 400-01. 
ejr, See supra note 231. 
m See In re Sensabaugh, 88 B.R. 95, 96 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1988) (Shelley,J.). 
"" 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a) (1994). 
23n See In re Mannings, 47 B.R. 318 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1985) (Eisen,].). 
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reinstated, could be reinstated once again. While sequential petitions 
are generally viewed as evidence of bad faith,240 they are not conclu-
sively so. 241 If successive petitions are an option, there is no sense 
in per se opposition to modifications of an existing chapter 13 plan. 
III. CURE 
And thou, too careless patient as thou art 
Committ'st thy 'nointed body to the cure 
Of those physicians that first wounded thee.242 
Before a debtor can reinstate a security agreement, she must 
first "cure" any defaults. "Cure" is distinct from reinstatement and 
can be thought of as the price the debtor must pay for the privilege 
of reinstatement. Cure is retrospective while reinstatement is pro-
spective in nature. 
Each reorganization chapter encourages the "cure" of loan 
agreements.243 Prior to 1994, however, the Bankruptcy Code did 
not define what this term might mean.244 In 1994, Congress added 
the following definition in new § 1123(d), "[n]otwithstanding sub-
section (a) of this section and sections 506(b), 1129(a) (7), and 
1129(b) of this title, if it is proposed in a plan to cure a default the 
amount necessary to cure the default shall be determined in accord-
ance with the underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy 
law." 245 Nearly identical provisions were added to chapters 12 and 
13. 246 While the cross-references in the versions appended to chap-
ters 12 and 13 are different, the effect is the same. According to 
§ 1222(d) "[n]otwithstanding subsection (b) (2) of this section and 
sections 506(b) and 1225(a) (5) of this title, if it is proposed in a 
plan to cure a default, the amount necessary to cure the default 
240 See Blatnick v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 198 B.R. 326, 329 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1996) (Bow-
ie,].); In re Herrera, 194 B.R. 178, 187 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (Squires,J.). 
241 Seejohnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 87 (1991) (Marshall,].); In mjohnson, 
708 F.2d 865, 868 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (successive chapter 13 petitions). 
242 WILLIAM' SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II act 2, sc. 1. 
24
' See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(5)(G), 1222(b)(3), 1222(b)(5), 1322(b)(3), 1322(b)(5) 
(1994). 
244 See Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 471 (1993) (Thomas, J.). Section 1124(2)(C) may be 
relevant. See infra notes 323-38 and accompanying text. 
24
" 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d) (1994). 
246 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(d), 1322(e) (1994). 
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shall be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement 
and applicable nonbankruptcy law."247 And according to § 1322(e) 
"[n]otwithstanding subsection (b)(2) of this section and sections 
506(b) and 1325(a) (5) of this title, if it is proposed in a plan to cure 
a default the amount necessary to cure the default shall be deter-
mined in according with the underlying agreement and applicable 
non bankruptcy law. "248 These various provisions enact a contractu-
al theory of cure. 
In defining what cure is, the 1994 amendments attempt to me-
diate a disagreement on the nature of cure that arose in the case law 
prior to 1994. One school of thought held cure to be defined by the 
state law'of contract, supplemented by local regulation. According to 
Judge Kenneth Hall in Landmark Financial Services v. HaU:.249 
A mortgage cure, in a sense, occurs outside the ambit of the Code. 
Any charges such as late fees may indeed be payable by the mortgagor 
who elects to cure, but such charges would be mandated not by sec-
tion 506(b) but, rather, because they are integral elements of the cure 
.... The valuation of the claim or the collateral is simply immaterial 
when the original agreement is reinstated and the debtor elects to 
make all the payments called for by the agreement. The mortgagee 
receives· only the interest and other charges to which it is entitled 
under the agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law.250 
Apparently, older security agreements (as reflected in the early case 
law) tended to be silent about the consequence of monetary defaults 
and the price of cure. The contract theory initially enriched debtors 
with cures that undercompensated their creditors.251 In effect, be-
cause the early contracts were silent, debtors could cure by paying 
defaults on principal and interest, without providing interest com-
pensation between the time of the default and the time at which the 
247 11 U.S.C. § 1222(d) (1994). 
2411 11 U.S.C. § 1322(e) (1994). For the sake of convenience, I will refer only to§ 1123(d), 
but, unless otherwise indicated, everything stated about§ 1123(d) applies equally to the analo-
gous amendments in chapters 12 and 13. 
249 918 F.2d 1150 (4th Cir. 1990) (Hall,J.). 
••• Id. at 1155 (citation omitted). 
"' See, e.g., Shearson Lehman Mortgage Corp. v. Laguna (In re Laguna), 944 F.2d 542, 545 
(9th Cir. 1991) (Leavy, J.); Hall, 918 F.2d at 1154-5; In re Capps, 836 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. i 987) 
(Stapleton, J.); In re Terry, 780 F.2d 894, 896-97 (11th Cir. 1985) (Roney, J.); In re Sanchez, 
137 B.R. 214 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992) (Sharp,J.); In re Small, 65 B.R. 686,689 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1986) (Scholl,J.), affd, 76 B.R. 390 (E.D. Pa. 1987). 
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cure price was calculated. Furthermore, in chapters 12 and 13, the 
price had to be paid within "a reasonable time. "252 Given the si-
lence of the contract about cure, the price could be paid over time 
without paying postconfirmation interest (or "cram down" interest) 
to equate the present cure price with the deferred payment of the 
price.253 
The victory, however, was strictly Pyrrhic. Creditors soon learned 
to add all sorts of penalties, default interest rates, provisions for in-
terest on interest, and various other boilerplate tortures. Such provi-
sions might have been supplemented or curtailed by state law. The 
contract theory took for granted that local regulation would control 
the contractual definition of cure.254 In any case, the price of cure 
increased as creditors learned to maximize their returns with new 
clauses that tested the limits of nonbankruptcy regulation.255 
The second school held that the cure was to be governed by 
§ 506(b) and § 1325(a) (5)-provisions that generally apply to se-
cured claims. Hence, when the cure was added to the principal 
amount still due and owing on the reinstated contract, and when the 
value of the collateral exceeded this sum, the cure was an 
oversecured claim. Accordingly, § 506(b) commanded that the se-
cured party receive postpetition interest between the time of the 
default and the time that the cure price was calculated. In addition, 
if payment of the cure price was to be deferred over time, 
§ 1325(a) (5) required that the present value of the deferred pay-
ment equal or exceed the value of the collateral.256 
"'' CJ 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(b)(5), 1322(b)(5) (1994). 
""' For example, suppose the debtor had defaulted on $100 due on March 1, 1990. The 
debtor had to cure this default in a plan confirmed on July I. Because the contract was silent 
on what "cure" meant, the debtor could pay $100 to cure on July I even though interest would 
have accrued between March and July. Furthermore, the $100 would not have had to be have 
been paid in cash on July I. It could have been paid in a "reasonable time." 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1322(b)(5) (1994). If the contract did not require "cram down" interest, the debtor might 
have gotten away with giving entitlements on July I worth less than $100. Cure was thus twice 
cursed under the contract theory where the contract was silent on the terms of cure. 
,,.. See Hall, 918 F.2d at 1155-56 (holding that state law applies but finding no supplement 
in Virginia law). 
m, Thus, one creditor's agreement awarded postdefault interest at "the highest rate per-
mitted by law." In re Laymon, 117 B.R. 856,857 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (Clark,J.), rev'd, 958 
F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1992). 
'"" See Cardinal Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n v. Colegrove (In re Colegrove), 771 F.2d 119, 122 
(6th Cir. 1985) (Wellford, J.). In chapter 12, this result would flow from § 1225(a) (5). This 
point about cram down would not apply in chapter 11, because in chapter 11, reinstatement is 
overtly an alternative tci cram down. Section 506(b) could apply to chapter 11 cures, however. 
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In Rake v. Wade,257 Justice Clarence Thomas applied § 506(b) 
to establish the secured creditor's right to preconfirmation interest, 
and he applied § 1325(a) (5) to establish the secured creditor's right 
to postconfirmation interest. In so doing, he emphasized that 
§ 506(b) and § 1325(a) (5) are of general application and did not 
expressly exclude the idea of cure from their domains. 258 
Section 506(b) applies only to oversecured creditors. Therefore, 
Justice Thomas left open the question whether undersecured creditors 
were entitled to preconfirmation interest. Accordingly, courts fell 
into immediate and unseemly disarray over the entitlement of 
undersecured creditors to preconfirmation interest. Some courts 
continued to assert the contract theory to supply preconfirmation 
interest.259 Others inferred that, if§ 506(b) was the operative theo-
ry of Rake v. Wade, undersecured creditors must be disentitled to 
preconfirmation interest. 260 
Equally problematic was Justice Thomas's reliance on 
§ 1325(a) (5) to establish a creditor's right to cram down interest. 
Section 1325(a) (5) requires that for a chapter 13 plan: 
with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the 
plan-
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan; 
(B) (i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim re-
tain the lien securing such claim; and (ii) the value, as of the 
effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under 
the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed 
amount of such claim; or 
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim 
to such holder .... 261 
This is chapter 13'~ "cram down" provision. By invoking the notion 
of present value, § 1325(a) (5) (B) (ii) suggests that postconfirmation 
interest must be paid in order to equate the value of payments with 
See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text. 
257 508 U.S. 464 (1993). 
2
•• See id. at 471-73. 
2
''" See In re Hardware, 189 B.R. 273, 276-77 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Duberstein,J.); cf. In 
re Callahan, 158 B.R. 898, 903 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1993) (Ninfo, J.) (using contract theory to 
supply prepetition interest). 
21
" See In re Jones, 168 B.R. 146, 149 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994) (Abel,J.). 
2
'
11 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5) (1994) (emphasis added). 
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the present value of the collateral. 
The emphasized language indicates that § 1325(a) (5) (B) (ii) 
only applies to secured claims. Because the creditor in Rake v. Wade 
was oversecured, the cure price could be viewed as a "secured claim" 
within the meaning of§ 1325(a) (5). 
In the case of undersecured creditors, the application of 
§ 1325(a) (5) was far less clear. Faced with an undersecured claim, 
some courts felt compelled to allocate cure between the secured and 
unsecured portions. Secured portions would be entitled to 
postconfirmation interest, as required by command of 
§ 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). Unsecured portions were not entitled to 
postconfirmation interest. Unsecured creditors in chapter 13 are not 
necessarily entitled to cram down interest-only to a distribution in 
excess of what they would have received in a chapter 7 liquida-
tion. 262 Of course, reinstatement going forward would include an 
interest component. On this assumption, only the undersecured 
party's arrearage claim-comprised of defaults on principal and 
interest-could be denied interest.263 
Under Rake v. Wade, courts had to make some sort of allocation, 
in order to determine whether the cure price was a secured claim 
within the meaning of§ 1325(a) (5) (B)(ii) or not. Some courts sim-
ply labelled any cure claim as per se secured within the meaning of 
§ 1325(a) (5), thereby entitling it to cram down interest.264 In other 
262 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (4) (1994). 
263 For example, suppose a secured creditor claims $100 on collateral worth only $80. Of 
the $100; $20 constitutes past defaults. In order to apply cram down to the requirement of 
cure, a court would have to decide whether the $20 cure price was part of the secured claim 
(subject to § 1325(a)(5)) or the unsecured claim (subject to the unsecured creditor cram 
down rule of§ 1325 (a)( 4)). The former cram down rule has a postconfirmation interest com-
ponent, because the rule is based on present value of payments, compared to the value of 
collateral. The unsecured creditor's provision has no present value concept and thus no clear 
requirement of cram down interest. 
,,;.i See, e.g., Jones, 168 B.R. at 149; In re Casey, 159 B.R. 963, 964 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1993) 
(Steele, J.); Callahan, 158 B.R. at 904. Professor Robert Lawless suggests that Nobelman rede-
fines the "secured claim" of a home mortgagee as the entire debt, including arrearages. Ac-
cordingly,§ 1325(a) (5) would have required interest to be paid on arrearages. Robert M. Law-
less, Legisprudence Through a Bankruptcy Lens: A Study in the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 47 
SYR. L. REv. 1, 69 (1996). This remark overlooks the fact that Justice Thomas preserved the 
§ 506(a) meaning for "secured claim." Instead, Thomas referred to "rights" as that which 
could not be modified. See Nob/,eman, 113 S. Ct. at 2110 (§ 506(a) "does not necessarily mean 
that the 'rights' the bank ertjoys as a mortgagee, which are protected by § 1322(b) (2), are 
limited by the valuation of its secured claim ... "). Nobelman and Rake taken together there-
fore required the arrearage claim to be .characterized as either secured or unsecured and gave 
no guidance how this might be done. 
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words, they applied secured creditor cram down to a claim that was 
really unsecured.265 Another possibility would split the difference. 
The arrearage claim would be added to the principal amount due 
under the reinstated contract; from this sum the value of the collat-
eral would be subtracted. The difference defined the arrearage 
amount not entitled to interest going forward, The balance of the 
arrearage claim would be entitled to interest.266 These allocative 
difficulties with regard to undersecured claims were purely the prod-
uct of Rake v. Wade's theory that made § 1325(a) (5) the basis of 
postconfirmation interest. 
Meanwhile, Rake v. Wade, as applied to chapter 11, meant that 
only § 506(b) governed cure. Cram down could never do so, be-
cause cure and reinstatement in chapter 11 had the effect of render-
ing a creditor into an affirmative voter. Since reinstated creditors are 
almost certainly placed in their own unique class, no reinstated cred-
itor could assert cram down protection. Hence, unlike in chapters 12 
and 13, cram down cannot provide a justification for 
postconfirmation interest. 
A. The 1994 Amendments 
A year after Rake v. Wade, Congress made contract and 
nonbankruptcy law the theme of cure.267 In § 1123(d) and its 
205 This comports with the "compensatory" theory which will be offered an an alternative 
to the contractual theory and the theory based upon § 506(b) and § 1325(a)(5). See generally 
infra Part IV. 
266 This allocative system was modified in In re Arvelo, 176 B.R. 349 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1995) 
(Wizmur, J.). In Aroelo, Judge Wizmur chose a somewhat different allocation formula: take the 
value of the collateral and divide it by the sum of the arrearage claim and the reinstated claim 
for principal; the resulting percentage should then be multiplied by the arrearage claim. This 
amount then becomes the "secured" arrearage claim, entitled to interest going forward. The 
balance was not entitled to interest. See id. at 357. 
It may b.e noted that under the formula utilized by Judge Wizmur, where the collateral 
was worth $85,000, the arrearage amount was $12,772, $77,767 was principal owed under rein-
statement, the total combined arrearage-reinstatement claim was $90,543, the percentage of 
the arrearage claim considered secured was 90.375% ($77,767/$85,000). Hence, the total se-
cured claim was $89,313 ($77,767 ($12,776) (.90375) = $89,313). In comparison, the value of 
the collateral was only $85,000.Judge Wizmur's formula therefore over-allocated the arrearage 
claim to the secured portion. 
Another court has ruled that the arrearage claim is unsecured, unless the creditor can 
show collateral is adequate to secure all or part of it-a burden of proof allocation. See In re 
Johnson, 203 B.R. 775 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (Proctor,].) 
•m Congress also established the foreclosure sale as the deadline for curing defaulted secu-
rity agreements. This deadline is purely a federal rule, since state law provides diverse dead-
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analogs in chapters 12 and 13, the cure price is to be defined solely 
by the contract and by whatever nonbankruptcy law constrains or 
supplements the contract.268 
Congress applied this theory to agreements entered into after 
the enactment of the 1994 amendments.269 Agreements prior to 
this time will continue to be governed by Rake v. Wade. 270 The pro-
spective effect is insidious, because it guarantees that secured credi-
tors whose security agreements antedate October 22, 1994, are enti-
tled to the market-based compensation of Rake v. Wade. All new 
agreements can provide their own cure by their own terms.271 
Thus, the old contracts will continue to obtain market-based com-
pensation because these contracts may not have described their own 
self-cure. The new contracts, however, will be permitted to spell out 
what cure means. Moreover, since security agreements can last a very 
long time, Rake v. Wade's interpretation of cure shall be with us for 
decades to come. 
The trouble with the contractual concept of cure is that chapter 
11 debtors have every incentive to bargain away too much to their 
secured creditors, because they know that their unsecured creditors 
will ultimately pay any interest charges and fees. Therefore, one can 
expect security agreements will contain lavish "cure" provisions.272 
In the dubious patois of price theory, debtors will export this cost to 
others, thereby creating Pareto misallocations of resources.273 A ~ 
lines, based on whether the debtor continued to have an interest in the collateral. See supra 
text accompanying notes 167-70. 
2011 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, §§ 305(a)-305(c), 108 Stat. 
4106, 4134. 
21
"' See id. § 702(b) (2) (D), 108 Stat. at 4150-51. This effective date impedes only 
§§ 1123(d), 1222(d), and 1322(e)-the new definitions of cure. All other relevant 1994 
amendments became effective to any bankruptcy case that was commenced after October 22, 
1994. See supra note 15. 
270 See, e.g., In re Johnson, 203 B.R. 775 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996) (Proctor, J.) (applying 
Rake to a case filed after 1994). 
271 See Marianne B. Culhane, Home Improvement? Home Mortgages and the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1994, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 467, 494 (1996). 
272 See Roger M. Whelan & Mandy S. Cohen, Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Balancing the 
Equities in Chapter 13, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 165, 180 (1994). 
273 See Kenneth N. Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11: Fine Tuning the Plan Process, 69 AM. BANKR. 
LJ. 551, 558-59 (1995).Judge Ralph Meskill assumes that debtor.rnbtain value from agreeing to 
pro-creditor covenants about attorneys' fees; see also United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc. v. Equita-
ble Life Assurance Soc'y, (In re United Merchants & Mfrs., Inc.), 674 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1982). 
Economically, this may be so. Since the debtor controls access to the ability to transfer wealth 
from the unsecured to the secured creditor, the debtor, in a competitive credit market, would 
be able to capture these rents for herself. 
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market-based notion of compensation would have prevented these 
abuses, since the contract would have been irrelevant in setting the 
cure amount, beyond establishing the times when payments would 
have been due. 
The 1991, amendments permit contractual governance of the 
right to cure. Could the contract provide that it may not be cured 
and reinstated at all? If so, state law would then control the impor-
tant question of bankruptcy jurisdiction over home mortgages and 
other security agreements. Yet such a contract clause would be tanta-
mount to an ipso facto clause, elsewhere rendered illegal in bank-
ruptcy.274 Secured creditors could then, in essence, have ipso facto 
rights in violation of this general principle. 
Federal bankruptcy courts must honor contractual cure provi-
sions, but they must not permit ipso facto clauses in the contract. To 
reconcile this contradiction, the idea of cure must have a federal 
component which yields to, but is not obliterated by, local law. Thus, 
§ 1123(d) refer~ to the positive right to cure, indicating that the 
price of the cure will be determined by contract and local law. 275 If 
the contract and nonbankruptcy law set an unreasonable price, a 
court could declare the price to be a penalty or an ipso facto con-
tract-not a cure at all.276 In other words, courts can be expected 
to insist that "cure" have a compensatory essence. When a contract 
clause or nonbankruptcy regulation is within the domain of cure, 
the federal courts might defer to these sources. But federal law 
should not allow the contract to smuggle in a penalty in the name of 
cure. Imposing penalties in the name of cure is precisely the kind of 
ipso facto intervention that federal law prohibits. 
Cure, then, must be fundamentally compensatory, not punitive 
or opportunistic. The secret message of the 1994 amendments, then, 
is that the contract can only be evidence of what constitutes compen-
sation to the secured creditor for past defaults. The contract can 
never be applied without deciding that the contract is in fact credi-
ble evidence of what constitutes market-based compensation. 
This critique does not work so well for chapter 12 and 13 debtors. Here, the debt-
or-not the unsecured creditors--pays the tab. Hence, a rational debtor has the incentive to 
resist lavish cure provisions. 
214 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(e)(l), 541(c)(l) (1994). 
275 See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d) (1994). 
276 See In re Orlando Tennis World Dev. Co., 34 B.R. 558, 561-62 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 
1983) (Proctor,].) (excluding "penalty" late charges from the cure price). 
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B. E/,ements of Cure 
According to the covert compensatory theme of cure that has 
just been developed, the cure price will be set by four factors: ( 1) 
breach of the promise to pay principal at set times, (2) breach of 
the promise to pay interest at set times; (3) attorneys' fees, costs and 
charges (whether or not provided for in the contract); and ( 4) inter-
est running from the time of breach to the time the price is calculat-
ed-that is to say, "preconfirmation interest." 
I. Principal 
Prior to 1994, only the first of these items - principal - was 
incontrovertibly conceded to be part of cure.277 Thus, in Sapos v. 
Provident Institution of Savings,278 the debtor wished to bifurcate a 
home mortgage into its secured and unsecured parts, with the debt-
or paying the secured claim at the contractual rate.279 Judge 
Ruggiero Aldisert ruled that the bifurcation was permissible.280 
The debtor proposed to make the payments on the secured 
claim serve a double purpose. First, the payment would satisfy the 
reinstated claim going forward. Second, the same payment would 
satisfy the backward looking cure of past defaults. 2111 According to 
the debtor, when the secured claim was paid, the mortgage agree:-
ment was automatically cured.2112 Indeed, thanks to this double-dip, 
the debtor's proposed plan in effect excused the debtor from paying 
any cure price at all, so long as the secured claim was eventually 
paid. Judge Aldisert ruled that such a plan could not be confirmed. 
Rather, the cure price had to be distinguished in the plan from the 
secured claim. 2113 Each had to be paid separately. In effect, arrears 
were assumed to be the unsecured deficit which nevertheless had to 
277 As any student of bankruptcy knows, there is always a case that gets in. the way of claim-
ing that a "universal" principle of law exists. Thus, in In re Hunt, 140 B.R. 333 (Bankr. D. 
Conn. 1992), Judge Alan Shiff excused the cure of postpetition defaults altogether. As a result, 
the debtor had to cure prepetition defaults and had to reinstate the mortgage from the time 
of confirmation. Missed payments in the interim were simply forgiven. &e id. at 336. 
2
'" 967 F.2d 918 (1st Cir. 1992) (Aldisert,J.). 
279 See id. at 926-27. This bifurcation was precisely what the Supreme Court ruled illegal in 
Nobelman v. American Savings Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993) (Thomas,J.), nearly one year later. 
2
"° See id. at 929. 
2HI See id. at 923. 
2
•
2 See id. 
2
"" See id. at 926-27. 
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be paid in, full. As a result, payment of arrears could transform an 
undersecured creditor into an oversecured one. For example, if the 
secured party claimed $100 against collateral worth only $80, a cure 
price of $25 would reduce the total claim to $75, rendering the 
secured party oversecured. 284 
2. Precon.firmation Interest 
Rake v. Wade 2115 is an interpretation of§ 506(b). As such, it im-
plies that the market rate of interest is the appropriate choice of a 
rate for § 506(b).286 This was because the contract itself in Rake was 
silent as to whether the debtor had to pay interest on interest in 
case of default. In deciding for the market rate of interest, Justice 
Thomas cited United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.,287 which held 
that involuntary lien creditors were entitled to interest under 
§ 506(b) if they were oversecured, even though no contract existed 
at all. That is, § 506(b) establishes a noncontractual right to interest 
on all amounts past due, including interest payments past due.288 
'"' AccUTd, Brown v. Shorewood Fin., Inc. (In re Brown), 175 B.R. 129, 133-34 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1994) (Feeney, ].). But see In re Cruz, 152 B.R. 866, 868 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(Schwartzberg,].); In re Terranova, 152 B.R. 20, 24 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1993) (Shiff,J.). 
As a result of Rake v. Wades reliance upon § 1325(a) (5) (B) (ii) to establish the right to 
cram down interest, courts had to allocate the cure price between the secured and the unse-
cured part of the debt. See supra notes 260-63 and accompanying text. The allocation in Sapos 
simply establishes that payment of principal does not simultaneously constitute payment of the 
cure price. 
'"" 508 U.S. 464 (1993) (Thomas,].). 
,.,; See Dean Pawlowic, l!.ntitlement to Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 
149, 160 (1995) (so interpreting Rake). But see In re Cureton, 163 B.R. 494, 495 (Bankr. E.D. 
Mich. 1994) (Spector,].) (reading Rake to mean that the market rate for cures should be used 
only where the contract does not specifically govem).Judge Spector's reading is based on the 
idea that § 1322(b) (2) prevents modification of the contract, but he overlooks the fact that 
§ 1325(b)(5) allows for cures "notwithstanding" § 1322(b)(2). Hence, Rake did not merely 
invoke the market rate in the absence of a contractual cure provision. It simply applied ordi-
nary standards from§ 506(b) and cram down. 
For a post-Rake case blithely ruling that § 506(b) requires any arrearage claim to receive 
contract interest, see In re Harris, 167 B.R. 813 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1994) (Bishop,].). This case also 
holds that cram down interest need not be paid on any arrearage claim that includes defaults 
on interest, because that would be interest on interest. See id. at 815. 
"
1 Rake, 503 U.S. at 467-8 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 
(1989) (Blackmun,J.)). 
2
"" Section 506(b) provides that, to the extent there is an equity cushion, "there shall be 
allowed to the holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or 
charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose." 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) 
(1994). Notice that, according to§ 506(b), the contract governs for fees and costs. Thus, if the 
contract does not provide for costs, they cannot be awarded. It is impossible, however, to tell 
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Although Rake v. Wade has been overruled for cure, this holding 
should continue to be good law for the meaning of § 506(b) in 
noncure cases. Congress did not overrule Rake v. Wade insofar as it 
governs noncure situations. 
After 1994, cure, newly defined by§ 1123(d), is "notwithstand-
ing" § 506 (b), and according to the contract. Thus, the law of cure 
and the law of the oversecured creditor are now entirely divorced, 
although a great many courts continue to apply the contract rate of 
interest for§ 506(b), in spite of Rake v. Wade. 289 
Under any of the theories operating prior to 1994, an 
oversecured creditor and perhaps even an undersecured creditor 
could have obtained postpetition interest on the amount of default 
as part of the cure. The cure price then includes the dollar amounts 
of interest that should have been paid under the contract. If, in 
addition, an interest component is added to reflect the fact that 
time had passed between the default and the calculation of the cure 
price, then cure represents, in part, interest on interest. 
Interest on interest begins an infinite regress that inflames the 
ire of equity. In the pre-Code case of Vanston Bondholders Protective 
Committee v. Green,290 interest on interest was declared inequitable 
as a matter of federal law. In Vanston, a secured debenture called for 
periodic interest payments. If the debtor were to default on these 
whether the contract also governs on the rate of interest a secured party may collect. The 
placement of the comma after "interest on such claim" is ambiguous. The comma separates 
the right to interest from the existence of a contract. 
In Ron Pair.Justice Harry Blackmun rested heavily on this fatal comma in ruling that the 
contract is irrelevant to an oversecured creditor's right to postpetition interest. See Ron Pair, 
489 U.S. at 241-42. This ruling affirmed the entitlement of statutory lienors to postpetition 
interest, when such lienors have no contractual relation with the debtor. According to Justice 
Blackmun: 
The phrase "interest on such claim" is set aside by commas and separated from the 
reference to fees, costs, and charges by the conjunctive words "and any." As a result, 
the phrase "interest on such claim" stands independent of the language that follows. 
"Interest on such claim" is not part of the list made up of "fees, costs, or charges," 
nor is it joined to the following clause so that the final "provided for under the 
agreement" modifies it as well. The language and punctuation Congress used cannot 
be read in any other way. By the plain language of the statute, the two types of re-
covery are distinct. 
Id. at 242 (citation omitted). In other words, the right to interest is unconnected to the contract, 
and from this it follows that the contract rate need not be used, even if there is a contract. The 
proper rate of interest is open to choice. 
'"
9 See, e.g., Bradford v. Crozier (In re Laymon), 958 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir. 1992) 
(Thornberry,].). 
2110 329 U.S. 156 (1946). 
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payments, the debenture called for interest on interest.291 The low-
er courts decided that New York law should decide whether interest 
on interest could be added to the secured claim. But they disagreed 
as to what New York law was. The District Court found that New 
York law permitted, while the Court of Appeals found that it prohib-
ited, interest on interest.292 
Justice Hugo Black decided that a federal rule of equity prohib-
ited interest on interest. He emphasized that interest on interest is a 
penalty-not compensation.293 Since bankruptcy delay is a fortuity 
imposed by law, Justice Black reasoned that creditors with favorable 
contracts should not obtain interest on interest at the expense of 
creditors whose contracts have no such provision.294 This ground is 
not entirely satisfactory. Justice Black also admitted that oversecured 
creditors were entitled to straight interest at the expense of unse-
cured or undersecured creditors;295 Straight interest allowed 
oversecured creditors to do precisely what Justice Black thought was 
inequitable with regard to compound interest, albeit at a lesser level. 
Given the exception for straight interest (as governed by the con-
tract), a prohibition on contractual interest on interest seems arbi-
trary.296 
Rake v. Wade 297 obviously interleres with this conclusion. In 
Rake, Justice Clarence Thomas reasoned that cure and reinstatement 
had to be reconciled with various other portions of the Bankruptcy 
Code, such as §§ 506(b) and 1325(a) (5).298 Part of the cure price 
represented defaults on interest past due.299 Justice Thomas noted 
that the secured creditor was entitled to interest, even if the contract 
was silent on the matter. Hence, he found that the right to interest 
on interest (for an oversecured creditor) is automatic, even if the 
"-
11 See id. at 159. 
292 See id. at 160. New York has since reversed itself and acquiesced to interest on interest. 
See N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW§ 5-527 (McKinney Supp. 1997) (enacted June 1989). 
"'" See Vanston, 329 U.S. at 166. 
"-
14 See id. 
29
' See id. at 164. 
"-
16 Interestingly, Justice Black justified his decision on the ground that it would avoid in-
tractable controversy over choice of law. See id. at 162. Ironically, the 1994 amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code opt for state law in calculating the cure price, thereby reimposing the neces-
sity for choice of law. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d) (1994). 
297 508 U.S. 464 (1993) (Thomas,].). 
"''" See id. at 468-69. 
21
"' See id. at 475 n.12. 
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loan agreement is silent on the matter.300 In contrast, Vanston con-
cerned a contract that specifically called for interest on interest, 
which the Supreme Court refused to enforce.301 It is safe to say 
that Vanston is overruled by Rake v. Wade. 302 
Rake v. Wades reliance on§ 506(b) has clearly been repealed in 
the 1994 amendments, at least insofar as cure is concerned. Specifi-
cally, § 1123(d) and its analogs provide for a contractual cure not-
withstanding§ 506(b). Hence, if the contract does not call expressly 
for interest on interest, the cure price will be calculated free and 
clear of any such interest.303 But what if the contract does call for 
interest on interest? After 1994, may courts, citing Vanston, still re-
fuse to award interest on interest? 
There is some evidence in the legislative history that Vanston is 
dead. According to Congressman Jack Brooks,§ 1123(d) is supposed 
to overrule Rake v. Wade.304 Brooks's complaint about that case, 
however, was very limited. He did not oppose Rake because of inter-
est on interest. He only opposed it when local law prohibited inter-
est on interest. When state law blessed compound interest, Congress 
was all for it. 305 In short, Congressman Brooks ( or at· least his aides-
de-camp) saw the 1994 amendments as directly overruling 
Vanston.306 However, the contract must call for interest on interest, 
""" See id. at 475. 
'"" See Vanston, 329 U.S. at 160. 
""" In Equitabk Life Assurance Society v. Subktt (In re Subktt), 895 F.2d 1381, 1385 (11th Cir. 
1990), Judge Frank Johnson ruled that Vanston was likewise overruled in § 506(b), because 
contractual interest on interest can be equated with "fees, costs, or charges" within the 
meaning of Bankruptcy Code § 506(b). In light of§ 506(b)'s sanctification of the loan con-
tract in this regard, Johnson thought that Vanston must be considered overruled. See id. at 
1385-86; see al.so In re Martindale, 125 B.R. 32, 37 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1991) (Pappas,J.) (allowing 
interest on interest because debtors "cite to the (c]ourt no authority which would allow the 
[c]ourt to simply disregard these otherwise valid contractual provisions"). However, it must be 
said in Vanston's favor that fees, costs, or charges must be reasonabk. Vanston amounts to a 
holding that interest on interest is "not reasonable." Hence, just because the contract is vali-
dated with regard to fees, costs, or charges does not necessarily prove that Vanston is overruled. 
"" One commentator points out that, if a creditor bargains to receive principal or interest 
at a certain time, part of the contract is actually to receive such payment in order to have the 
reinvestment opportunity. Accordingly, interest on arrears is ordinary contract damages and 
always part of the contract. See Jonathan S. Fields, Note, Taking Interest in a Cure: Compensation 
for Time Value of Chapter 13 Residential Mortgage Arrears, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 2ll9 (1992). 
"°
4 See 140 CONG. REc. Hl0752, Hl0770 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep. 
Brooks). 
""'' See id. 
son Kenneth Klee calls for a clarifying amendment to prevent any charge of interest on 
interest, because he (wrongly) supposes that the statute fails to conform to congressional in-
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in case of defaults on interest past due, and state law must validate 
such a contract. 
3. Interest on the Accekrated Debt 
It has been suggested that once a loan agreement has been 
accelerated because a debtor has missed a few installments, interest 
should be awarded between the time of default and the time of cure 
not on the missed installments, but on the full accelerated 
amount.307 In fact, this is not a meaningful question because inter-
est is always due and owing on principal. In other words, interest on 
missed installments is the same as interest on accelerated principal 
plus installments, as the following example proves. 
Take a very simple $1 million loan due in five years. Interest is 
at 12% per annum or 1 % per month-$10,000 of interest is payable 
monthly. Suppose the debtor misses two installments of interest, and 
as the third becomes due, files files for bankruptcy. The debtor then 
immediately seeks to cure and reinstate the loan agreement. It is 
clear that the debtor must pay the two missed $10,000 payments. Let 
us assume that interest of 12% per annum (interest on interest) is 
owed on those installments. For the first installment, $10,000 plus 
two months of interest is $10,201.00 ($10,000 x 1.012). For the sec-
ond installment, the debtor owes $10,100 ($10,000 x 1.01). Finally, 
the third, installment of $10,000 is presently due. No interest has 
accrued for this installment. The cure price is therefore $30,301. 
Suppose now that we treat the entire $1 million loan as acceler-
ated, with interest accruing on this whole sum for three months. At 
the end of three months, the debtor owes $1,030,301 ($1 million x 
1.013). Since reinstatement excuses the debtor from paying accelerat-
ed principal (and no regularly scheduled principal is due), the cure 
price is $30,301. This is the exact same amount due when only inter-
est on missed installments was charged. Therefore, interest on accel-
erated amounts is precisely identical to compound interest on accel-
erated principal showing acceleration has no effect on the amount 
of interest due and owing. 
tent. See Kenneth N. Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11: Fine Tuning the Plan Process, 69 AM. BANKR. LJ. 
551, 557-58 (1995). 
"°7 See In re Arlington Village Partners, Ltd., 66 B.R. 308, 316 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) 
(Waldron, J.); In re Manville Forest Prods. Corp., 43 B.R. 293, 299 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(Lifland,].), rev'd on other grounds, 60 B.R. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
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4. Default Rates of Interest 
In response to the contract theory of cure, modem secured 
creditors have learned to demand higher postdefault interest rates. 
& unsecured creditors must pay the price, debtors are apparently 
quite ready to agree to higher postdefault interest rates. Reinstate-
ment of the security agreement reestablishes the predefault status 
quo, thereby allowing for the predefault rate going foiward. But 
what of the cure price, which is retroactively calculated? The 1994 
amendments invoke a contractual theory raising the question: must 
the cure be accomplished at the higher postdefault rate? 
In chapters 12 and 13, there is no restraint on what secured 
creditors can demand by way of cure, save what local law prevents, 
and save for the "core" federal notion that penalty clauses must not 
be honored. In chapter 11, the 1994 amendments add a confusing 
new provision which may have an impact upon a debtor's obligation 
to pay higher postdefault rates, at least with regard to the cure. Ac-
cording to new§ 365(b) (2) (D), cure of executory contracts does not 
require "the satisfaction of any penalty rate or provision relating to a 
default arising from any failure by the debtor to perform nonmone-
tary obligations, under the executory contract or unexpired 
lease."308 This section was incorporated by reference into 
§ 1124(2) (A), which requires the cure of any default other than "a 
kind specified in section section 365(b) (2) ... "309 
The meaning of this amendment is that postdefault rates are 
not part of cure, provided the debtor's defaults were nonmonetary. 
From ·this rule, one might infer that the slightest monetary default 
triggers the postdefault interest hike, at the expense of the unse-
cured creditors. This is an irrational distinction, yet one that argu-
ably may be inferred from the 1994 amendments. Meanwhile, where 
§ 1124(2) (A) contains a direct reference to § 365(b) (2) (D), the 
chapter 12 and 13 analogs do not. Hence, courts will have to decide 
whether cure is accomplished according to the contractual 
postdefault rate or the predefault rate. & § 1222(d) and § 1322(e) 
· invoke the contract and nonbankruptcy law, postdefault rates argu-
ably may now be imposed as part of the cure price. 
Prior to 1994, courts often ruled that the cure price could be 
""" 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (2)(0) (1994). 
,
09 11 u.s.c. § 1124(2) (A) (1994). 
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calculated by paying predefault rates. Thus, in Florida Partners Corp. 
v. Southeast Co. (In re Southeast Co.),310 Judge Mary Schroeder held 
that cure can be accomplished at the predefault rate, even though 
the contract calls for the postdefault rate. According to Judge 
Schroeder "[t]o allow pre-petition interest at the post-default rate 
would completely eliminate the benefits of cure in this case, as it 
would fail to nullify a significant consequence of default. "311 
Here are terms unsquared, which seem hyperboles. 312 
Postdefault rates would result in a higher cure price, which helps the 
secured creditor at the expense of the unsecured creditors, but by 
no means would a higher price "completely eliminate the benefits of 
cure. "313 Indeed, if Judge Schroeder saw herself as following the 
"contractual" school of cure, it must be admitted that the contract 
calls for the higher rate at any time after default. While reinstatement 
might be based on reestablishing the predefault interest rate con-
trary to the contract, cure under the contractual school is not autho-
rized to override the contract. Hence, there is a noncontractual, 
compensatory principle loose in Judge Schroeder's opinion.314 
Pretending the contract is not in default (when it is) and there-
by invoking the predefault rate in violation of the contract cannot 
be called a contractual theory of cure. Indeed, subjunctive work of 
this sort (reimagining the world "as if' the contract were never 
breached) threatens to produce a cure price of zero. That is, if we 
can pretend the debtor never defaulted for the purpose of trigger-
ing postdefault interest, we can pretend no default for other reasons 
as well. Namely, we can pretend that the secured party was paid all 
amounts due and owing under the contract, plus attorneys' fees. If 
we unleash subjunctive imagination, there is no limit, save that 
which imagination chooses to impose upon itself, in reordering the 
310 868 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1989) (Schroder,].). 
"' Id. at 339. 
312 
"When he speaks, 'Tis like a chime a-mending; with terms unsquared, Which from the 
tongue of roaring Typhon dropp'd Would seem hyperboles." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE 
TRAGEDY OF TROILUS AND CRESSIDA Act 1 Sc.3. 
313 In re Southeast, 868 F.2d at 339. 
314 In Casa Blanca Lenders, L.P. v. City Commerce Bank (In re Casa Blanca Lenders, L.P.), 196 
B.R. 140 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996),Judge Sidney Volinn held that the default rate was inappropri-
ately charged. The lower court held that the 1994 amendments overruled In re Entz-White Lum-
ber & Supply, Inc., 850 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1988) (Snedd,J.) (the case upon which the decision 
in Southeast was based) but judge Volinn said only that the 1994 amendments did not apply to 
cases filed before the effective date of the 1994 amendment. See Casa Blanca Lenders, 196 B.R. 
at 147. 
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contractual rights of the parties. 
Reimagining the world and then proclaiming that the contract 
is not in default does not constitute following the contract. In enact-
ing the 1994 amendments, Congress has decreed that the cure must 
occur according to the contract, and hence interest must accrue at 
postdefault rates. Nevertheless, it is still true that the contract must 
describe a "cure," not a penalty. If the contract describes a penalty, 
courts are not obliged to follow the contract. 
5. Fees, Costs, and Charges 
Prior to 1994, many courts held that attorneys' fees and the like 
must also be paid as part of cure.315 These cases were, in part, over-
ruled by Rake v. Wade, 316 which implied that § 506(b) was the basis 
of the conclusion that cure included postpetition interest. If an 
equity cushion was necessary for postpetition interest, it is likewise 
necessary for postpetition "fees, costs, or charges. "317 
After 1994, even undersecured creditors may obtain postpetition 
fees, costs, and charges, provided they are sanctioned by the contract 
and by applicable nonbankruptcy law. Yet the 1994 amendments 
introduce some ironies. Oversecured creditors whose security agree-
ment are not reinstated are entitled only to "reasonable" fees, costs, 
and charges.318 "Reasonable," in the context of oversecured credi-
tors, has taken on a federal meaning. 319 Courts are rigorous in scru-
''" See II U.S.C. § 1124(2) (A) (1994) (cure applies to "any such default that occurred 
before or after the commencement of the case under this title ... "); see also, e.g., Green Tree 
Acceptance, Inc. v. Hoggle (In re Hoggle), 12 F.3d 1008, 1010 (11th Cir. 1994) (Anderson,].); 
In re Hardware, 189 B.R. 273 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1995) (Duberstein,J.); In re Henson, 182 B.R. 
588 (Bankr. N.D. Okla 1995) (Wilson, J.) (so holding but reducing the fee to a reasonable 
amount); Vitelli v. Cheltenham Fed. Savs. & Loan Ass'n (In re Vitelli), 93 B.R. 889, 894-95 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (Scholl, J.). Earlier, Judge David Scholl ruled that only prepetition 
attorneys' fees had to be paid as part of cure, unless § 506(b) applied. Jackson v. Boulevard 
Co. (In re Nickleberry), 76 B.R. 413 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987). In Vitelli, however, he regretted his 
Nickkberry conclusion. Vitelli, 93 B.R. at 894. 
3111 508 U.S. 464 (1993) (Thomas,].). 
317 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994). 
"" Id. 
319 See Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Walter E. Heller & Co. Southeast, Inc., (In re K.E. 
Stephenson Supply Co.) 768 F.2d 580, 585 (4th Cir. 1985) (Ervin, J.); In re Record Enters., 
Ltd., 189 B.R. 769 (D. Neb. 1986) (Beam,J.) (fee in violation of Nebraska law awarded); In re 
Berry Estates, Inc., 47 B.R. 1004, 1007 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Schwartzberg,].); Longwell v. Banco 
Mortgage Co., 38 B.R. 709, 711 (N.D. Ohio 1984); In re Hyer, 171 B.R. 67, 70-71 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mo. 1994) (Koger,].); In re Saunders, 130 B.R. 208, 211-13 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991) (Anderson, 
J.) (strongly stating that attorneys' fees could be allowed under federal law, but not actually 
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tinizing security agreements for reasonableness, in order to prevent 
secured creditors from taxing the unsecured creditors. Yet, unless 
cure has a covert federal compensatory soul,320 a reinstated security 
agreement is free to be unreasonable, so long as nonbankruptcy law 
approves. Fortunately, the contract and state law govern only when 
cure is provided for. An unreasonabl,e fee, cost, or charge can be 
viewed as a penalty, not a cure. If this premise is accepted, even after 
1994, courts may ignore any contract that sets up a penalty in lieu of 
a cure. 
Another irony in the 1994 amendments is that a great many 
courts have ruled that, even if local law prevents fees, costs, and 
charges from being charged, oversecured creditors under § 506(b) 
are entitled to the enforcement of their contract as a matter of fed-
eral law.321 That is, § 506(b) sets up a federal law of contract sepa-
rate and apart from local regulation. New § 1123(d), however, es-
tablishes the suzerainty of nonbankruptcy law. Hence, reinstated 
oversecured parties could lose the right to an attorneys' fee that 
§ 506(b) otherwise would have granted, where local law is hos-
tile.322 
finding that attorneys' fees violated state law); In re Campbell, 138 B.R. 184 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 
1991) (Calhoun, J.) (secured creditor could collect attorneys' fees under contract that was 
contrary to Ohio law); Schlect v. Alaska (In re Schlect), 36 B.R. 236, 238-41 (Bankr. D. Alaska 
1983) (Williams, J.); In re American Metals Corp., 31 B.R. 229, 234 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983) 
(Franklin, J.); see also David Gray Carlson, Oversecured Creditors Under Bankruptcy Code Section 
506(b): The Limits of Postpetition Interest, Attorneys' Fees, and Collection Expenses, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 
381, 407-10 (1990) (criticizing this development). 
"
0 See Citicorp Savs. v. Oliver (In re Oliver), 183 B.R. 87, 90 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1995) 
(Bentz, J.) (suggesting that the federal rule of reasonableness in § 506(b) still applies when a 
debtor wishes to cure and reinstate the claim of an oversecured creditor). 
"' See Joseph F. Sanson Inv. Co. v. 268 Ltd. (In re 268 Ltd.), 789 F.2d 674, 676 (9th Cir. 
1986) (Goodwin, J.); Unsecured Creditors' Comm. v. Walter E. Heller & Co. Southeast, Inc. 
(In re K.E. Stephenson Supply Co.), 768 F.2d 580, 585 (4th Cir. 1985) (Ervin,J.). 
322 Georgia has an unusual provision which allows creditors to add up to 15% to the prin-
cipal amount as an attorneys' fee. This sum is owed to the lender, not to any attorney. Further-
more, in order to collect the premium: 
The holder of the note ... shall, after maturity ... notify in writing the maker ... 
that such maker has ten days . . . to pay the principal and interest without the 
attorneys' fees. If the maker ... shall pay the principal and interest in full before 
the expiration of such time, then the obligation to pay the attorneys' fees shall be 
void ... 
GA. CODE ANN. § 13-l-ll(a)(3) (1994). It has been held that cure and reinstatement relieves 
the debtor from having to pay the 15% premium, because cure and reinstatement authorizes a 
subjunctive calculation of the cure price that assumes no defaults had occurred. See In re 
Centre Court Apts., Ltd., 85 B.R. 651, 656-69 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988) (Bihany,J.). 
Centre Cmtrt involved a very peculiar chapter 11 plan. The debtor proposed to reinstate 
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6. Reliance Damages 
Under§ 506(b), if the contract does not call for "fees, costs, or 
charges," then an oversecured party has no right to them if they 
accrue after the bankruptcy petition is filed. Does cure follow the 
same principle? 
The 1994 amendments indicate that§ 506(b) no longer governs 
the cure. Only the contract does. Hence, it is likely that in chapters 
12 and 13, the contract had better provide for the payment of 
attorneys' fees if the secured creditor is to collect them in the name 
of cure. But chapter 11 has a different rule. Whereas § 1124(2) (A) 
requires the debtor to cure prepetition and postpetition defaults, 
§ 1124(2)(C) requires the debtor to compensate a creditor "for any 
damages incurred as a result of any reasonable reliance by such 
holder on such contractual provision or such applicable law. "323 
The phrase "damages," standing over against "cure" in§ 1124(2)(A), 
must mean positive damages in excess of the cure amount.324 The 
phrase "reliance damages" implies that this provision covers noncon-
tractual damages. Thus, if§ 506(b) requires that an agreement provide 
for the payment of attorneys' fees, § 1124(2) (C) could be read as 
providing for reimbursement when, in "reliance" on a breach of 
contract, the creditor incurs collection expense.325 
future payments on the mortgage, but also proposed to sell the collateral free and clear of the 
mortgage and pay cash proceeds to the mortgagee. Unless the debtor had a contractual right 
to prepay, such a sale would appear to be inconsistent with reinstatement. See In re Newton, 
161 B.R.. 207, 216-17 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993) (Kishel, J.) (chapter 13) (so acknowledging but 
suggesting that payment of a claim under § 1322(b) (8) was not inconsistent with the rule 
against modifying home mortgages under the right conditions). 
In any case, the secured party never objected to the sale-only to the failure of the debt-
or to pay the 15% fee. In relieving the debtor of this obligation, Judge Joyce Bihary remarked 
that "[t]he result might be different if the debtor had proposed a plan to sell the property 
without a cure and reinstatement, since requiring the creditor to wait until a sale was consum-
mated might have resulted in an impairment under§ 1124." Id. at 659. Had the secured party 
also objected that the sale free and clear was itself an impairment, the secured party might 
have won the 15% premium. 
Judge Bihary also invited the secured party to seek attorneys' fees under § 506(b)-but 
only for the reasonable value of services rendered. The percentage required by the contract 
was held to be "unreasonable." Id. at 660-61. After 1994, cure and reinstatement would, of 
course, preclude the application of any§ 506(b) rules. 
"' 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (C) (1994). 
324 See In re Arlington Village Partners, Ltd., 66 B.R. 308, 316 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1986) 
(Waldron, J.); In re Rolling Green Country Club, 26 B.R. 729, 733 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982) 
( Owens, J.). 
"'' See Arlington Village Partners, 66 B.R. at 316 ("Damages would include actual expenses 
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Meanwhile, "reliance" suggests more than mere passivity. A 
creditor who fails to obtain payment has obviously suffered a loss, 
but not a reliance loss. Although "reliance damages" has been 
thought to include amounts due and owing under the contract,326 
what of the opportunity cost a creditor suffers, representing the 
return on reinvested money? Does a creditor "rely" in any sense of 
the word when the creditor is unable to reinvest?327 In other words, 
doing nothing is not reliance, but interest is necessary to provide full 
compensation. Yet since § 1124(2)(C) requires compensation for 
reliance, mere want of compensation is not enough to invoke the 
authority of that provision.328 
In spite of these observations, courts have cited § 1124(2)(C) as 
proof that chapter 11 creditors deserve interest on all arearages, 
including interest on defaulted interest.329 This interest is not to be 
a creditor's actual opportunity cost; this would be too speculative330 
and inconsistent with the spirit of cure, which locks the creditor into 
the existing bargain.331 Instead, some sort of interest rate must be 
assigned as part of the cure price.332 
incurred by creditors pursuing their right to accelerate such as attorney's fees expended in a 
foreclosure action."). 
326 See In re Orlando Tennis World Dev. Co., 34 B.R. 558, 560 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) 
(Proctor,].). 
'
27 Professor Walter Blum thought a positive or negative answer was equally plausible: 
To qualify for compensation, a creditor presumably must show that he suffered dam-
ages from engaging in some course of conduct on the assumption that payment of 
the debt would be accelerated as a result of a default. Yet it is not implausible to 
interpret the statute as covering interest on an arrearage. Were an acceleration per-
mitted, the creditor would receive payment of the debt and then be in a position to 
invest those funds at interest and to earn interest on that interest. Everyone who 
invests in interest-bearing securities, it can be assumed, anticipates being able to 
engage in such additional investment and hence can be considered to have relied 
on that opportunity. To ignore the value of a compound interest opportunity is to 
deny the creditor compensation for damages that go to the very essence of his in-
vestment. 
Walter J. Blum, Treatment of Interest on Debtor Obligations in Reorganizations Under the Bankruptcy 
Code, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 430, 437 (1984). 
"" See In re Manville Forest Prods. Corp., 43 B.R. 293, 301-02 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) 
(Lifland, J.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Unsecured Creditors Comm. v. Manville Forest 
Prods. Corp. (In re Manville Forest Prods. Corp.), 60 B.R. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
329 See Great Western Bank & Trust v. Entz-White Lumber & Supply, Inc. (In re Entz-White 
Lumber & Supply, Inc.), 850 F.2d 1338, 1343 n.7 (9th Cir. 1988) (Sneed, J.); Arlington Village 
Partners, 66 B.R. at 315-17. 
"" See Arlington Village Partners, 66 B.R. at 316. 
"' See ManviUe Forest Prods., 43 B.R. at 303. 
332 See Arlington Village Partners, 66 B.R. at 319 (market rate, but predefault contract rate 
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Section 1124(2) (C) has been read to require interest on inter-
est, even when local state law does not permit it. Thus, if interest 
can pass as "reliance" damages, which is questionable, interest on 
interest is surely allowed, because § 1124(2) (C) is a federal principle 
that overrides state law. 333 
It has been held that reliance damages do not include the dif-
ference between the present value of the loan at a low contract rate 
loan and the present value of a higher market rate loan. Such an 
award defeats the entire purpose of reinstatement-capturing the 
low contract rate for the benefit of a debtor's creditors.334 
Courts sometimes assume that damages under § 1124(2) (C) 
refer only to prepetition damages,335 even while § 1124(2) (A) re-
quires cure of "any such default that occurred before or after the 
commencement of the case .... "336 This assumption comes from a 
sole reference in the legislative history of § 1124(2) (C), wherein 
Congressman Jim Edwards remarks, "[A] class of claims is not im• 
paired under the c.ircumstances of§ 1124(2) if damages are paid to 
rectify reasonable reliance engaged in by the holder of a claim . . . 
arising from the prepetition breach of contractual provision, such as 
an ipso facto or bankruptcy clause, or law."337 This is surely a casu-
al or careless remark. There is no evidenc.e that Congressman Ed-
wards (or his staff, who undoubtedly wrote this line) specifically 
intended to exclude postpetition reliance. If the idea of cure is to 
render the reinstated creditor whole, what is. the sense of making 
was to be a minimum and postdefault contract rate was to be a maximum); see also Florida 
Partners Corp. v. Southeast Co. (In re Southeast Co.), 868 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(Schroeder,].) ("reliance damage ... 'does not comprise contractual penalty interest rates'") 
(quoting In re Southeast Co., 81 B.R. 587, 592 (BA.P. 9th Cir 1987) (per curiam), afj'd, 868 
F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
'"" See Manville Forest Prods., 43 B.R. 293 (refusing to award interest on interest on the 
strength of Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v. Green, 329 U.S. 156 (1946)). Judge Rich-
ard Owen reversed, holding that interest on interest was indeed equitable. See Unsecured 
Creditors Comm. v. Manville Forest Prods. Corp. (In re Manville Forest Prods.), 60 B.R. 403, 
404 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Owen, J.). It is mystifying that Owen cited Vanston for this proposition. 
See id. at 404-05. A subsequent authority has theorized that the equity of interest on interest 
depended upon the solvent nature of the debtor in Manvil/,e. See In re 360 Inns, Inc., 76 B.R. 
573,583 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (Houston,].). 
"
4 See In re Rainbow Forest Apts., 33 B.R. 576 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983) (Kahn, J.); In re 
Rolling Green Country Club, 26 B.R. 729, 733 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982) (Owens,].). 
''" See Arlington Village Partners, 66 B.R. at 31!:i-16; In re Tavern Motor Inn, Inc., 56 B.R. 
449, 452 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985) (Conrad,].). 
»n 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (A) (1994) (emphasis added). 
m 124 CONG. REc. H32406 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards). 
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this distinction? The cure price everywhere transcends the distinc-
tion between prepetition and postpetition matters, and it should do 
so with regard to "reliance damages" under § 1124(2) (C). In any 
case, if§ 1124(2) (C) is read to provide that noncontractual damages 
for attorneys' fees are limited to prepetition fees, it still remains true 
that, where the contract expressly requires the debtor to pay 
postpetition attorneys' fees, postpetition defaults in violation of such 
a contract must be cured under§ 1124(2) (A).338 
C. Deferred Payment 
The preceding discussion has established the elements of the 
cure price-the price that must be paid to reinstate a contract. But 
when must the price be paid? It does not necessarily follow that the 
cure price must be paid in cash on the effective date of a reorganiza-
tion plan. At least in chapters 12 and 13, the claim might be paid 
over time. If so, the question arises as to whether deferred payment 
implies "cram down" (i.e., postconfirmation) interest so that the 
present value of the stream of payments precisely equals the present 
payment for which it is a substitute. 
1. Chapter 11 
Chapter 11 declines to give advice as to the time by which the 
cure must be accomplished, except that § 1124's preamble does 
indicate that "the plan" must accomplish the cure.339 This leaves 
open the possibility that the cure amount could be paid over time. 
Some courts have insisted that cure be accomplished by the 
effective date of the chapter 11 plan-not stretched out over 
time.340 It has been suggested that cure on the effective date of the 
plan saves litigation and avoids implication into matters of valua-
tion. 341 One of the justifications for permitting cure and reinstate-
''" In declaring that§ 1124(2)(C) covers only prepetition reliance damages,Judge Francis 
Conrad suggested that postpetition interest could be awarded under§ 506(b). See Tavern Motor 
Inn, 56 B.R. at 453. This suggests that, in chapter 11, postpetition interest is not part of the 
cure price when the creditor is undersecured. After 1994, however, the cure price is supposed 
to be calculated "notwithstanding"§ 506(b). 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d) (1994). 
339 11 u.s.c. § 1124 (1994). 
340 See In re Holthoff, 58 B.R. 216, 219 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1985) (Mixon,].); cf 11 U.S.C. 
§ 365(b)(l)(A) (1994) (at the time of assumption of an executory contract, the trustee must 
cure or give adequate assurance of a prompt cure). 
341 See In re Jones, 32 B.R. 951 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983) (Clark,].). 
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ment had been to avoid the valuations inherent in cram down hear-
ings.342 Yet, in opposition to this point, the only valuation needed 
in deferring payment of the cure amount is setting the cram down 
interest rate. Precisely the same valuation issue would have been 
required in deriving the cure amount, as it existed prior to the 1994 
amendments. 
If chapter 11 is opaque as to whether cures may be paid by 
deferred payments, chapters 12 and 13 are not. They specifically 
provide for payment over a "reasonable time."343 This comparison 
suggests by negative pregnant that, with regard to chapter 11, Con-
gress intended for immediate payment on the effective date of the 
plan. 
2. Chapters 12 and 13 
In chapters 12 and 13, at least when the scheduled payments 
exceed the length of the plan, the cure price need only be paid 
''within a reasonable time. "344 If the scheduled payments do not 
exceed the length of the plan, then neither § 1222(b) (5) nor 
§ 1322(b)(5) apply to authorize cure within "a reasonable time." 
These short-term mortgages present the same dilemma on payment 
terms as do all security agreements in chapter 11: when must the 
cure price be paid for such security agreements? 
At least we know that the cure proce for long-term security 
agreements in chapters 12 and 13 need not be paid immediately but 
instead may be stretched over a reasonable time. But what is "area-
sonable time?" It is quite often suggested that cure over the entire 
life of the chapter 13 plan is acceptable,345 but that spreading the 
cure over the life of the plan is not per se reasonable either. 346 The 
""
2 See sufrra notes 62-66 and accompanying text. Furthermore, Judge Clark suggested if 
cure could be accomplished over time, then disimpairment would itself become a cram- down 
technique in competition with§ 1129(b). See Jones, 32 B.R. at 959. In truth, that is the role of 
reinstatement-to compete with cram down as a technique. This last remark therefore lacks 
bite. 
""" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(b)(5), 1322(b)(5) (1994). 
""
4 Id. 
""' See In re Capps, 836 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1987) (Stapleton,].); Central Fed. Savs. & Loan 
Ass'n v. King (In re King), 23 B.R. 779 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1984) (Volinn, J.); In re Hatcher, 202 
B.R. 626, 630-31 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1996) (Comish,].); Epps v. Lomas Mortgage USA, Inc. (In 
re Epps), ll0 B.R. 691, 707 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (McGiynn,J.); In re Chavez, ll7 B.R. 730 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. 1990) (Cristo), J.). 
""" See First Nat'l .Bank v. Sidelinger (In re Sidelinger), 175 B.R. 115, 117-20 (Bankr. D. Me. 
1997] Rake's Progress 341 
time might even extend beyond the duration of the very agreement 
that is reinstated, where the agreement matured within the life of 
the plan.M7 In any case, since the chapter 12 or 13 plan cannot last 
beyond five years, 3411 this five year period will surely be the maxi-
mum time in which the cure price may be paid.349 At least one 
applellate opinion exists, however, that found 25 years-the life of 
the mortgage-to be a reasonable time.350 
The Bankruptcy Code is not explicit as to whether cram down 
interest must be paid in order to commensurate future payment with 
present value of the cure. In Rake v. Wade, 351 the Supreme Court 
made clear that postconfirmation interest compensation is required 
when a creditor is oversecured. In fact, Justice Clarence Thomas 
ruled that both preconfirmation and postconfirmation interest com-
ponents were needed to accomplish the cure.352 Yet becaµse he re-
lied on § 1325(a)(5), which applies only to secured claims, he left 
unclear whether undersecured creditors were entitled to cram down 
interest. 
The 1994 amendment clearly reverses this holding. According to 
new § 1322(e), cure is governed by the contract notwithstanding 
§ 1325(a) (5).353 Carefully read, this provision governs "the amount 
necessary to cure the default." 354 In other words, the cure price is 
to be defined by state law. How this price is to be paid-now or over 
time-is not necessarily consigned to contractual governance. 
Hence, courts might still decide that cram down interest is not nee-
1994) (Haines, J.) (so concluding but nevertheless allowing cure over life of plan); In re 
Acevedo, 9 B.R. 852 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (Parente,].) (finding cure over three years unrea-
sonably long). Judge Gregory Kishel has decreed that any payment lasting more than twelve 
months is presumed unreasonable. See In re Newton, 161 B.R. 207, 210-11 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
1993). But see In re Chavez, 117 B.R. 730, 731 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (Cristol,J.) (even suggest-
ing a presumed deadline would be impermissible judicial legislation). 
347 See In re East, 172 B.R. 861, 867 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1994) (Greendyke, ].). 
""" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(c), 1322(d) (1994). 
""" See Capps, 836 F.2d at 776 (five-year cure allowed); In re Molitor, 133 B.R. 1020 (Bankr. 
D.N.D. 1991) (Hill, J.). In In re Masterson, 147 B.R. 295, 296-97 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1992), Judge 
James Yacos noted that court approval is needed for a chapter 13 plan to extend beyond three 
years. He thought the very need to stretch out payment of the cure price justified extension of 
the plan. 
'"
0 See PNC Mortgage Co. v. Dicks, 199 B.R. 674 (N.D. Ind. 1996) (Sharp,].). 
"'' 508 U.S. 464 (1993) (Thomas,].). 
'" Id. at 475. 
"'' Prior to 1994, the "contractual theory" of cure held that§ 506(b) was inapplicable to 
the amount of the cure price. See, e.g., Landmark Fin. Servs. v. Hall, 918 F.2d 1150, 1153 (4th 
Cir. 1990) (Hall,J.). 
'"' 11 U.S.C. § 1322(e) (1994). 
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essarily required to defer payment. That is, courts might decide that 
the cure price is contractual, but the payment terms are a matter of 
federal law. 
The contrary argument is that§ 1322(e) calls for the contract to 
govern "notwithstanding"§ 1325(a)(5). This grammar suggests that 
Congress viewed the contract as capable of governing the way a cure 
price is to be paid. Of course, the contract cannot contradict any 
part of the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, the contract could not provide 
that the cure price must be paid in cash on the effective date of the 
plan, because§ 1322(b) (5) indicates that the price may be paid over 
"a reasonable time." A contractual prov1S1on calling for 
postconfirmation interest, however, would not contradict the Bank-
ruptcy Code. It would only supplement it. Therefore, it is possible 
that the contract or nonbankruptcy law could produce 
postconfirmation interest, but absent authority from those sources, 
the Bankruptcy Code itself does not provide for it.35.,; 
If cram down interest is awarded on deferred payment of the 
cure price, it will in part constitute interest on interest on interest. 
This thrice compounded interest rate might be raised to still higher 
powers if a chapter 13 debtor is permitted to cure defaults on cram 
down interest with the modification of the plan, as many courts al-
low. 356 
D. Avoidance Powers 
Cure implies that a bankruptcy trustee must waive all sorts of 
rights that otherwise might be asserted against secured creditors to 
belittle and minimize their rights. Thus, cure should imply that a 
trustee waives all avoidance powers against a secured creditor.357 
!If,, For a case in which the contract was allowed to set the cram down rate in lieu of the 
market, see In re Cureton, 163 B.R. 494 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994) (Spector, J.). This conclu-
sion is based on a reading of Nobelman and Rake whereby the contract was thought 
unmodifiable, even after calculation of the cure price. This is not a necessary reading of either 
Supreme Court decision and in addition overlooks the fact that cures are to be calculated 
"notwithstanding"§ 1322(b)(2). 
Judge Arthur Spector went on to note that the cure price consisted of overdue principal 
and overdue fees and charges. Id. at 496. Because the contract called for a high rate of interest 
on principal (but not other. charges) Spector required that plan payment first be allocated to 
the charges and then to principal. Id. at 496-97. Presumably, Spector thought that no cram 
down interest was owed on the charges. His allocation thereby maximized the interest expense 
on the debtor. 
!lf,o See supra notes 224-53 and accompanying text. 
357 When transfers are made pursuant to an executory contract which· a bankruptcy trustee 
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The loss of a security interest is certainly an impairment of the 
prepetition rights of the creditor. For this reason, it has been held 
that, in spite of§ 552(a), which destroys a secured creditor's after-
acquired property rights in a prepetition security agreement, rein-
statement of a security agreement implies the restoration of those 
rights.358 
A few courtsc have suggested otherwise. In Citicorp Acceptance Co. 
v. Ruti-Sweetwater (In re Sweetwater),359 the debtor wished to disimpair 
the secured claim and to reserve the right to avoid the mortgage 
after confirmation. Judge Bruce Jenkins held that reinstatement 
might still occur because "the threat of litigation arose by operation 
of law-not because of the plan."360 Because cure and reinstate-
ment imply a Pavlovian affirmative vote on the plan, a creditor fac-
ing ruination by avoidance of a lien is not allowed to vote on a plan 
because, pending the actual avoidance, such a creditor is not 
deemed to be impaired. The fairness of this disenfranchisement has 
been found deserving of criticism.361 
A more extreme version of this principle outside the context of 
secured credit is In re American Solar King Corp.362 In American Solar 
King, the debtor claimed that securities plaintiffs who sought to 
rescind the purchase of their equity securities were unimpaired, even 
though the plan would pay them nothing.363 The debtor argued 
that§ 510(b) subordinated such claims. Therefore, paying the secu-
rities plaintiffs nothing constituted "leav[ing] unaltered the legal, 
equitable, and contractual rights to which such claim or interest 
entitles the holder of such claim or interest. "364 Judge Leif Clark 
found merit in the claim. 35.,; When applied to secured creditors, 
this case produces disturbing results. For example, suppose a se-
cured party has received a voidable preference, but the debtor wish-
later assumes, the voidable preference authorities are divided as to whether voidable prefer-
ence actions can be brought. See David Gray Carlson, Security Interests in tne Crucible of Voidable 
Preferences Law, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 350-56. 
"'"' See In re Blackwelder Furniture Co., 31 B.R. 878, 881-82 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1983) 
(Wooten,].). 
""
0 57 B.R. 354 (D. Utah. 1985) Oenkins,j.). 
,.., Id. at 357. 
:mi Evan D. Flaschen, The Martgagee and the Real Estate Reorganization Debt<1r, 105 BANKING 
LJ. 188, 210 (1988). 
362 90 B.R. 808 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (Clark,].). 
"" Seeid.at814. 
'"" Id. at 819 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1) (1988)). 
'"" See id. at 818. 
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es to disimpair the contract. According to Judge Clark's reasoning, if 
th.e plan gives to the secured creditor exactly what the Bankruptcy 
Code provides, the secured creditor is not impaired within the 
meaning of§ 1124(1) and so cannot vote on the plan. "Leaves unal-" 
tered" cannot mean the post-Bankruptcy Code assessment of 
entitlements. If such meaning is given to § 1124(1), no creditor is 
ever impaired so long as the bankruptcy trustee gives every creditor 
what the Bankruptcy Code requires them to be given. In truth, the 
securities claimants should have been viewed as impaired and hence 
allowed to vote. 
A similar line of reasoning was followed by Judge Francis 
Conrad in In re Tavern Motor Inn, Inc.366 Judge Conrad reasoned 
that since a debtor in possession does not have to pay postpetition 
interest to an undersecured creditor pursuant to § 502(b), such 
interest is never due and owing. Therefore, no default occurred 
when the debtor failed to pay postpetition interest. Yet, 
§ 1124(2) (A) does compel the debtor to cure defaults "that oc-
curred before or after the commencement of the case."367 It has 
been suggested that Judge Conrad's decision ignores this provi-
sion.368 But this does not exactly address Judge Conrad's point, · 
which is that there were no postpetition defaults, once the effect of 
§ 502(b) was considered. A better answer is that "cure" should not 
comprehend the postpetition entitlements of a creditor. Rather cure 
should only comprehend the rights stemming from breach of the 
contract, as if no bankruptcy proceeding had ever been commenced. 
On this view, some sort of postpetition interest would be 
due-whether at a market or contract rate. Section 502(b) could not 
be cited to prove that the creditor does not deserve postpetition 
interest. 
E. Is Cure a Modification? 
Prior to 1994, courts were bitterly divided over whether cure is a 
modification of a mortgage agreement. At that time, the question 
was important, because § 1322(b) (5) permitted "cure" of long term 
mortgages "notwithstanding" the antimodification rule in 
§ 1322(b)(2). Cure of short-term mortgages, however, had to be 
300 56 B.R. 449 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1985) (Conrad,J.). 
'
67 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2){A) (1994) (emphasis added). 
•r.• See Flaschen, supra note 361, at 212. 
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accomplished under§ 1322(b)(3), which lacked a "notwithstanding" 
clause. If cure constituted a modification, then the antimodification 
rule of § 1322(b)(2) prevented short term home mortgages from 
being cured. 
To prevent this implication, many courts held cure is not modi-
fication. They pointed out that§ 1322(b) itself distinguishes between 
"modification," permitted except for home mortgages under 
§ 1322(b) (2), and "cure," permitted under § 1322(b) (3). This dis-
tinction was supposed to prove that cure does not offend the rights 
of a secured party claiming only the debtor's residence.369 On this 
view, a debtor may indulge in cures under § 1322(b) (3) without 
regard to the antimodification rule of § 1322(b) (2).370 Moreover, 
the function of§ 1322(b) (5) was simply to empower a court to rein-
state a security agreement beyond the life of the chapter 13 plan, 
something § 1322(b) (3) does not refer to. Cure per se was not in 
violation of§ 1322(b) (2). 
In Wade v. Hannon, 371 Judge James Logan vociferously insisted 
that to cure a security agreement implied that it had been modi-
fied. 372 According to Judge Logan, cure is a modification of the 
contract, and therefore cure, in general, must not be a contractual 
idea.373 This left Judge Logan free to award postpetition interest as 
part of cure, even though the contract didn't call for it.374 In the 
end, however, Judge Logan insisted (like Justice Thomas would later 
do on appeal) that §§ 506(b) and 1325(a) (5) apply to cure claims, 
in order to justify preconfirmation and postconfirmation interest 
31m See Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Savs. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 241 n.9, 247 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(en bane) (Tate,J.). 
"
0 See In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 1376 (3d Cir. 1987) (Stapleton, J.); Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 
247 (using§ 1322(b)(3) to cure junior mortgage of less than three years); Di Pierro v. Taddeo 
(In re Taddeo), 685 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (Lumbard,].). 
371 968 F.2d 1036, 1040-42 (10th Cir. 1992), affd sub nom. Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464 
(1993) (Thomas,].). 
m Justice Thomas, on appeal, agreed. See Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 473 n.9 (1993) 
(Thomas,].). 
373 See Wade, 968 F.2d at 1040. 
374 See id. at 1040-42. If cure is not modification, then the language in § 1322(b) (5) allow-
ing cure "notwithstanding" § 1322(b) (2) is surplusage, which at least one judge freely admit-
ted. See In re Roach, 824 F.2d 1370, 13775 (3d Cir. 1987) (Stapleton, J.). It has also been sug-
gested that, if cure is not modification, then § 1322(b) (2) and (3) would be superfluous as 
well. See In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1984) (Marshall, J.). This is refutable. Cure 
might be a subset of modification. If so, § 1322(b) (2) has utility to explain that all other types 
of modifications except cure are prohibited. Section 1322(b) (2) and (3) therefore prevent every 
type of modification of a home mortgage-including cram down-that is not a cure. 
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payments respectively.375 These points are not affected by the char-
acterization of cure as a modification one way or the other. 376 
Some courts had ruled that § 1325(a) (5)-cram down-only 
applies if a security agreement has been "modified." Cure, they 
thought, is not a "modification." Therefore, § 1325(a) (5) cannot 
apply to cure, and it cannot dictate cram down interest on the 
cure.377 What these courts are really suggesting is that cure is a sui 
generis claim that combines both prepetition and postpetition 
claims. In contrast, § 1325(a) (5) governs secured claims, which cover 
postpetition defaults only if the creditor is oversecured.378 This is 
the position that Rake v. Wade overruled,379 but which was ultimate-
ly vindicated when the 1994 amendments demanded the cure price 
be calculated "notwithstanding" cram down. 
Whether cure constitutes a modification is now a useless ques-
tion in chapter 13. Since adoption of the 1994 amendments, a chap-
ter 13 debtor may modify a short-term mortgage.380 As to long-term 
mortgages, the cure may proceed "notwithstanding" the 
antimodification rule in § 1322(b)(2). Thus, absent a distinction in 
treatment between short and long term mortgages with regard to 
modification, the question of whether cure constitutes a modifica-
tion is moot. 
F. Cure as Dependent on Reinstatement 
Often debtors owe a lump sum payment to a creditor, as where 
the security agreement, without an event of acceleration, has ended 
by its terms and requires a balloon payment to retire the entire debt. 
May a debtor "cure" this security agreement by paying off the loan 
agreement in the reorganization plan? 
Since 1994, this question is of little import in chapter 13. Prior 
to 1994, home mortgages could not be modified.381 Meanwhile, 
'
75 See Wade, 968 F.2d at 1041. 
"" Judge Logan also noted that Ron Pair had held oversecured creditors with no contrac-
tual rights were entitled to postpetition interest. Why not then oversecured mortgagees whose 
contracts were silent as to interest on interest as a mode of cure? See id. at 1041. 
m Landmark Fin. Servs. v. Hall, 918 F.2d 1150, 1154-55 (4th Cir. 1990) (Hall, J.); Roach, 
824 F.2d at 1375; In re Capps, 836 F.2d 773, 776 (3d Cir. 1987) (Stapleton,].). 
37
" See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994). 
"" 508 U.S. 464 (1993). 
"'" See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2) (1994). 
"'' 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988). 
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cures under § 1322(b) (5) were authorized "notwithstanding" 
§ 1322(b)(2) only when payments were due after the end of the 
chapter 13 plan. If a mortgage was fully mature (without the aid of 
acceleration), debtors were anxious to "cure" mortgages over the life 
of the chapter 13 plan under§ 1322(b)(3). If payment of the entire 
mortgage (while reinstating nothing) was a cure (and if cure was 
consistent with the antimodification rule),382 debtors could achieve 
the cure over the three to five year period of the plan, instead of 
paying immediate cash to the mortgagee. 
Many courts held that cure did not contemplate payment of the 
entire amount due and owing. Rather, cure required some degree of 
"reinstatement." Accordingly, debtors could not use § 1322(b) (3) to 
override § 1322(b) (2) 's insistence that home mortgages not be mod-
ified. The plan could not defer payment over time but had to pay 
cash to any creditor with a mature claim.383 
Other courts have disagreed, holding that payment in full is a 
cure.384 In Great Western Bank & Trust v. Entz-White Lumber & Sup-
3112 See supra notes 369-80 and accompanying text. 
'"" See First Nat'! Fidelity Corp. v. Perry, 945 F.2d 61, 65-66 (3d Cir. 1991) (Stapleton, J.); 
Justice v. Valley Nat'! Bank, 849 F.2d 1078, 1084-85 (8th Cir. 1988) (Gibson, J.); Seidel v. 
Larson (In re Seidel), 752 F.2d 1382, 1383 (9th Cir. 1985) (Farris,].); In re French, 174 B.R. 1, 
7-8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (Boroff,].); Linzmeier v. Bull's Eye Credit Union (In re Linzmeier), 
138 B.R. 59, 62 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1991) (Martin, C. J.); In re La Brada, 132 B.R. 512, 516 
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991) (Duberstein, C.J.). 
In United States Trust Co. v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 150 B.R. 529 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1993), affd, 170 B.R. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1994),Judge Burton Lifland ruled that a postma-
turity interest rate had to be distinguished from a postdefault interest rate, where the original 
schedule of payments had not yet run out. Reinstatement might reestablish the predefault 
rate, but reinstatement could not be accomplished when the loan agreement reached its natu-
ral maturity. See id. at 542-43. This view implies that paying the secured claim does not cure it. 
If it did, it might be possible to pay the prematurity interest rate under the authorities that 
rule that the cure price can be calculated on the assumption of the predefault rate. 
3114 See Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Savs. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 247 (5th Cir. 1984) (en 
bane) (Tate, J.) (suggesting that any claim accruing before bankruptcy might be cured under 
§ 1322(b)(3)); Larkins v. Commercial Bank (In re Larkins), 50 B.R. 984 (W.D. Ky. 1985) 
Oohnstone,J.); In re]ohnson, 184 B.R. 570, 572-73 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995) (Dreher,].) (hold-
ing that since secured claim was paid in full, it was "cured," and the court would use its discre-
tion to use predefault contract rate, rather than the postdefault contract rate); In re Eason, 181 
B.R. 127 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1995) (Cohen,].); In re Hart, 184 B.R. 849 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995) 
(Glenn, J.); In re Dixon, 151 B.R. 388, 392-94 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1993) (Ellington, J.); In re 
Aguirre, 150 B.R. 922, 923 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993) (Akard, J.); In re PCH Assocs., 122 B.R. 
181, 198 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (Blackshear, J.) (dictum); Vitelli v. Cheltenham Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n (In re Vitelli), 93 B.R. 889, 894-95 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (Scholl,].). In In re Wat-
son, 190 B.R. 32 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995), involving a mortgage on commercial real estate,Judge 
David Scholl unnecessarily ruled that, where the mortgage had fully matured prior to the 
chapter 13 plan, it could still be "cured"-i.e., paid off over time. In fact, he should have sim-
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ply, Inc. (In re Entz-White Lumber & Supply, lnc.),385 the loan at issue 
was entirely mature. The secured party was oversecured and hence 
entitled to postpetition interest under§ 506(b). The loan agreement 
called for a higher postmaturity interest rate. The debtor proposed a 
chapter 11 plan that would pay cash to the secured creditor, but 
with interest calculated at the predefault rate. The secured creditor, 
on the other hand, claimed that it was entitled to the contract rate 
of interest, by which it meant the higher postdefault rate. 386 
Judge Joseph Sneed upheld the debtor's plan on grounds that 
the debtor was entitled to "cure" the claim at predefault rates.387 
Cure meant the restoration of the status quo ante, which Sneed took 
to mean paying as if payment had occurred on the day the loan 
matured. Of course, under this premise, no interest was due and 
owing. 
A better approach to resolving this issue would have been for 
Judge Sneed to rule that the payment of the full claim in cash is not 
"cure and reinstatement," but rather, that cure is the retrospective 
price of prospective reinstatement. Without reinstatement going 
forward, cure of past defaults is meaningless and not permitted. As 
to the interest rate to which the oversecured creditor in Entz-White 
was entitled, § 506(b) governed the proper interest rate for the 
oversecured creditor in question. Accordingly, that rate should have 
been the market rate, not the contract rate. 
It is probable that Judge Sneed resorted to his definition of 
cure because he feared that § 506(b) would institute the contract 
rate. Indeed, ill-conceived dictum in the Ninth Circuit had stated so 
directly.388 Therefore, cure was apparently used by Judge Sneed to 
displ,ace § 506(b) as the operative theory of the case.389 Ironically, 
Rake v. Wade declared § 506(b) to be the theme of cure after all, 
ply ruled that the mortgage could have been modified through cram down. There was no sense 
in calling cram down a "cure," since there was no need to get past the antimodification rule of 
§ 1322(b)(2). 
""-' 850 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1988) (Sneed,].). 
""'; See id. at 1339. 
""; See id. 1342. 
""" Joseph F. Sanson Investment Co. v. 268 Ltd. (In re 268 Ltd.), 789 F.2d 674, 676 (9th 
Cir. 1986) (Goodwin, J.) (stating that interest under§ 506(b) should be at the contract rate 
regardless of whether it is reasonable). 
""" See Entz-White, 850 F.2d at 1343 n.7 (concluding that§ 1124(2) (C) compels payment of 
interest even if no equity cushion exists); cf. In re Johnson, 184 B.R. 570, 574 (Bankr. D. Minn. 
1995) (Dreher,].) (reading .Entz-White as assuming§ 506(b) governs cure claims, but that cure 
leads to lower predefault interest rate). · 
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thereby contradicting Entz-White, but Rake also implied that the ap-
propriate rate for use was the market rate. Congress in turn has 
overruled Rake in this regard, but by no means does it follow that 
Entz-White's definition of cure should govern. The 1994 enactment of 
§ 1123(d) only establishes that a cure price is to be calculated "not-
withstanding" § 506 (b). The question still remains open as to wheth-
er merely paying a creditor (without reinstating anything) is a cure. 
To summarize, if the idea is to prevent the postdefault interest rate 
from being charged, courts should define cure to require some 
degree of reinstatement (the opposite of Entz-White) and should rule 
that § 506(b) governs. Moreover, courts should hold that § 506(b) 
establishes the market rate, thereby disenfranchising the contract 
altogether. 
Another part of the 1994 amendments can be taken -to contra-
dict Entz-White. Prior to 1994, disimpairment meant either cure or 
paying the claim in cash. Congress eliminated the latter and kept 
the former. If Entz-White is the law, then congressional elimination of 
disimpairment through payment is utterly defeated. That is, if pay-
ment in full is cure, then payment in full is disimpairment, contrary 
to legislative desire. Hence, Congress must have intended that cure 
is more than just payment in full. Cure must require some element 
of reinstatement. For this additional reason the 1994 amendments 
should be viewed as overruling Entz-White. 
In Entz-White, Judge Sneed did not want to impose the default 
rate, but wished to honor Ninth Circuit dictum equating § 506(b) 
with the contract rate.390 Yet, in bowing down before this question-
able dictum, Judge Sneed ran up against a second Ninth Circuit 
case. In Seidel v. Larson (In re Seidel),391 Judge Jerome Farris ruled 
that, absent some reinstatement going forward, payment in full 
could not be viewed as cure. Hence, a chapter 13 debtor could not 
cure a fully mature home mortgage debt by paying it over the life of 
a chapter 13 plan. To do so would be to modify the mortgage in 
violation of§ 1322(b) (2).392 
To distinguish Seidel from Entz-White, Judge Sneed noted that 
the Seidel cure would have been paid over the life of a chapter 13 
990 See Entz-White 850 F.2d at 1343. 
391 752 F.2d 1382, 1383 (9th Cir. 1985). 
392 The violation of§ 1322(b)(2) by modifying a mortgage has been overruled by the 1994 
amendments. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(l) (1994). Accord, First National Fidelity Bank v. Perry, 
945 F.2d 61, 65, (3d Cir. 1991) (Stapleton,].). 
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plan. In Entz-White, the cure would be paid in cash. 393 On this basis, 
Sneed ruled that the Seidel situation did not represent a cure. Al-
though in Seidel Judge Farris emphasized the absence of reinstate-
ment as the disqualifying factor,394 Judge Sneed reinterpreted Seidel 
to mean that "cure" refers to cash payment-not deferred pay-
ment.395 On the reasoning of Entz-White, therefore, "cure" under 
§ 1322(b) (5) may be accomplished over a "reasonable time" because 
Congress modified "cure" with this extra clause. "Cure" simpliciter 
means present cash payment. 
The Entz-White definition of cure has been extended to absurd 
lengths in Casa Blanca Lenders, L.P. v. City Commerce Bank (In re Casa 
Blanca Lenders, L.P.).396 In this case, the debtor did not even pro-
pose a reorganization plan. Instead, the debtor sold collateral under 
§ 363 (b) and wished to surrender cash proceeds directly to the se-
cured party for payment in full. The secured party insisted on the 
postdefault interest rate, but Judge Sidney Volinn, on the strength of 
Entz-White's definition of "cure," ruled that the predefault rate could 
be used.397 
Section 1124(2) now indicates that a cure must be accomplished 
in a plan. Hence, payment before the confirmation of a plan could 
never be a cure. Nothing in § 363 authorizes cure.398 Furthermore, 
though the Casa Blanca Lenders opinion is not perfectly clear, it ap-
pears as if the secured claim was not fully mature, but rather an 
accelerated obligation. If so, to pay was to cure, even though the 
contract itself called for a schedule of future payments. Rather than 
engage in such interpretive difficulty, Judge Volinn should have 
ruled that§ 506(b) applied, and that§ 506(b) implies a market rate 
as opposed to a contract rate. This would have effectively avoided 
the unfair postdefault interest rate. Meanwhile, cure should imply 
"'' See Entz-White, 850 F.2d at 1342 . 
.,,. See Seide~ 752 F.2d at 1386. 
395 See Entz-White, 850 F.2d at 1341. 
3116 196 B.R. 140 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1996) (Volinn,J.). 
"'
7 See id. at 141. 
"''" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1124(2), 363 (1994).Judge Kathleen Lax remarked that, "one cannot, 
by its absence from the text of section 363, leap to the conclusion that 'cure' and any legal 
considerations Qased on the concept of cure have no application to the sale and consequent 
payment of obligations under section 363." In re 433 South Beverley Drive, 117 B.R 563, 566 
(Bankr. C.D7 Cal. 1990).Judge Lax noted that§ 365 refers to cure, thereby supposedly proving 
that cure exists outside the context of a chapter 11 plan. See id. Section 365, though, is a sec-
tion limited to executory contracts, not "executed" loan agreements. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 
(1994). 
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that a security agreement has been reinstated with regard to pay-
ment of interest and principal going fmward. 
IV. A COMPENSATORY THEORY OF CURE 
The incoherence of case law on cure can be attributed to the 
failure of the courts to develop a principled concept of what consti-
tutes "cure" of a default. At most, courts offered exampl,es of cure. 
Now, in an effort to clarify the issue, Congress has developed its own 
contractual theory. Yet this theory runs up against the fact that, 
where a contract too greedily demands entitlements upon default, 
the contract institutes a penalty and not a cure. 
Cure must therefore have a compensatory soul, in spite of the 
1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. In order to develop the 
Dorian Gray portrait relevant to this area of law, I offer the following 
principles. 
The cure of a loan agreement has as its goal reinstatement of 
the agreement going forward. Parties to the contract thus obtain the 
exact benefit of their bargain, as if no default had occurred and no 
bankruptcy petition had been filed. Cure implies that a debtor 
should be able to deaccelerate the loan and reestablish the sched-
uled payments as contemplated in the loan agreement. Of course, 
defaults have occurred. No remedy can retroactively change this 
historical fact. What remedies can do, however, is to make a creditor 
objectively indifferent to the fact of this history. 
A creditor should be entitled to compensation rendering the 
creditor indifferent to default. Thus, monetary amounts that became 
due in the ordinary course should now be paid as the price of the 
cure.399 Since the point of cure is deacceleration, the amounts due 
and owing must be calculated without regard to acceleration. Other-
wise, cure would swallow acceleration whole, leaving no future pay-
ment schedule to reinstate.400 
Because the idea is to render the creditor indifferent to the fact 
of default, the creditor should receive the interest compensation at 
market rate between the time of the default and the time the cure 
price is calculated.401 It may strike one as strange that market rates 
0!1!l See In re Cureton, 163 B.R. 494, 495-96 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994) (Spector,].). 
""" See Di Pierro v. Taddeo (In re Taddeo), 685 F.2d 24, 27 (2d Cir. 1982) (Lumbard, J.) . 
...,, See Jonathan S. Fields, Note, Taking Interest in a Cure: Compensation for Time Value of 
Chapter 13 Residential Mortgage Arrears, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 2119, 2130 (1992). In Cardinal Feder-
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of interest should be paid as part of cure, when cure is the price for 
reinstating a lower contractual rate of interest.402 The paradox, how-
ever, is a false· one. Reinstatement was premised on placing the se-
cured creditor in precisely the position she would have enjoyed had 
the contract never been breached. True, a default may be the failure 
to pay the contract rate of interest at some designated time in the 
past. But in order to reinstate the secured creditor to her precise 
economic position, it is necessary to commensurate the past default 
with present cure by employing a market rate of interest. The market 
rate is justified by the premise that, had the debtor actually paid 
when she was supposed to, the secured creditor could have reinvest-
ed the contractually-set interest payment in a market-rate investment 
vehicle. Thus, the market rate is totally consistent with reinstatement 
of the contractual rate of interest. 
It is sometimes argued that, when a contract does not call for 
interest on arrears, awarding such interest as part of cure constitutes 
a "modification" of the home mortgage agreement and therefore 
should be blocked by the antimodification rule of§ 1322(b)(2).403 
The easy answer to this challenge is that cure may be accomplished 
"notwithstanding"§ 1322(b)(2). Hence, the antimodification rule is 
incompetent to block a compensatory theory of cure. · 
Loan agreements often impose a higher postdefault rate of 
interest upon debtors. Again, the spirit of cure and reinstatement is 
to return the secured creditor to the position that she would have 
occupied had no defaults been sustained and no bankruptcy petition 
filed. Hence, cure should ignore any postdefault terms and any liqui- , 
dated damage clause. Instead, only the ordinary course payments, 
al Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Cokgrove (In re Cokgrove), 771 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1985),Judge Harry 
Wellford ruled that the market rate at the time a secured claim was allowed should be used. 
See id. at 123. But the idea of cure (as presented here) is to make the creditor whole at the 
time of reaffirmation, so that no losses are felt from past breaches and the contract flows into 
the future. This suggests that only the prevailing rate at the time of reaffirmation should 
count. 
Although compensation implies market rates of interest to commensurate past monetary 
defaults and the present price of cure, it does not imply that attorneys' fees should be paid 
unless the contract or local law makes this part of the state-law remedy. In other words, where 
state law follows the traditional American rule that each side bears the cost of her own attor-
ney, the rule should apply to the concept of cure as well. See In re Small, 65 B.R. 686, 693 
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (Scholl,].), affd, 76 B.R. 390 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (Schapiro,].). 
'
02 See Cokgrove, 771 F.2d at 124 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting) (posing this point as a para-
dox). 
"'" See Shearson Lehman Mortgage Corp. v. Laguna (In re Laguna), 114 B.R. 214, 217-18 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) (Perris,].), affd, 944 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1991) (Leavy,J.). 
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supplemented by market rates of interest, may be included in the 
ideal cure price. 
Many loan agreements require the debtor to pay what§ 506(b) 
calls "fees, costs, or charges" related to enforcement of the loan 
agreement.404 Any such fee, cost, or charge that constitutes an out-
of-pocketloss to the creditor should be included in the cure price, 
to the extent that the contract requires the debtor to reimburse the 
creditor for such expenses. Interest compensation on these losses 
should likewise be added to the cure price. In fact, a compensatory 
theory requires compensation for attorneys' fees and the like even if 
the contract does not so specify, because the idea is to make credi-
tors indifferent to the fact of default as the price of reinstatement. 
Such fees should be reasonable, of course, under the ordinary miti-
gation principles that temper the tyrrany of damages. 
At a time certain, the trustee or debtor will have calculated a 
single cure price, composed of ordinary course principal and inter-
est payments (whether falling due before or after the bankruptcy 
petition), out-of-pocket losses for which the debtor is contractually 
bound to pay, and market rates of interest on the above amounts, to 
render the creditor indifferent to the fact of default. This lump sum 
price is what the debtor must pay to exercise the right to reinstate 
the loan agreement. 
As of when must this price be paid? In order to reconcile the 
above theory of cure with the existing reorganization chapters, I 
propose that, in chapter 11 cases, the debtor in possession or trustee 
must pay cash on the effective date of the plan. In chapters 12 and 
13, the debtor may pay the cure price over the life of the plan. The 
rationale for this distinction is that the cure price is a postpetition 
expenditure made at the option of the trustee or debtor in order to 
exercise the privilege of reinstatement. In this respect, the cure price 
represents an administrative expense. Therefore, payment terms 
should match the terms under which any other administrative ex-
pense must be paid. 
In chapter 11, administrative claims must be paid in cash on the 
effective date of the plan.405 In chapters 12 and 13, administrative 
claims may be paid over the life of the plan406 (i.e., over three to 
404 11 U.S.C. § 506(B) (1994). 
"'
15 See 11 u.s.c. § 1129(a)(9) (1994). 
'
06 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(a)(2), 1322(a)(2) (1994). 
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five years) .407 These rules should be borrowed to govern payment 
of the cure price. Currently, §§ 1222(b) (5) and 1322(b) (5) permit 
the cure price to be paid over "a reasonable time." 408 This phrase 
is opaque and is in any case usually interpreted to mean the cure 
price is to be paid over the life of the chapter 12 or 13 plan.409 
The Bankruptcy Code should make explicit what a great many courts 
are doing anyway. 
If the cure price is paid on the above terms, then the loan 
agreement is reinstated. In chapter 11, the effect of reinstatement 
ought to be that the secured creditor is deemed unimpaired. As 
such, the secured creditor is deemed to be an affirmative vote on 
the plan for cram down purposes. In other words, the secured party 
is not entitled to bring any cram down objections to confirmation, 
even if the present value of the cure price and the reinstatement is 
less than the value of the collateral. This effect of cure and reaffir-
mation accords with current law. 
At this point, it is important to remember that cure is an adjunct 
to reinstatement. Cure is merely the price a debtor must pay for the 
privilege of reinstatement - .it has no independent life. If a loan 
agreement is already mature according to its terms, there is nothing 
to reinstate and cure becomes irrelevant. A creditor in such a posi-
tion is entitled to vote and thereby to trigger cram down protections. 
Note that this last suggestion does constitute a reversal of at least 
some case law which interprets "cure" as including the payoff of a 
claim already due and owing, without regard to acceleration.410 On 
the view being offered here, the point of cure would be the perfor-
mance· of some act of deacceleration. 
In chapters 12 and 13, a reinstated claim should prevent the 
secured creditor from claiming any cram down protections under 
§ 1222(a) or § 1322(a). Because the premise of cure and reinstate-
ment is the absolute indifference of the creditor to the fact of de-
fault and bankruptcy, the creditor should have no standing to object 
to the confirmation of the plan, so long as the cure price has been 
correctly calculated and dealt with in the plan. This suggestion sides 
with the 1994 amendments against Rake v. Wade,411 but would ex-
407 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(c), 1322(d) (1994). 
4
°" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(b) (5), 1322(b)(5) (1994). 
•
09 See supra notes 344-56 and accompanying text. 
410 See supra notes 145-56 and accompanying text. 
411 508 U.S. 464 (1993) (Thomas,].). 
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tend these amendments, which now excuse compliance only with 
§ 1222(a) (5) and § 1322(a) (5). These cram down provisions relate 
only to secured claims. An undersecured creditor holding an unse-
cured deficit claim should likewise be incapable of asserting any 
cram down protection under§ 1222(a) (4) or§ 1322(a) (4), since the 
undersecured creditor will be rendered indifferent to the fact of 
plan confirmation. 412 
The option to cure and reinstate must eventually come to an 
end. Prior to 1994, the case law was fiercely divided on this question. 
Some courts equated the right to cure with the debtor's continued 
ownership in the collateral, though such an equation is by no means 
logically compelled.413 Other courts reasoned that, if a judgment 
had- been rendered, the contract merged with the judgment and 
could no longer be revived.414 The 1994 amendments declared that 
cure may be accomplished at least until a foreclosure sale has oc-
curred. 415 This is already being read to mean that cure after the 
foreclosure sale is impossible.416 A better rule would focus on in-
convenience to third parties. Thus, when a foreclosure sale involving 
a third party buyer has occurred, the trustee or debtor may not cure 
the contract and deprive the buyer of the collateral. But, where the 
creditor still owns the collateral as the result of a bid-in sale, cure 
should still be possible.417 Merger-a state law concept-should not 
govern the federal policy of cure and reinstatement. Thus, when a 
bid-in sale has occurred the same instinct that leads to rejecting the 
judgment of foreclosure as the deadline also leads to rejecting the 
sale as the deadline. This is especially so because bid-in sales are so 
notoriously abusive in consumer contexts. Even bid-in buyers pay 
cash to some degree-,-such as when retiring senior liens or reim-
bursing the sheriff. Debtors or trustees should be required to reim-
burse the bid-in buyer for these amounts before a contract can be 
412 In this respect, it may be noted that new§ l 123(d) indicates that cure is "notwithstand• 
ing section 1129(a)(7)"-the "best interest of the creditors" test. 11 U.S.C. § 1123(d) (1994). 
No such exception exists in the chapter 12 and 13 analogs. Congress should make clear that 
the "best interest" test is repealed in these chapters whenever a loan agreement is cured and 
reinstated. 
413 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
414 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
4
"' See supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
416 See supra note 169-70 and accompanying text. 
417 See Barry L. Zaretsky, Some Limits on Mortgagees' Rights in Chapter 13, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 
433, 449-50 (1984) (arguing for this position). 
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reinstated. 
To summarize, the difference between the pure compensatory 
theory being proposed here and the R.ake v. Wade theory relying on 
§ 506(b) and § 1325(a) (5) is ,that the compensatory theory would 
apply to over- and undersecured creditors alike. Sections 506(b) and 
1325(a) (5) apply only to oversecured creditors, leaving no theory of 
cure for undersecured creditors. The difference between a compen-
satory theory and the contractual theory adopted in the 1994 
amendments is that under the former, courts can ignore default 
penalties and postdefault interest rates called for in the contract. 
This view comports with the current structure of the Bankruptcy 
Code's governance of allowed claims. Cure is not a secured claim 
when the collateral is insufficient to cover both the cure price and 
principal not yet due under the reinstated agreement. Neither can 
cure be considered a prepetition unsecured claim under § 502 (b), 
because cure includes both prepetition and postpetition 
amounts.418 Finally, a cure cannot be viewed, strictly speaking, as a 
postpetition administrative claim,419 since cure includes prepetition 
defaults. Administrative claims refer to postpetition expenses 
only.420 To be sure, cure has an .administrative odor to it. Cure is 
the price that a debtor or trustee must pay to reinstate a loan agree-
ment. As such, the trustee or debtor chooses to incur the price 
postpetition. Cure, in a sense, resembles cross-collateralization terms 
in postpetition loans, where, as the price for the loan, the trustee 
agrees to pay prepetition amounts. Increasingly, these loan agree-
ments are being treated as illegitimate, because they straddle the 
postpetition-prepetition distinction inherent in administrative 
claims.421 Obviously, cure (expressly so in chapter 11)422 is invited 
to breach this gap. Cure is best viewed as a sui generis charge volun-
tarily undertaken by a debtor in order to buy the privilege of rein-
••• Section 502 includes various "late" claims as exceptions to this rule. None is relevant 
here. See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1994). 
•
111 See 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1994). 
•
20 Section 503(b)(l)(A) implies this by emphasizing that expenses must be "the actual, 
necessary costs and expenses of preseIVing the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (l)(A) (1994). The 
existence of the estate implies the postpetition time period. 
m See Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co. (In re Saybrook Mfg. Co.), 963 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 
1992) (Cox, J.); David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Security Interests Under the Bankruptcy Code, 48 
Bus. LAW. 483, 497-505 (1993); Charles Jordan Tabb, Requiem for Cross-Collateraliz.ation, 2 J. 
BANKR. LAW & PRAC. 109, 154-55 (1993) . 
.., See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (A) (1994). 
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statement. Cure, therefore, should be accorded the same treatment 
as are administrative claims. 
So ends my catechism on what Congress ought to do. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Reinstatement of security agreements is an important concept in 
bankruptcy reorganization. It is particularly important in chapters 11 
and 13, where reinstatement is the only means by which a debtor 
can hold on to her home once she has defaulted on her mortgage. 
Reinstatement, however, implies cure of past defaults. Whereas 
courts had been divided over whether cure was a compensatory (i.e., 
"tort") concept or a contract concept, the Supreme Court, in Rake v. 
Wade,423 adopted a third view-that§ 506(b) and § 1325(a) (5) gov-
erned the cure price. Congress, however, has intervened by shifting 
bankruptcy jurisprudence back to the contract theory. The 1994 
amendments make clear that, for the most part, the contract is to 
govern the notion of cure. 424 This legislative initiative is unfortu-
nate, because many debtors will have a reduced incentive to protect 
their future unsecured creditors from secured creditor depredations 
in a prepetition agreement. It may now be expected that, in the 
name of cure, secured creditors will load on all sorts of expensive 
placebos and aroma therapies in order to obtain cure at the highest 
level of contractual luxury. 
A better theory of cure and reinstatement would be to make 
cure purely compensatory and federally preemptive. Under such a 
theory, a creditor would be stuck with the bargain actually struck 
with the debtor, but the creditor would be rendered indifferent to 
the occurrence of bankruptcy, given the bargain. The means of 
rendering the creditor indifferent would be to award market rates of 
interest on all monetary defaults. This interest compensation would 
start to accrue when the monetary default occurs and would contin-
ue until the time the cure price is calculated. If the debtor proposes 
to pay the cure price over time, market rates must be used again to 
assure that the present value of payment over time precisely equals 
the cure price. 
423 508 U.S. 464 (1993). 
424 The only exception is that federal law imposes the deadline of sale on the power to 
cure. See supra notes 161-77 and accompanying text. 
